The Syrian “window of missed opportunities”: features of RF’s half-hearted foreign policy strategy

Expert Commentary, 29.01.2025

Norayr A. Dunamalyan

By December 2024, RF defense minister Andrey Belousov outlined the priorities in the field of ensuring Russia’s security at an expanded meeting of the ministry’s board, noting “the fulfillment of individual tasks” and the military presence in Central Asia and Africa, the Caucasus, and Transnistria. Syria was not mentioned among the priorities, although the “comprehensive support for the Syrian Arab Republic” has been given special attention in the RF Foreign Policy Concept of 2023. The problem is that after the overthrow of the B. al-Assad’s regime, the Russian leadership managed to quickly abandon the significance of the Syrian orientation of its foreign policy. However, the question is to what extent this step became a rule or an exception for the general logic of Russia’s foreign policy strategy.

The Russian Federation’s military operation in Syria, which began in 2015, was carried out against the backdrop of deteriorating relations with the West over Ukraine and represented an attempt to go beyond the geopolitical boundaries of the post-Soviet space. In fact, Russia intervened in the processes taking place against the background of the consequences of the “Arab Spring”, without sharing the logic of the existence of such a geopolitical entity as the “Greater Middle East. The concept of the region, encompassing the Middle East and adjacent territories such as the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and North Africa, was introduced by American geopoliticians. Their intention was to establish a specific subsystem of international relations that would exclude the dominance of any other power in this extensive region except for the United States.

The Russian geopolitical thought is subject to two ideological currents that find expression in two extremes. The first can be conditionally called “imperial” and perceives international processes around Russia in the context of the ongoing “Great Game” (another “Western” term introduced to denote the rivalry between the British and Russian empires in Central Asia and other regions of Eurasia). The imperial trend reflects rather outdated “colonial” views on international politics, within which Russia sought to catch up with the European powers in the context of strengthening its geopolitical status by possessing the “straits”, dividing the Ottoman Empire, and dominating Eurasia.

The second concept — the idea of “Island Russia”, is somewhat similar to the doctrine of “isolationism.” This idea is based on the perception of the works of A. Solzhenitsyn and V. Tsymbursky by Russian elite circles in the context of developing the ideas of “the new conservatism”, representing Russia as a separate “civilizational space” or an “island” with a certain “shelf” in the form of culturally and politically close territories (which can include Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, some territories of Central Asia and the Caucasus). It is noteworthy that both these trends coexist in the modern Russian foreign policy. However, it should be understood that among the bearers of these ideas there can be various groups of the Russian elites, the composition of which can change, and their views are constantly revised depending on changes in the internal or external political situation. In any case, due to the lack of a basis for the implementation of the first or second model of foreign policy, the Russian leadership returns to the scheme of tactical “pragmatic” relations, without creating a more adequate strategy for behavior on the world stage.

The Syrian “field” of geopolitical experiments

Before the Russian Federation decided to send troops to Syria, it abandoned its presence in Kosovo (2003), Georgia (2007) and Azerbaijan (2012). Of course, the geopolitical situation in the world was changing, and the approaches to responding to various challenges could also be different. However, the constant crises showed that the Russian leadership lacked a strategic vision of the processes among. The takeover of Crimea became Russia’s first acquisition after the collapse of the USSR, but this event occurred within the context of a narrowly perceived irredentist project of the “Russian world”. Meanwhile, the operation in Syria required a more complex justification representing Russia’s specific interests and goals in the Middle East.

In general, the RF’s interests in the SAR were limited to the military-political component of achieving political reconciliation within the Arab republic and excluding Turkish and the USA influence in certain regions of the country. However, the most discussed agenda was the “struggle against international terrorism” and, in particular, against ISIS. On the other hand, the economic interests of the Russian business elites in the management of phosphate mines (“Stroytransgaz” by G. Timchenko) and the oil and gas sector (“Promsyrimport” company) in Syria were left out of focus. At the same time, the military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus allowed creating a communication system linking Russia’s territory with the Middle East and Africa and also to use its presence in Syria to put pressure on Turkey, which could block the Black Sea straits for Russian warships.

However, in December 2024, the entire system of military-political and economic balances built with Russia’s participation collapsed. In fact, none of the goals of the Russian military operation in Syria was fully achieved. Turkey strengthened its position in the region by ensuring the rise to power of the Islamist radicals it supported. The USA created conditions to pressure Turkey and Iran by supporting Kurdish autonomy, thereby contributing to the process of reformatting the borders of not only Syria but the entire Middle East. Moreover, Russia’s interest in maintaining military bases and its economic interests may become the subject of another round of Russian-Turkish negotiations on the “Syrian format”, which has been repeatedly proposed by R. Erdogan in the case of Syria, Libya, and Armenia, which means that Russia will again make concessions to the Turkish side in order to maintain its limited presence in the region. After the fall of the B. Assad regime, the task of justifying the Russian presence shifted to the dilemma of the fight against international terrorism and the readiness to negotiate with the same leaders of the “former” terrorist groups under Turkey’s patronage.

