{"id":20672,"date":"2026-09-25T19:48:25","date_gmt":"2026-09-25T15:48:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/?p=20672"},"modified":"2026-09-27T00:00:20","modified_gmt":"2026-09-26T20:00:20","slug":"georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/","title":{"rendered":"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”]<\/p>\n

ARVAK Center comment, September 26, 2026 [1]<\/sup><\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”]<\/p>\n

1. The Tbilisi <\/strong>i<\/strong>ncident and Turkish expansion in Adjara<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Following the diplomatic incident during the Tbilisi meeting between the Interior Ministers of Georgia and Turkey \u2013 Sulkhan Tamazashvili and Mustafa \u00c7ift\u00e7i \u2013 it is logical to expect the Georgian authorities to begin reassessing the nature of bilateral ties with Ankara or, at the very least, to demonstrate to their Turkish partners their readiness to take such a step.<\/p>\n

In its comment<\/a> of September 17, 2026, entitled \u201cThe Adjara issue amid changes in the regional security architecture\u201d<\/em>, the ARVAK Center had already provided a detailed assessment of the talks in Tbilisi, during which the head of the Turkish ministry effectively questioned Georgia\u2019s sovereignty over Adjara. Although the parties attempted at the official level to conceal the demarche that had occurred, media reports about the conflict significantly stirred Tbilisi\u2019s socio-political environment, once again raising acute questions about the Islamization and Turkification of Adjara and intensifying concerns regarding Ankara\u2019s broader expansionist policy in Georgia.<\/p>\n

Although the Georgian authorities refrain from making open public statements condemning the actions and rhetoric of Turkey\u2019s top leadership, they are sending Ankara unequivocal, albeit veiled, signals. These messages clearly demonstrate Tbilisi\u2019s deep concern over the development of the situation and the current state of bilateral relations.<\/p>\n

2. The \u201cArmenian factor\u201d: An unprecedented signal from Tbilisi to Ankara<\/strong><\/h4>\n

An example of such indirect reaction was the television debate of September 14, 2026, during which Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze addressed the issue of the Armenian Genocide. He stressed that the relevance of international recognition of the mass crimes committed in the Ottoman Empire as a crime against humanity remains regardless of the current Armenian leadership\u2019s desire to normalize dialogue with Ankara. In a discussion with Paata Zakareishvili, representing the pro-European Republican Party of Georgia, Kobakhidze specifically stated: \u201cArmenians have not healed the pain of the Genocide, and the process of its recognition does not depend on the position and plans of the current Armenian authorities\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

Since gaining independence, Georgia\u2019s official authorities have displayed extreme caution in assessing the tragic events of a century ago in the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Irakli Kobakhidze\u2019s statement represents an unprecedented step in the country\u2019s political history. Until now, Tbilisi had refrained from state recognition of the Armenian Genocide, strictly limiting commemorative events and public initiatives related to the issue to the framework of the Armenian community. For Georgia, the Armenian Genocide issue has always remained exceptionally sensitive, as it is closely intertwined with relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan \u2013 a state that, no less and at times even more actively than Ankara, promotes a policy of denying the documented facts of this national tragedy of the Armenian people. Historically, the position rejecting recognition of the Armenian Genocide was one of the few consensual areas of Georgia\u2019s foreign policy, uniting the authorities and the systemic opposition despite their sharp disagreements over the country\u2019s political system and foreign-policy orientation. Such agreement underscored that, regardless of geopolitical circumstances and Tbilisi\u2019s orientations toward major global centers of power, maintaining good-neighborly relations with Turkey was consistently regarded by Georgian elites as a key priority and a basic guarantee of security in the unstable South Caucasus and Black Sea basin.<\/p>\n

Against this background, the resonant public statements by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze \u2013 although without directly mentioning Turkey, but with a clear emphasis on its responsibility for the Armenian Genocide \u2013 became a sensation on the country\u2019s domestic political scene. This indicates that Tbilisi is compelled to develop a set of deterrent measures aimed at neutralizing the growing pressure from Ankara and compelling it to adopt a more restrained course. Given the high sensitivity of this issue for the Turkish side, the \u201cArmenian question\u201d is viewed by the Georgian leadership as an effective lever of influence.<\/p>\n

