Georgia and the indivisibility of the South Caucasus
ARVAK Center comment, 05.09.2025[1]
Analysis of the situation
In late August, discussions in Georgia were once again re-actualized regarding how Western countries sought to compel Tbilisi to initiate a so-called “second front” against Russia, which, in parallel with the Ukrainian front, was intended to deplete Moscow and disperse its military resources. In particular, on August 26, 2025, the General Secretary of the ruling party “Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia” and Mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, issued a resonant statement. According to him, direct “threats, blackmail, and insults” were articulated in the Georgian Prime Minister’s office at the time. Kaladze pledged to publish evidence of this if necessary[2].
Since the beginning of Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine (February 24, 2022), Georgian authorities have repeatedly stated that the EU, the Biden Administration, and indeed, official Kyiv have been exerting permanent pressure on Tbilisi on this matter. This was stated at various times by former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili[3] (2021–2024), his successor Irakli Kobakhidze[4], and the founder of the “Georgian Dream” party himself, Bidzina Ivanishvili[5], who is considered the de facto leader of the republic and the main opponent of pro-Western factions in Georgia. The current statement by the General Secretary of the ruling party is notable because he for the first time revealed the existence of specific evidence, which suggests that the Georgian side prudently recorded the scandalous negotiations in the “Prime Minister’s office”. It should be assumed that the publication of these materials could seriously undermine the image of a “peace-loving and democratic” West and also influence the paradigm of the current U.S.–Russia relations, which, at least on a declarative level, are seeking ways to de-escalate tensions in Eastern Europe.
Geopolitical context & Georgia’s countermeasures
In light of the above, Kaladze’s statement can be interpreted as a counter-blackmail in response to EU threats to annul the visa-free regime with Georgia, which was established in 2017. Earlier, on July 15, 2025, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, issued an ultimatum to Tbilisi demanding that by August 31, 2025, it must repeal the new “Law on Foreign Agents” and annul the legislative package “On Family Values and the Protection of Minors”, which is seen as infringing on the rights of LGBTQ+ people. Otherwise, Brussels promised to “take appropriate measures on the basis of Article 8 of the Visa Regulation, in particular, to activate the suspension mechanism of the visa-free regime”[6]. In a broader sense, the EU’s cancellation of the visa-free regime with Georgia would outline the prospect of the EU withdrawing from the “Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area”, which is a key stage on this South Caucasus republic’s path to integration into a unified Europe.
Kaladze’s warning regarding Tbilisi’s readiness to disseminate the aforementioned materials, coupled with his assurances that such action is presently unnecessary, may suggest Georgia’s confidence that the EU will not revoke the visa-free regime upon the expiration of the ultimatum. Furthermore, merely days before the ultimatum’s deadline, Georgian authorities conspicuously confiscated the bank accounts of several prominent NGOs under the EU’s patronage, accusing them of “actions against the constitutional order”. This diplomatic gesture by Tbilisi can be construed as a demonstration of disregard for Brussels and its admonitions. It is probable that the current Georgian authorities possess ample justification to anticipate that the EU and the Donald Trump administration, which has expressed solidarity on this matter, will not escalate beyond their current warnings. Even pro-Western Georgian political figures and experts concede that a consensus within a unified Europe on the Georgian issue is absent, with a number of EU member states unequivocally opposing drastic measures against “recalcitrant” Tbilisi. Therefore, it was clear long before Kallas’s ultimatum that Brussels, at least for now, was not ready for radical countermeasures.
Consequently, it can be posited that the impactful declaration by the “Georgian Dream” Secretary General, which alluded to coercion regarding a “second front”, was directed not solely, and perhaps not primarily, at the collective West, but also at other regional nations of interest to the United States, and particularly to the United Kingdom and the European Union, within the framework of strategies to orchestrate a new proxy conflict against the Russian Federation. While Georgia has unequivocally declined involvement in such an undertaking, Tbilisi possesses a clear comprehension that another locus of anti-Russian sentiment is emerging in the region, seemingly being deliberately fomented by the aforementioned Western centers.
The approaching “second front” & the parties’ reactions
It is noteworthy that discussions in Tbilisi regarding the “second front” have intensified amidst the peak of the crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Significantly, the Secretary General of Georgia’s ruling party reiterated concerns about the West’s alleged desire to draw the South Caucasus into a destructive conflict merely one day prior to Ilham Aliyev’s forceful anti-Russian declarations. On August 27, 2025, during an interview with the Arabic-language TV channel Al-Arabiya, Aliyev accused Soviet Russia of occupying Azerbaijan in 1920, asserting that this historical event is the genesis of the “Zangezur Corridor”[7] problem. This was not merely a historical overview but a pointed suggestion that Russia is purportedly a historically “occupying country”. As substantiation, Aliyev directly characterized Russia’s current actions in Ukraine as an “invasion”.
Tbilisi appears to believe that a “second front” is rapidly forming through Azerbaijan, a development that Western actors had previously been unable to establish along the Russian-Georgian border. It is noteworthy that, unlike the winter of 2024–2025, when the situation stabilized somewhat after a political and diplomatic crisis concerning the downing of the AZAL aircraft, the current conflict is escalating. This is further substantiated by the absence of bilateral discussions between Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China, an opportunity they could have utilized if there were a genuine mutual desire to de-escalate the situation. While some Russian media outlets have suggested that Aliyev attempted such discussions[8], these claims are questionable, particularly given that the Azerbaijani leader seemingly deliberately scheduled his essentially Russophobic interview with Al-Arabiya just days before the summit in Tianjin, China.
Nevertheless, the trajectory of the crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations has so far been managed by Moscow and Baku. Both sides retain room for maneuver and the possibility of de-escalation as long as the “Declaration on Allied Interaction between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan” of February 22, 2022, remains in force de jure[9]. However, observers in the expert community fear that the situation could reach a point of bifurcation where control over events is lost. This could be facilitated primarily by Azerbaijan’s partners and allies in the West, as well as by Turkey and Israel, all of whom exert significant influence on Baku’s foreign policy maneuvers.
The threat of the South Caucasus’s indivisibility
According to the virtually unanimous opinion of independent experts, Aliyev’s regime, due to objective and subjective reasons, is more dependent on external interference than the “Georgian Dream” party, which is in power in Georgia. Azerbaijan’s total energy and resource dependency on the Western bloc, its investment dependency on British, European, and American corporations and banks, and Turkish-Israeli patronage over its defense sector have effectively deprived the Caspian republic of the ability to maintain balanced relations with Russia and Iran, against which the Western bloc and its allies in the Middle East are pursuing an extremely aggressive “containment policy”. In this context, the factor of the Aliyev clan’s personal financial interests, which are tightly linked to Western offshore accounts and an extensive list of elite real estate in Europe, also plays a major role. This inevitably creates a situation where the subjective interests of the ruling regime exert a dominant influence on the country’s foreign policy course and can often contradict the pragmatism of the state interests. In this regard, Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be a stronger figure than Ilham Aliyev, who is more susceptible to manipulation by Western powers. This may explain why Russian politicians have attributed the Russian-Azerbaijani crisis to Western influence, a view often met with skepticism. However, Aliyev’s lack of independence is arguably substantiated by his strong anti-Russian rhetoric, which seems to conflict with Azerbaijan’s long-term interests in a volatile security region.
Currently, the topic of an impending Russian-Azerbaijani military clash is no longer taboo in the official media of Moscow and Baku. Azerbaijani politicians and pro-government propagandists increasingly mention Russia’s “occupation policy”, “Azerbaijani Derbent” that was supposedly taken away, the need to establish NATO bases in the republic, and the intensification of work to create a so-called “Turan army”. In turn, the Russian side, represented by independent politicians, Duma deputies, and experts, is also sharpening its rhetoric about a “second front”, which they claim is an inevitability caused by “Baku’s ill-considered policy, instigated by the West”[10]. Some Russian analysts are now openly analyzing data on the potential and strength of the Azerbaijani armed forces, considering the likelihood of assistance from Ankara and other allies of Baku, and predicting the outcome of a Russian-Azerbaijani military conflict[11]. Thus, the verbal representations of a “second front” or a “southern front” in the international media space are already acquiring concrete contours and geography.
Returning to the conflict between Georgia and the collective West, one might assume that Tbilisi believes it was able to avoid the threat of becoming an arena for military action against Russia at the cost of worsening relations with the EU. In reality, however, the situation is much more complex, both theoretically and practically.
The indivisible geography of the South Caucasus dictates that a hypothetical military confrontation between major interested powers would extend beyond initial engagements. A clash between Moscow and Baku, for instance, would not be confined to the Russian-Azerbaijani border; it would invariably engulf the entire Black Sea-Caspian region, encompassing not only the Greater Caucasus but also the southern flank along the Armenian-Turkish and Georgian-Turkish borders. This is due to the fundamental stakes involved: not merely the future of Russian-Azerbaijani relations or the fate of Azerbaijan, but the broader question of undivided dominance and military presence in the entire region by either Russia or the Western bloc, acting through Turkey. Consequently, Georgia’s resolute stance, while shifting the geopolitical front eastward from its immediate territory, would not ultimately insulate Tbilisi from the pervasive threat of a large-scale regional conflict.
