Publication
Strategy for the “Albanization” of the Christian heritage of the South Caucasus: Geopolitical objectives and mechanisms
ARVAK Center comment, October 05, 2026[1]
1. Introduction and the relevance of the “Albanian project”
The events unfolding in recent months clearly demonstrate the Azerbaijani leadership’s complete focus on promoting the so-called “Albanian issue”. Baku seeks to turn this issue into an effective political lever for reshaping the balance of power in the South Caucasus and finally establishing its own regional hegemony. To this end, the Azerbaijani authorities have launched a large-scale inventory of the “material and cultural heritage of Caucasian Albania,” into which Christian architectural sites belonging exclusively to the Armenian and Georgian historical and cultural spheres are being artificially fitted.
At the same time, the Azerbaijani side is intensively working to build an ideological and political foundation intended to ensure the recreation of “Albanian autocephaly”. In Baku’s view, this structure should receive official recognition from the global Christian community.
ARVAK Center has repeatedly analyzed the steps taken by the Azerbaijani authorities – both domestically and internationally – to legitimize this historically anachronistic and spiritually and canonically untenable concept. In particular, the comments [1, 2] examined in detail the instrumentalization of the small Udi ethnic group in large-scale political combinations, as well as attempts to involve influential global Christian centers (the Vatican and the Patriarchate of Constantinople) in this process. The Center also predicted the inevitable escalation of these efforts against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) and the authorities of the Republic of Armenia.
2. International-diplomatic escalation and pressure on Armenia
The validity of ARVAK’s analytical forecasts has been confirmed: the autumn events of 2026 were marked by the shift of Azerbaijan’s claims concerning the “Albanian issue” into the international-diplomatic sphere, accompanied by direct pressure on Yerevan and the presentation of tough demands. The peak period of this informational and political escalation was September. In particular on September 12, 2026, the Administration of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan initiated a visit by heads of diplomatic missions and representatives of international organizations to the ancient Armenian monastery of Gandzasar, located in Nagorno-Karabakh. The guests were shown so-called “evidence” of alleged Armenian falsifications concerning the site’s origins, while narratives about the “appropriation” and “Armenianization” of the cultural and historical heritage of Caucasian Albania were simultaneously promoted.
Following this, on September 22, 2026, the State Service for the Protection, Development and Restoration of Azerbaijan’s Cultural Heritage announced the inclusion in the INTERPOL international database of cultural heritage items removed from the Artsakh monastery of Dadivank in November 2020. The head of the agency, Sabina Gadzhiyeva, stated that Baku had initiated this procedure as early as 2025 in response to the alleged “theft” and “illegal transit” to Armenia of frescoes, khachkars, and bells removed from the complex, which the Azerbaijani side presented as elements of an “authentic Albanian-Christian tradition”. Gadzhiyeva emphasized Baku’s intention to consistently defend this position in all international structures and seek a systemic resolution of the issue, asserting that the claims cover not only the cultural objects of Dadivank but the entire body of the historical and architectural heritage of Caucasian Albania in Karabakh.
Furthermore, on September 28, 2026, at the UN headquarters in New York, during the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, the Baku Initiative Group (BIG) and participants of the conference “The Right to Return and Decolonization” addressed a joint appeal to UN special rapporteurs. In addition to calling for assistance in the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia within the framework of the “Western Azerbaijan” concept, the document includes a demand to “ensure the protection and preservation of cultural, religious, and historical heritage on the territory of Armenia”, including “Christian monuments of Caucasian Albania”.
During the period under review, more than 10 different forums, seminars, and public events devoted to the “Albanian issue” were held in Azerbaijan. Their key objectives were declared to be preventing the “Armenianization” of the Christian heritage (both tangible and intangible) of Caucasian Albania, as well as revising the international academic discourse on the history of South Caucasian Christianity. According to the Azerbaijani organizers, international researchers, following Armenian authors, distort the picture of historical processes and diminish the significant contribution of the Albanian Church to the formation of the region’s cultural and civilizational foundation.