Thus, the Georgian leadership is demonstrating a readiness to depart from its longstanding distancing and join international calls for a final and unequivocal qualification of the tragic events of the past, a legal assessment of the crime, and compelling Turkey to fulfill the obligations arising from such a step. At the same time, Georgia has every reason to consider itself an interested party, given that a significant proportion of its Armenian, Yazidi, and Greek communities consists of descendants of refugees who escaped persecution in the Ottoman Empire.<\/p>\n

Some Armenian analysts have suggested that, through this unexpected demarche, the prime minister expressed Tbilisi\u2019s desire to \u201cdrive a wedge\u201d into the barely recovering Armenian-Turkish dialogue. However, this interpretation of the Georgian side\u2019s motives appears rather superficial \u2013 especially in light of Irakli Kobakhidze\u2019s own clarification about the need to distinguish Nikol Pashinyan\u2019s policy from the process of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. In our view, the key aspect lies elsewhere \u2013 namely, in the context of the complicated dynamics of Turkish-Israeli relations. Referring to the ongoing campaign for the international qualification of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire, the Georgian prime minister probably had in mind the demarche<\/em> by the Israeli leadership, which on June 28, 2026 unanimously approved recognition of this large-scale crime and submitted the initiative to the Knesset for legislative force. Since no similar steps have recently been taken by other states, Kobakhidze\u2019s statements were directly addressed to Tel Aviv. Although such a scenario remains highly uncertain, articulating the very possibility of such a geopolitical configuration could provide Tbilisi with additional leverage to counter Turkish pressure. I. Kobakhidze\u2019s signal to Ankara may indicate not so much hypothetical Georgian-Israeli coordination around the Armenian Genocide issue (the relevant bill formally remains on the Knesset agenda, and its further fate will be determined following the autumn parliamentary elections) as Georgia\u2019s readiness to scale up and deepen its partnership with Tel Aviv. In such a configuration, the Armenian issue serves as a catalyst for a process that could hypothetically lead to a shift in Israel\u2019s regional orientation away from reliance on an alliance with Azerbaijan toward more active engagement with Georgia and Armenia.<\/p>\n

3. The Israeli vector and the search for regional counterweights<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In Tbilisi, there is an awareness that amid the escalation of Turkish-Israeli contradictions, Tel Aviv is interested in finding local allies and forming a regional bloc capable of containing Ankara\u2019s expansion in an area that Israel has traditionally regarded as within its vital interests. Apparently, the Georgian authorities intend to use this counterweight: if the administration of R. T. Erdo\u011fan continues to exert pressure on Georgia\u2019s sovereignty, Tbilisi is prepared to make it clear to Ankara that it reserves the right to support Israel\u2019s foreign-policy initiatives.<\/p>\n

4. Reassessing anti-Russian discourse: The Russian Federation as a factor of survival<\/strong><\/h4>\n

As another response to Turkey\u2019s actions, the Georgian authorities are intensifying discourse about the need to reassess Russia\u2019s role in the South Caucasus and reevaluate the degree of its responsibility for Tbilisi\u2019s loss of control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During a televised debate among representatives of political forces on Rustavi 2<\/em> TV channel, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze addressed Georgian-Russian relations. He stressed that it is improper to attribute all of Tbilisi\u2019s problems exclusively to the Russian factor and pointed out that the Russophobia being comprehensively imposed from outside prevents Georgian society from adequately assessing the geopolitical processes surrounding the country.<\/p>\n

According to Kobakhidze, the anti-Russian wave being imposed must be \u201cnipped in the bud\u201d<\/em>, since it carries political and economic risks. Earlier, the head of government had also stated that the artificially provoked growth of anti-Russian sentiment represents a major threat to the country\u2019s independence, behind which stand the opposition and the \u201cdeep state\u201d<\/em>. The prime minister directly linked this \u201cdangerous process\u201d<\/em> to Tbilisi\u2019s refusal to open a \u201csecond front\u201d<\/em> against Russia after 2022, despite Western incitement.<\/p>\n