Back in August 2014, when Russia began intensive work on the construction of the high-altitude “Avaro-Kakhetian road” through Dagestan to the Georgian border, Tbilisi was deeply concerned about this project. Despite Russian assurances that the highway with dozens of bridges and tunnels through gorges and mountain ridges would be intended for mutually beneficial communication and trade, Tbilisi increasingly, and not without objective reasons, began to talk about its military purpose[12]. The project was also met with alarm in Baku, where it was noted that the road was the shortest and most convenient route for Russia through Georgia’s Kakheti region to Azerbaijan’s Zakataly region and the western borders of Azerbaijan stretching along the Kura Valley, which are most vulnerable due to the absence of natural barriers for effective defense.
At the time, Azerbaijan’s regime tried not to publicize its concerns, likely not wanting to jeopardize the positive momentum in its relationship with Moscow. Tbilisi was more resolute on this issue amid the political and diplomatic crisis that followed the “August War” of 2008. However, no signals had any effect on Moscow, and the “Avaro-Kakhetian road”, dubbed a “military project” aimed at a rapid invasion into the heart of the South Caucasus, was built in record time. Now, Tbilisi senses a symmetrical threat from Turkey, which, in the event of a Russian-Azerbaijani conflict, and in accordance with the provisions of the “Shushi Declaration” of June 16, 2021[13], would be obliged to come to the defense of its ally. In this case, Georgia, against its will, would become the main logistical artery for providing forces and means to the warring powers, and thus an immediate arena for intense military action and an integral part of the “second front”.
The indivisibility of the political geography of the South Caucasus is beyond doubt, as is the axiomatic assertion that a war in this region would encompass all its borders and have a total character. The permanent signals from Tbilisi mentioning Western blackmail over a “second front” evidently indicate that Tbilisi is trying to warn its immediate neighbors in the region about a catastrophe that threatens everyone equally.
[1] The original (in Rus.) was posted on our website on 05.09.2025.
[2] “Tbilisi Mayor Announces West’s Demand to Open ‘Second Front’ Against Russia”. Kommersant (in Rus.), 26.08.2025, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7990399 (download date: 02.09.2025).
[3] “The Second Front Against Russia”. What They Say About It in Georgia. Gazeta.ru (in Rus.), 18.11.2022, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2022/11/18/15804997.shtml (download date: 02.09.2025).
[4] “Kobakhidze made a statement about a second front against Russia”. RIA NOVOSTI (in Rus.), 23.02.2025, https://ria.ru/20250223/front-2001110435.html (download date: 02.09.2025).
[5] “Ivanishvili announced a proposal to fight with Russia for three to four days”. RBC (in Rus.), 21.10.2024, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/10/2024/6716a71c9a794727b423696b (download date: 02.09.2025).
[6] Barateli I., “Visa-free travel in question”. Novaya Gazeta Evropa (in Rus.), 31.08.2025, https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/08/31/bezviz-pod-voprosom (download date: 02.09.2025).
[7] “Ilham Aliyev accused Russia of occupying Azerbaijan in 1920”. NEWSRU.CO.IL (in Rus.), 28.08.2025, https://www.newsru.co.il/world/28aug2025/az_202.html (download date: 02.09.2025).
[8] “Aliyev, who failed at the SCO summit, hopes to meet Putin in Beijing: will the Russian president agree to save his tomatoes?”. Bloknot Russia (in Rus.), 02.09.2025, https://bloknot.ru/obshhestvo/provalivshijsya-na-sammite-shos-aliev-nadeetsya-na-vstrechu-s-putinym-v-pekine-soglasitsya-li-prezident-rossii-spasat-ego-pomi dory-1451287.html (download date: 03.09.2025).
[9] “Declaration on Allied Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan”. Kremlin.ru (in Rus.), 22.02.2022, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5777 (download date: 03.09.2025).
[10] Stolyarov M., “The Second Front” – Transcaucasian? Why Azerbaijan Chooses the Path of Militarization”. Stoletie.ru (in Rus.), 25.08.2025, https://www.stoletie.ru/tekuschiiy_moment/vtoroj_front__zakavkazskij _666.htm (download date: 03.09.2025).
[11] “The army has been mobilized; the plan has been drawn up. Aliyev has already worked out the attack. What should Russia expect?” Tsargrad (in Rus.), 27.08.2025, https://tsargrad.tv/dzen/armija-mobilizovana-plan-svjorstan-aliev-uzhe-otrabotal-napadenie-chego-zhdat-rossii_1350928 (date accessed: 03.09.2025).
[12] “Avar-Kakheti road: threats and opportunities”. Regional Dialogue (in Rus.), 11.12.2014, https://regional-dialogue.com/ru/avaro-kakhetskaia-doroga/ (download date: 03.09.2025).
[13] “Shusha Declaration on allied relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey”. Prezident.az, 16.06.2021, https://president.az/ru/articles/view/52122 (download date: 03.09.2025).