Thus, the Russian leadership once again became a “victim of circumstances”, which is associated with several factors, not only related to the activities in Syria but also to Russia’s foreign policy in general.

The preservation of Bashar al-Assad’s power in Syria was explained by the consensus around his figure from Russia and Iran, although over time, his steps began to contradict the policy of the countries supporting the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic. For the Russian side, the main problem was that it could only rely on the Syrian government, without having any leverage over certain population groups. Moscow’s attempts to build trust with the Christian and Alawite minorities in Syria clashed with the incompetence of the Russian officials and a lack of interest in using the “Christian” factor in the foreign policy. Iran, on the other hand, has support in Syria in the form of Shiites, who make up 13% of the SAR population. Turkey, in turn, used both ethnic and religious factors in Syria, supporting Turkmens in northern Syria, thus creating the “Turkmeneli” (Turkomen) project, which can counter the idea of a “united Kurdistan”, and at the same time, encouraging the activities of various Sunni groups (from moderate to the most radical).

In fact, preserving B. al-Assad in office, Russia could not create an alternative political and cultural support that could counter the Islamists. Moreover, the “victory” of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorist organization, which includes many natives of the North Caucasus and Central Asia left a high potential for the spread of the terrorist threat in the post-Soviet space. On the other hand, the creation of alternative pro-Russian forces in Syria was hampered by the lack of coordination between the actions of the Russian Federation and the IRI, which made the situation in the country more fragile.

The main distinctive feature of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East is the absence of ideologization. Unlike Turkey and Iran, which try to fill their foreign policy with ideological settings, Moscow has not been able to formulate a clear ideological basis for its mission in Syria, Africa, and other regions of the world.

It is known that the presence of the Russian military in Libya, the Central African Republic, and other regions of Africa and Asia often coincides with the business interests of individual groups of Russian elites, who are at the same time interested in the relative fragility of the situation in the countries where they operate. The vulnerability of local elites is perceived as a guarantee of protection from political pressures that may be fraught with the consolidation of the ruling regime’s forces. However, the problem is that other competing actors may have a more stable set of connections with the local population based on religious, cultural, and ethnic affinities, which Russia does not have. And therefore, in the case of the fall of another “pro-Russian” regime, Moscow loses any advantages on the ground and becomes a “hostage of the situation”.

The only sphere of consensus that holds together the political and economic elites of the Russian Federation together is economic “binding”, which maintains the dependence on Russia of potentially “unfriendly” countries even in the event of a political conflict with it. A striking example of this is Georgia, whose energy and trade continued to depend significantly on the activities of Russian companies even after 2008. However, in practice, economic linkage (if not due to the use of unique technologies) can be disrupted in the case of more promising foreign investors.

The Karabakh “mirror” of the Syrian “window of opportunities”

Many Russian analysts quickly attributed the “Syrian catastrophe” on the policies of Bashar al-Assad, who, in their opinion, failed to build functioning institutions in the country and to ensure the consolidation of the population. However, the problem is that external players also influenced the internal political situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) and contributed to the known result. Despite the main trigger for the regime’s fall was the weakening of the “Axis of resistance” created by Iran and its proxies in the region, Russia’s behavior in the region is quite symptomatic and should not be seen as an anomaly.

By building the concept of “national imperialism” within the country, extending to the “Russian world” limited to Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and promoting the idea of a “civilization-state”, which, in essence, aligns with the concept of Russia as an “island”, the Russian leadership strives to act within the framework of pragmatism beyond its “limits”. This is why it is difficult for Russian society to understand why Russian troops should fight for culturally alien countries and peoples. Over the past 30 years, this stereotype has also spread to the post-Soviet space, but such sentiments are more due to the institutional weakness of the Russian state rather than the opposite.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the fall of the Assad regime could help resolve the contradictions between Turkey and Russia, which have been unable to agree on the future of the country. However, this conclusion can only be made at first glance. To maintain its presence in Syria, Russia will have to play by “Turkish” or “anti-Iranian” rules. It is symptomatic that almost immediately after Assad’s departure the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) published an article in which an Egyptian researcher pointed out the mistake of Russia’s cooperation with Iran on the Syrian issue.