Obviously, the Georgian leadership is not yet prepared to initiate a full-scale restoration of relations with Russia. This is hindered, on the one hand, by intensified political pressure from the West on Tbilisi and, on the other, by Turkey\u2019s openly expansionist ambitions. The key determinant of Georgia\u2019s foreign-policy course remains the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. I. Kobakhidze confirmed this in his interview of August 11, 2026, stating unequivocally: \u201cGeorgia will not restore diplomatic relations with Russia as long as Moscow recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

Under circumstances in which the majority of Georgian politicians and citizens regard these territories as occupied, it is extremely difficult for the government to explain to society the necessity of normalizing dialogue with Moscow \u2013 a step dictated by the extremely dangerous geopolitical situation surrounding the republic. Nevertheless, the ruling Georgian Dream\u2013Democratic Georgia Party does not intend to accept this state of affairs. Tbilisi is aware that Western-fueled Russophobia imposes on the state an irrational and total rejection of the Russian Federation \u2013 a power which, under current circumstances, is the only one capable of preserving the fragile balance of regional security. The Georgian authorities reasonably believe that over the two decades during which anti-Russian sentiments were cultivated in the country, the external beneficiaries of this process systematically prepared conditions for pursuing their own ambitious designs, including those involving encroachments on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic.<\/p>\n

Avoiding alarmist methods of \u201cawakening\u201d the population, the Georgian authorities are acting cautiously while expressing a clear position: the country\u2019s political climate needs to be reformatted, and key risks reassessed. Under the prevailing circumstances, the threat from Russia is no longer perceived by Tbilisi as the principal or existential one. According to the republic\u2019s leadership, eliminating anti-Russian manifestations in the social and political spheres is a primary and unequivocal step toward establishing a new format of dialogue with Moscow.<\/p>\n

Despite the baggage of mutual grievances and unresolved disputes, it is Russia, in the view of the Georgian authorities, that remains the only real factor capable of countering the expansion of the Turkish-Azerbaijani duo in the South Caucasus, which enjoys Western support. Thus, normalization of ties with the Russian Federation has transformed for Georgia from a matter of free choice into a condition of survival. This necessity is driven both by external pressure from Ankara and by destabilizing internal processes initiated by ultra-liberal circles, which Irakli Kobakhidze has linked to the activities of the \u201cdeep state\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Almost 20 years after the failed attempt to resolve the South Ossetian conflict by force, Tbilisi once again finds itself facing extremely serious risks of destabilization and threats to its sovereignty. However, the key challenge under current circumstances is no longer forming on the northern border. Georgia is compelled to adapt to a reconfigured geostrategic environment caused by Turkey\u2019s active promotion of its interests in the South Caucasus and Azerbaijan\u2019s assistance in these efforts. Amid Yerevan\u2019s geopolitical turn toward the West and Ankara, the northern vector is becoming Tbilisi\u2019s only fundamental support. This enables the Georgian state not only to balance the regional security architecture and defend national independence, but also to protect its distinctive spiritual and cultural identity, the preservation of which the country\u2019s current leadership has elevated to the rank of a major priority.<\/p>\n

5. Conclusion: Georgia\u2019s geopolitical choice amid the new security architecture<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Since coming to power in autumn 2012, the Georgian Dream\u2013Democratic Georgia Party has constantly faced accusations of a pro-Russian orientation and a covert desire to normalize relations with Moscow. To refute these accusations, the party was compelled not only to employ tough rhetoric but also to take concrete practical steps demonstrating rejection of the Russian Federation\u2019s \u201coccupation policy\u201d<\/em> and commitment to the pro-Western course established as early as the \u201cRose Revolution\u201d.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, accusations of cooperation with Moscow, previously promoted by the West and Georgian ultra-liberals, may acquire quite concrete substance under today\u2019s circumstances. The current Tbilisi leadership is apparently already examining options for geopolitical interaction with Russia, as well as for establishing new ties with Israel. All three sides are similarly uninterested in the expansion of Turkish neo-Ottomanism and at the same time demonstrate a restrained or strained attitude toward the offensive policy of Western liberalism.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> The original (in Rus.) was posted on our website on 25.09.2026.<\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column]

Download publication<\/a><\/div>[\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] ARVAK Center comment, September 26, 2026 [1] [\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] 1. The Tbilisi incident and Turkish expansion<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":20659,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[88,89],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-20672","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-bordering-countries-en","category-middle-east-en"],"yoast_head":"\nGeorgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] ARVAK Center comment, September 26, 2026 [1] [\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] 1. The Tbilisi incident and Turkish expansion\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-09-25T15:48:25+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-09-26T20:00:20+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1280\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"720\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"ARVAK\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"ARVAK\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"12 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"ARVAK\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/a95ab60fed9f1457c1cd1663dfcb59d2\"},\"headline\":\"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-09-25T15:48:25+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-09-26T20:00:20+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":2177,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Bordering countries\",\"Middle East\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/\",\"name\":\"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-09-25T15:48:25+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-09-26T20:00:20+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/09\\\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg\",\"width\":1280,\"height\":720},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/\",\"name\":\"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024\",\"description\":\"\u0540\u0531\u0545\u053f\u0531\u053f\u0531\u0546 \u054e\u0535\u0550\u053c\u0548\u0552\u053e\u0531\u053f\u0531\u0546 \u053f\u0535\u0546\u054f\u0550\u0548\u0546\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/05\\\/2.svg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/05\\\/2.svg\",\"width\":1045,\"height\":255,\"caption\":\"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/a95ab60fed9f1457c1cd1663dfcb59d2\",\"name\":\"ARVAK\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/880981559a780d232f86d733b2003fb8460756c9dc48ab09c0c1a86d9644af9f?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/880981559a780d232f86d733b2003fb8460756c9dc48ab09c0c1a86d9644af9f?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/880981559a780d232f86d733b2003fb8460756c9dc48ab09c0c1a86d9644af9f?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"ARVAK\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/arvak.am\\\/en\\\/author\\\/arvak\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024","og_description":"[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] ARVAK Center comment, September 26, 2026 [1] [\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] 1. The Tbilisi incident and Turkish expansion","og_url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/","og_site_name":"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024","article_published_time":"2026-09-25T15:48:25+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-09-26T20:00:20+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1280,"height":720,"url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"ARVAK","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"ARVAK","Est. reading time":"12 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/"},"author":{"name":"ARVAK","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/a95ab60fed9f1457c1cd1663dfcb59d2"},"headline":"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel","datePublished":"2026-09-25T15:48:25+00:00","dateModified":"2026-09-26T20:00:20+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/"},"wordCount":2177,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg","articleSection":["Bordering countries","Middle East"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/","url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/","name":"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg","datePublished":"2026-09-25T15:48:25+00:00","dateModified":"2026-09-26T20:00:20+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/\u0420\u0435\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u044f-\u0413\u0440\u0443\u0437\u0438\u0438-\u043d\u0430-\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0435-\u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435.jpg","width":1280,"height":720},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgias-reaction-to-turkish-pressure-the-armenian-factor-and-the-prospects-for-relations-with-russia-and-israel\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Georgia\u2019s reaction to Turkish pressure, the Armenian factor, and the prospects for relations with Russia and Israel"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/","name":"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024","description":"\u0540\u0531\u0545\u053f\u0531\u053f\u0531\u0546 \u054e\u0535\u0550\u053c\u0548\u0552\u053e\u0531\u053f\u0531\u0546 \u053f\u0535\u0546\u054f\u0550\u0548\u0546","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#organization","name":"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024","url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/05\/2.svg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/05\/2.svg","width":1045,"height":255,"caption":"\u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/a95ab60fed9f1457c1cd1663dfcb59d2","name":"ARVAK","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/880981559a780d232f86d733b2003fb8460756c9dc48ab09c0c1a86d9644af9f?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/880981559a780d232f86d733b2003fb8460756c9dc48ab09c0c1a86d9644af9f?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/880981559a780d232f86d733b2003fb8460756c9dc48ab09c0c1a86d9644af9f?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"ARVAK"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/arvak.am"],"url":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/author\/arvak\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20672","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20672"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20672\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":20680,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20672\/revisions\/20680"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/20659"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20672"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20672"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20672"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}