In particular, on September 22, 2026, in Baku, a special “Working Group for the Study of the Cultural Heritage of Caucasian Albania on the Territory of Modern Armenia” was established under the structure known as the “Western Azerbaijan Community” (WAC). The group’s activities focus on studying Armenian monasteries, churches, and chapels, with mandatory examination of their inscriptions and architecture on the basis of archival sources; its declared key objective is the “inclusion of the region’s multilayered religious and cultural heritage in the context of the history and culture of Azerbaijanis”.
On the eve of this event, on September 21, 2026, actions organized by the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism of Azerbaijan were held in Baku on the topic “The Heritage of Caucasian Albania in the History of Azerbaijani Statehood”. Scholars, representatives of state bodies, civil society activists, and religious leaders took part in the discussions. In their statements, they unanimously criticized the “centuries-long practice of the Armenian side and the AAC of appropriating and distorting the historical and cultural heritage of the Caucasian Albanians”. Participants announced the launch of an initiative to restore “historical justice”, emphasizing that the program for the “restoration” of Albanian heritage should also extend to monuments located directly within the borders of the Republic of Armenia.
Furthermore, on September 23, 2026, a seminar entitled “Albanian Heritage in Western Azerbaijan”, organized by the National Forum of Azerbaijani NGOs (NFANGO), was held in Baku. According to the APA news agency, historians, archaeologists, public figures, and NGO leaders participated in the event. The organizers emphasized that the key objective of the meeting was to “highlight a strategically important milestone in history – the Albanian Christian heritage in Western Azerbaijan”. During the presentations, claims were made that major Armenian spiritual centers, including Tatev, Goshavank, Noravank, and Aruch, in fact represent monuments of Albanian architecture. On this basis, it was argued that Baku must seek the “restoration of historical truth” and the return to the Azerbaijani people of the heritage of their “ancestors” – the Caucasian Albanians. The seminar concluded with the assertion: “The heritage of Caucasian Albania is an integral element of the ethnogenesis, cultural memory, and statehood of Azerbaijan”.
Similar “informational and educational” campaigns were also organized at numerous Azerbaijani universities. Their official objective was to immerse students and young people generally in the history of the Azerbaijani people and to popularize the concept of “reviving historical and political justice distorted by the Armenian Church, scholars, and state officials”.
Consequently, the Azerbaijani side is displaying unprecedented intensity in promoting the “Albanian issue”, turning it into a key vector of its state strategy. The main specificity of the current stage is that Baku has taken this campaign far beyond its previous boundaries. Previously, its actions were largely limited to the pseudo-Albanization of authentic Armenian Christian architecture directly in Nagorno-Karabakh – where, following the exodus of the Armenian population after the escalations of 2020 and 2023, conditions emerged for direct control over the monuments of Artsakh, followed by the reconstruction or elimination of sites that contradicted the official “Albanian concept” – whereas the claims have now acquired a different scale.
3. Expansion of claims to Georgian heritage
The doctrine of “consolidating Albanian heritage” formulated by the Azerbaijani authorities has substantially expanded the geographical scope of their overt political claims. The “Albanian narrative” has been transformed: it has moved beyond the framework of seeking a domestic national identity and become an international and regional issue with a pronounced geopolitical subtext. The expansion of Baku’s narratives has not merely crossed the boundaries of the Karabakh cultural area and targeted a revision of Armenian heritage within the borders of the Republic of Armenia but has also encompassed the indigenous Georgian historical and civilizational heritage.