It can be assumed that over time, the strengthening of anti-Iranian tendencies in Syria will become an important part of the Russian-Turkish-Syrian agenda. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Iran, signed on January 17, 2025, is unlikely to practically affect the deepening of Russian-Iranian relations, as it was conceived in a completely different geopolitical context.

The erosion of Russia’s positions in the SAR is also not unprecedented. The presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent (RPC) in Nagorno-Karabakh clearly demonstrated the failure of the Russian leadership’s actions, which perceived the post-war realities as a status quo situation, even though there were periodic clashes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border before the start of large-scale hostilities in Ukraine in 2021. The signing of the Declaration on Allied Interaction between Russia and Azerbaijan on February 22, 2022, was supposed to secure the situation on the Southern Caucasian flank, but the war in Ukraine completely deprived Moscow of its advantages in the South Caucasus. In other words, the situation of “control” over Nagorno-Karabakh and the double impact on Armenia and Azerbaijan gradually shifted to a format of unilateral cooperation with Baku and Ankara, which prepared the conditions for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers against the backdrop of an actual blockade and complete “de-Armenization” of Artsakh after 3.5 years of the Russian “Peacekeeping Operation”.

Several initial assumptions can be made here:

1. 1. Throughout the post-Soviet period, Russia has failed to develop a language of communication with the Armenian authorities and population, depriving it of the opportunity to create a viable alternative to the “pro-Western” agenda within the republic,
   2. The Russian authorities have traditionally perceived the leadership of Azerbaijan as part of their own elite,
   3. Russia’s “pragmatic” foreign policy in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh lost out to the ideologized Turkish strategy.

The situation in Syria had similar prerequisites in terms of the Russian elites’ confidence that they understood the rules and logic of the geopolitical game, although, as it turned out, the processes were perceived rather narrowly. As in the case of the “Karabakh scenario”, Moscow may be offered a place at the “Syrian settlement” table, which will ultimately result in further concessions from Russia. And Russian society will be presented with slogans such as “we will not fight for them” or “they are to blame themselves”.

In this regard, it is important to compare Russia’s costs in recent years: according to various estimates, by early March 2018, expenses on the Syrian campaign amounted to $1.77 to $2.52 billion; in Nagorno-Karabakh – $35-50 million per year (with the Republic of Armenia continuing to annually provide the NKR with a loan of about $150-160 million); in the Special Military Operation in Ukraine – $211 billion over 2 years of war. However, after the 44-day war, the Russian media mainly discussed the issue of the “burden on the Russian budget” due to the peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh was.

Failures in Russia’s “Chess Strategy”

A narrow understanding of foreign policy has led to increased vulnerability of political regimes in Russia’s fragmented zone of interests. The desire to “control” the situation through moderating post-Soviet conflicts has led to the formation of a persistent template for penetration into the spheres of former neo-colonial interests of the West. Thus, the Russian military has appeared in Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Niger, and other countries. However, the situation in the post-Soviet space shows the formation of very fragile configurations within Russia’s patronage of peripheral conflicts. The defeat of “pro-Russian” forces in Moldova and the establishment of its anti-Russian policy in alliance with Ukraine led to the increased vulnerability of the pro-Russian PMR – the Transnistrian enclave, which is forced to borrow gas from its nominal opponent, the Moldovan government. Fully loyal to Russia, Belarus could fall victim to internal political upheaval due to growing dissatisfaction with the unchanging nature of power. In the South Caucasus, the pro-Russian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was subjected to ethnic cleansing, and in Abkhazia, adjacent to Russia’s borders, anti-Armenian propaganda is being openly conducted amid political destabilization to bring a pro-Turkish candidate, A. Ardzimba, to power. On the other hand, narratives about the “pro-Russian position” of the Georgian authorities have become more of an opposition agenda than a basis for a real geopolitical turn. Similar problems exist in an embryonic form in Central Asia, which still faces a geopolitical split.

In any case, it can be concluded that the political regimes supported by Russia are not characterized by stability, but rather the opposite. The policy of the Russian leadership consists of limited actions perceived as a long-term guarantee of its presence. This may include the presence of military bases, economic influence, the spread of the Russian language, or cultural affinity. However, all these aspects individually cannot ensure a long-term strategy of presence. The “Syrian” lesson, and before it the “Georgian”, “Ukrainian”, and “Karabakh” lessons, do not demonstrate Russia’s “defeat” but its weakness in forming a strategic vision that could provide advantages to the Russian state and its allies, rather than becoming another groundwork for concessions to more “active” geopolitical rivals.