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Recent developments in Central Asia have highlighted significant challenges for Turkey’s foreign policy in the region.

The Turkish-Israeli negotiations on Syrian issues, held in Baku on April 9, 2025, were expected, and therefore the information disseminated by the Azerbaijani media about the supposed ownership of their initiative by I. Aliyev is exaggerated.

According to the news in the Azerbaijani and Pakistani media, the leader of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev will make an official visit to Pakistan this month.

On April 4, 2025 the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stated at the EU–Central Asia Summit held in Samarkand that “…the opening of the borders of Armenia with Turkey and Azerbaijan is going to be a game changer.

The dynamics of the events around Iran once again updates the security problems of the Syunik region and the entire Armenia.

On March 27, 2025 during the Paris Summit, also named the “coalition of the willing”, the French President E. Macron stated: “Europe needs Turkey, and Turkey needs Europe”.

We would venture to assume that the U.S.-Russian negotiations will last somewhat longer than the deadlines announced by Washington at the beginning of the process.

The analysis of the current situation in the Middle East suggests a direct connection between destabilization in Turkey and the plans of the United States and Israel to attack Iran.

On March 19, 2025, Turkish authorities detained the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, a member of the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

Since February 2025 Israel has actively begun the process of including Azerbaijan into the list of countries of the so-called “Abrahamic Accords”.

On March 6, 2025, fierce fighting broke out in Syria between the “remnants of Assad’s army”, including Alawite militia units, and the security forces of the new government in Damascus.

One of the main instruments of Turkey’s interference in Syria’s internal affairs is considered to be the “Turkoman factor”, used by Ankara to legitimize the actual expansion in relation to the Arab Republic.

On the eve of the second round of the snap presidential elections scheduled for March 1, 2025, the situation in Abkhazia has become extremely tense.

On 14.02.2025, a meeting took place in Washington between U.S. President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took place in Washington.

Based on recent events in the region, Washington has refused Ankara’s request to disarm the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and dismantle the Kurdish administration of Rojava.

The formal reason for the political-diplomatic conflict was an incident involving the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) passenger aircraft on December 25, 2024, in Aktau, Kazakhstan(2). Immediately after the crash, media outlets close to the Azerbaijan’s government placed all responsibility on the Russian side, accusing its air defense and civil aviation services of negligence and unprofessionalism.

In January 2025, the Iranian leadership once again announced its intention to move the capital from Tehran to the location called Makran – one of the regions of the Sistan and Baluchestan province, on the shores of the Indian Ocean.

In February 2025, during a press conference following talks with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. president Donald Trump proposed taking the Palestinian enclave of Gaza under American control in the form of “long-term ownership”.

Experts tend to believe that the success of Azerbaijani offensive in the fall of 2020 was due to the high degree of Ankara’s involvement in the Karabakh war.

In late January 2025, international media circulated a document with a request from a close associate of R. Erdogan, Turkish MP and the leader of the radical “Nationalist Movement Party” Devlet Bahceli, addressed to Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan.