Ethnic aspects of internal political struggle in Iran

ARVAK Center comment, August 09, 2025

1. Escalation of the intra-Iranian conflict: reformists vs. conservatives

According to information coming from Iran, an acute internal conflict is brewing in the country. Against the backdrop of the military-political and socio-economic crisis that befell the Islamic Republic after the “12-Day War”, friction between reformists and conservatives has again intensified. The former are mainly represented in the Iranian government, headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who won the elections in July 2024. The latter includes the immediate entourage of the Supreme Leader of Iran, the institutional structures of theocratic authority in the country and the security forces headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

At this stage, the IRI reformists felt their positions had strengthened and they had a chance to formalize a more significant participation in the country’s governance, which they had been deprived of due to the traditionally conservative-supported anti-Western and anti-Israeli doctrine, which narrows, as they put it, the country’s opportunities on the path to legal and social progressive reforms. Pezeshkian and his supporters are trying to use in the interests of their faction the fact that the radical position of the conservatives led to the actual destruction of the “Resistance axis” system built by Tehran over decades in the Middle East, to a devastating Israeli-American attack on Iran and to the decline of the country’s weight and role in the region. The reformists are seeking support in a new wave of public discontent in Iranian society over Tehran’s “failed gambits” in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. This discontent is also fueled by the security forces’ inability to effectively deter Israeli military attacks and subversive activities within the Islamic Republic, as well as by economic and social problems that have worsened since the June events.

At its core, the prevailing issue may no longer primarily concern the reformists’ aspirations to acquire greater instruments of influence within the nation and a mandate for widespread reforms. Instead, it appears to revolve around a fundamental restructuring of the entire system of statehood, thereby necessitating the dismantling of the incumbent theocratic regime. At least, this is how the conservative forces in Iran perceive the heightened activity of the reformists, accessing their steps as an existential threat to the entire system. They tend to view the current executive’s actions as a precursor to a conspiracy against the Islamic Revolution and its core values. The primary indicator of these sentiments for radical circles is M. Pezeshkian’s attempts to maintain a loyal relationship between Tehran and Baku, despite Azerbaijan’s de facto participation in the anti-Iranian aggression in June.

2. Foreign policy “signals” & conservative discontent

Insider sources in Iran, citing representatives of the country’s army and secret services, insist that the Israeli Air Force used Azerbaijan’s airspace and its military infrastructure to strike targets in the north of Iran and, in part, the capital Tehran. Against this background, the active contacts of the Iranian president and his team with the political elite of Azerbaijan, with noticeable elements of ingratiation with the Azerbaijani leader, are forcing radicals in the Iranian political and military elites to express dissatisfaction with the president’s position.

Iranian radicals were most outraged by M. Pezeshkian’s July 2025 trip to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Stepanakert and his behavior, which was unbecoming of the country’s leader. M. Pezeshkian’s critics accused him of pandering to I. Aliyev, who considers himself a friend of B. Netanyahu and who has completely handed over his country to Israel for the purpose of carrying out strikes against Iran. Many politicians and experts in Iran qualified this trip and the president’s behavior during it as the “shame of Iranian diplomacy”. According to them, instead of flattering I. Aliyev and hugging him during the “meaningless summit”, it would have been wiser to attend the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, where Tehran was obviously underrepresented. There were also claims that the Iranian president, in the country’s strategic interests, should have first of all visited China and, certainly, Armenia, but for some reason he gave preference to Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The aforementioned incident, coupled with several other overt demonstrations of loyalty towards Azerbaijan and Turkey, compels Iranian conservatives to distrust the government led by M. Pezeshkian. Radicals do not interpret such actions as attempts to mitigate acute tensions with Baku and Ankara during challenging times for Iran, but rather as an endeavor to establish a “soft cushion” for the Iranians and foster conditions conducive to abandoning the strategic policy of robust counteraction against potential regional threats.

3. Ethnic factor as a catalyst for intra-systemic schism

It can be posited that M. Pezeshkian was interested in suppressing the burgeoning discontent regarding his “pro-Azerbaijani” policy and to re-establish the disrupted power balance through requisite elucidations. However, after the sensational statement of his son, the problem only worsened, threatening the country with a crisis of foreign policy discord. On August 6, 2025, Yusuf Pezeshkian, known for his accentuated demonstration of loyalty to his ethnic Turkic roots, criticized the political circles “looking for an Iranian enemy in the person of Azerbaijan”. According to Pezeshkian Jr., Iran should only be friends with Azerbaijan, ignoring the false accusations of its participation in the anti-Iranian campaign.

It seems strange that Yusuf Pezeshkian stated that there was no evidence of Baku’s cooperation with Tel Aviv during the “12-Day War”, while the sources from Iranian security agencies had already provided the media with numerous facts indicating the opposite. Perhaps, in other circumstances and regarding some other topic, the statement of the president’s son would not have had such resonance. However, given the atmosphere of ethnic traditionalism in which, according to the Iranian media, M. Pezeshkian’s children were raised (his ménages still forbid interfamily communication in any language other than their native Turkic dialect), the ideas expressed by Yusuf bear a clear imprint of bias and ethnic commitment. It is obvious that M. Pezeshkian, who himself holds similar sentiments, given the complicated situation in which he found himself, preferred not to personally voice the idea of Azerbaijan’s friendliness, which is currently unpopular in the IRI, but found it expedient to put forward this thesis to the authorities through his son, an activist in the struggle for broader rights of Azerbaijanis in Iran. Pezeshkian Jr.’s statement exhibits a tone and emphasis that suggest a reproach to the highest political authorities and a recommendation for respectful caution toward Baku, rather than an appeal to the general public or conservative factions. Furthermore, his remarks appear to contain veiled threats, likely originating from the prevalent ideological concept within Iranian Azerbaijani nationalist circles concerning the reunification of Iranian Turks with their counterparts in the South Caucasus.

It is noteworthy that after M. Pezeshkian was elected as the country’s president, the pro-government Iranian media addressed the issue of his family’s ethnicity with evident delicacy. The reality itself was not concealed, but it was not given significant importance, obviously considering the fact that the multinational composition of Iran’s population is fully reflected in the military-political and administrative elites of the Islamic Republic. It is enough to mention that the Supreme Leader of the country, Ali Hosseini Khamenei, himself comes from a Mashhadi Turkic family, which, however, did not affect the paradigm of the development of the current Iranian statehood, the titular bearers of which are still the Farsi-speaking ethnic groups. However, the current actions of President M. Pezeshkian, which appear illogical from the perspective of genuine Iranian interests, coupled with the ostentatious rhetoric of a family member raised to prioritize ethnic Turkic self-awareness, are altering the situation.

Amidst the severe exacerbation of the geopolitical climate surrounding Iran and the observable ethno-social unrest within the nation, the stance demonstrated by the Pezeshkian family could signify more than merely an opinion regarding certain foreign policy prospects for the benefit of a unified, sovereign Iran. It may, in fact, pertain to the advocacy of interests on behalf of a country ethnically aligned with the aforementioned individuals, a nation that has openly engaged in hostile actions against the Islamic Republic.

4. New challenges for Iranian statehood

It is obvious that Tehran is facing a qualitatively new form of political struggle of the elites. In it, the rivalry between reformists and conservatives is already diluted by the ethnic factor, which is extremely sensitive for the fragile, in demographic terms, Iranian statehood. Iran has been given a new challenge, which it must either resolve with a flexible policy of preserving consolidation, combining internal diplomacy, Islam and force, or give free rein to Farsi nationalism, the consequences of which, however, may be no less destructive for this “Middle Eastern long-liver”.