In September 2026, relations between official Baku and the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) again deteriorated. The immediate cause of the latest dispute was archaeological excavations conducted near the Church of St. George in Kurmukhi (Gakh District of Azerbaijan) without coordination with the Georgian Patriarchate. Official Tbilisi regards this church and the adjoining lands as part of the historical Georgian region of Hereti (Saingilo), where an indigenous Georgian population – the Ingiloys – still lives today. Azerbaijani historical narratives, however, assign this region to the heritage of Caucasian Albania and the site itself to the “Albanian Church”. Representatives of the GOC strongly criticized Azerbaijan’s “restoration and archaeological works” in Kurmukhi, stating that the use of heavy construction equipment near the church walls serves fundamentally different purposes.
In response to the GOC’s demarche, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry reacted sharply: the Azerbaijani side accused the Georgian Patriarchate of latent territorial claims associated with the mention of the ancient toponym “Hereti”. The Baku ministry called on the Georgian clergy “not to repeat the mistakes of the Armenian Church”, while separately stating that all historical and architectural monuments within the borders of Azerbaijan constitute its exclusive national heritage.
Georgia’s expert community viewed the Azerbaijani statements as a veiled threat and an attempt to employ the same instruments of historical revisionism that had previously been tested in Armenian Artsakh. According to their assessments, Baku’s actions around Kurmukhi follow the same logic as its approach to the Armenian monuments of Nagorno-Karabakh (including Gandzasar, Dadivank, Amaras, the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral, and other Christian sanctuaries). Having declared these sites to be part of Albanian Christianity, Azerbaijan proceeded with “restoration” aimed at distorting and neutralizing their authentic architectural and historical appearance.
These events triggered active discussions in Georgian society and political circles about the mistaken nature of the long-term strategy of concessions and restraint toward Baku and Ankara. According to its critics, such an approach allowed neighboring states to interpret history freely and advance claims to Georgian Christian heritage. The debate concerns not only Georgian religious sites in the Gakh and Zaqatala districts of Azerbaijan, but also monuments on the territory of Georgia itself, including the major David-Gareja monastery complex in the Sagarejo municipality of Kakheti.
For more than 20 years, Baku has questioned Tbilisi’s historical and administrative-political rights to the David-Gareja monastery complex and the adjacent lands. Because of this protracted territorial dispute, the process of delimiting and demarcating the border, presumed to run along the ridge of hills in the area of the monastery, remains frozen indefinitely. Nevertheless, without waiting for decisions by the joint intergovernmental commissions, the Azerbaijani side unilaterally deployed border posts and strongpoints at strategically advantageous locations within the complex. As a result, Georgian clergy and pilgrims lost the opportunity to visit the churches and sanctuaries of David-Gareja, to which Baku has asserted its own claims.
In Georgian society, which is deeply sensitive to questions of national identity and religious values, public indignation at the actions of the country’s leadership is steadily growing. Citizens express dissatisfaction with political elites that, since the “Rose Revolution”, have built a framework of interaction with Azerbaijan that infringes upon the principles of equality and mutual compromise.
In the view of numerous representatives of Georgian society and political groups adhering to principles of Christian traditionalism and Georgia-centered nationalism, the official authorities in Tbilisi have long ignored the problem of Baku’s systematic claims to Georgia’s cultural and historical heritage. This permissiveness, driven by economic expansion and energy dependence on Azerbaijan, allowed the Baku authorities to freely promote a distorted interpretation of regional history. As a result, such restraint led Azerbaijan to move the issue of Albanian ethnocultural identity into an exclusively political sphere, laying the groundwork for potential encroachment on Georgian sovereignty. This scenario appears to be a well-founded threat to the active part of society. Against this backdrop, the Georgian Orthodox Church remains the only institution offering real resistance to Azerbaijan’s strategy, yet it clearly lacks the political instruments and resources necessary for containment. A familiar but no less paradoxical situation has emerged: while the Georgian Patriarchate engages in direct and uncompromising polemics with Azerbaijan’s state and diplomatic structures, Georgia’s leadership refrains from taking tough measures, evidently fearing a direct confrontation scenario with Baku.
4. Timing and geopolitical context
Consequently, Baku’s intensification of activity around the “Albanian issue” has reached its peak. Employing manipulative methods and plagiarism, Azerbaijan is conducting a systematic inventory and asserting claims to the “inheritance” of the material and spiritual heritage of the region’s ancient Christian cultures. At the same time, the spatial and temporal scope of Baku’s claims extends far beyond the geopolitical and historical boundaries of the small South Caucasian kingdom that, more than a thousand years ago, rapidly lost its sovereignty, ethnocultural identity, and civilizational distinctiveness under the pressure of Islamic expansion.
The timing of the current escalation of Baku’s activity has been calculated with great precision. The practice of “Albanization” of Armenian cultural, historical, and architectural sites in Artsakh showed the Azerbaijani authorities that supranational and international structures are limited to passive reactions or fail to notice such steps altogether. At the same time, the global scientific and academic community lacks effective institutional instruments to block state policies of falsifying history and disseminating pseudoscientific concepts.
Having become convinced of its impunity in appropriating Armenian civilizational heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku seeks to extend the same practice to Armenian Christian monuments within the Republic of Armenia itself. If it proves impossible to immediately establish rights over these sites, the key objective of the first stage is at least to artificially introduce the thesis that their ownership is allegedly “disputed”.
In addition, the choice of the moment for intensifying Baku’s policy was directly influenced by the deep crisis in relations between the Armenian Apostolic Church and Armenia’s highest leadership. Having come under serious institutional and political pressure domestically, and facing risks of centrifugal processes in certain dioceses, the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin has been forced to divert attention and resources away from countering external threats. Baku has deliberately exploited this factor, although the strategy of “Albanizing” the Christian cultural heritage of the South Caucasus – and above all Armenian spiritual and material assets – was developed by the Azerbaijani authorities long before the emergence of internal tensions around the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin.
At the same time, Baku regarded the current moment as the most favorable for advancing similar claims to Georgian Christian heritage in the South Caucasus. This is explained by objective factors: the position and patriarchal authority of the newly elected Catholicos-Patriarch Shio III have not yet become sufficiently consolidated to effectively withstand Azerbaijani pressure. As a result, the GOC has limited ability to influence the formation of a model of relations between Tbilisi and Baku that would allow disputes over Christian sanctuaries to be settled with maximum consideration for the interests of the Patriarchate and the sentiments of Georgian believers.
Earlier, in its May 23, 2026, publication ARVAK Center examined in detail the multifaceted pressure exerted on Georgia’s new Catholicos-Patriarch, both from within the state and by key global actors. At the same time, it was forecast that for Shio III, the need to resolve complex interstate disputes concerning the ownership of religious complexes along the Azerbaijan-Georgia border would become a serious test. The simulation of research and restoration activities around the Church of St. George in Hereti was, from Baku’s perspective, a kind of reconnaissance in force: the Azerbaijani authorities sought to gauge the possible steps of the Georgian Patriarchate and the newly elected primate personally in order to formulate an optimal strategy for imposing their “Albanian concept” on Tbilisi.
5. Plans to establish an “Albanian Catholicosate”
Based on these trends, Baku’s inevitable next step within the campaign to “Albanize” the Christian heritage of the South Caucasus will be an attempt to establish a so-called “Albanian Catholicosate”. The Azerbaijani side’s intentions are reinforced by active public discussions within the country concerning the alleged “revival” of autocephaly which, according to Baku, was abolished by Armenians with the assistance of the Russian Empire. For example, at the above-mentioned event organized by the Center for Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism on “The Heritage of Caucasian Albania in the History of Azerbaijani Statehood”, Ramil Agaev, PhD in Historical Sciences and Head of the Department at the Institute of History and Ethnology of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, has directly stated that “the formation of a Catholicosate in Caucasian Albania is one of the important issues”.
ARVAK publications have previously examined Baku’s efforts to legitimize the project of “recreating” the “Albanian Catholicosate”. Following the military resolution of the Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijani side has systematically sought to obtain a Tomos (of Autocephaly) from one of the key centers of global Christianity, since such a step is a mandatory canonical requirement. According to Azerbaijani sources, Baku held negotiations with the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople (Phanar) and established close dialogue with the Vatican, hoping for their assistance in recognizing the “new see”. Unofficial contacts on this agenda continue to this day, and some progress by the Azerbaijani side cannot be ruled out, which partly explains the recent surge of attention to the “Albanian issue” in Azerbaijan.
6. Systemic vulnerabilities and canonical insolvency
Despite Baku’s apparent successes in artificially inflaming the “Albanian issue”, thereby exerting pressure on Armenia and Georgia, as well as in promoting systematic scholarly and historical falsifications, this state strategy contains fundamentally vulnerable elements. First and foremost is the virtual absence of the necessary flock on which, and for the sake of which, the idea of Albanian autocephaly would have to be built. The Christian Udi population living in Azerbaijan, regarded as descendants of one of the many tribes of ancient Caucasian Albania, cannot serve as such a foundation either in terms of numbers or in terms of its qualitative composition.
In the village of Nij – the only compact settlement of Udis in Azerbaijan – there are no more than 3,000 people. They previously followed the canons of the AAC, but under severe state pressure and the influence of Azerbaijani chauvinism they were forced to depart from this tradition; today, their religious practice is essentially reduced to a substrate of predominantly symbolic and ethnic attributes of the Christian faith. Approximately 4,000 ethnic Udis live in Baku and Absheron, and another 10,000 or so in Russia; however, these groups are subject to rapid assimilation and have practically lost their linguistic, cultural, and spiritual connection with their roots. Being on the verge of complete disappearance, the Udi ethnic group appears to be a disproportionately weak “flock” for such a large-scale structure as Baku is attempting to substantiate on the appropriated Armenian and Georgian spiritual heritage.
The main vulnerability of the Baku initiative lies in its violation of centuries-old church traditions, which calls into question the possibility of such claims being accepted by the Universal Church. Contrary to the assertions of Azerbaijani propaganda, the historical Albanian Church did not possess a separate national authenticity and remained strictly within the canonical field of the Armenian Apostolic Church. This substantially complicates the issuance of a Tomos of Autocephaly by leading Christian centers, both Greek Orthodox and Latin Catholic. And although questions of the canonical legitimacy of the “Albanian Church” may appear secondary to Baku, it is precisely this disregard for tradition that may ultimately lead to the rejection of the project by a significant part of the Christian world.
Another significant problem for Azerbaijan remains the contradictory nature of its policy of “Albanizing” Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Artsakh and the surrounding territories. On the one hand, official Baku publicly declares Christian sanctuaries to be its heritage; on the other, it destroys a number of sites or removes crosses and other Christian symbols from them. Such incompatibility of actions exposes the absence of a coherent state policy in this sphere and clearly points to the political subtext of Baku’s entire initiative. Within this geopolitical game, “Albanian identity” serves exclusively as a lever of pressure on neighboring countries, while the declining Udi ethnic group becomes a hostage of the program that has been launched.
7. Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Azerbaijani leadership’s strategy of “Albanizing” the Christian heritage of the South Caucasus represents an overt geopolitical adventure. Nevertheless, Baku apparently recognizes the low feasibility of actually alienating the sanctuaries, proclaiming autocephaly, and legally consolidating claims to the sovereignty of Armenia and Georgia. The calculation is that the large-scale propaganda campaign surrounding this issue itself becomes an effective mechanism of psychological and political influence on neighboring countries. Regardless of the further fate of the “Albanian project”, the Azerbaijani authorities have already become convinced of the effectiveness of this lever of pressure on the socio-political climate and the actions of the authorities of Armenia and Georgia in the context of their relations with Azerbaijan.
[1] The original (in Rus.) was posted on our website on 05.10.2026.
