{"id":19883,"date":"2026-06-15T13:33:18","date_gmt":"2026-06-15T09:33:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/?p=19883"},"modified":"2026-06-15T13:36:09","modified_gmt":"2026-06-15T09:36:09","slug":"a-comparison-of-iran-and-turkeys-foreign-policies-in-the-south-caucasus-and-west-asia-an-analysis-from-the-perspective-of-regionalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/a-comparison-of-iran-and-turkeys-foreign-policies-in-the-south-caucasus-and-west-asia-an-analysis-from-the-perspective-of-regionalism\/","title":{"rendered":"A comparison of Iran and Turkey\u2019s foreign policies in the South Caucasus and West Asia: an analysis from the perspective of regionalism"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=”” woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”]<\/p>\n

Dr. Ehsan Movahedian[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

1\u2024 Introduction<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially the developments from the 2010s onwards, have turned the South Caucasus and West Asia into a dynamic arena for the agency of two historical powers, Iran and Turkey. Iran, relying on its long-standing civilizational, linguistic, identity-based, and religious ties with its neighbors in the South Caucasus and West Asia, and Turkey, utilizing the discourse of Neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism, each seek to play a role and exert influence in these two regions. The fundamental question is: what are the substantial differences between these two approaches, and what are their implications for the regional order? Using the theoretical framework of regionalism within constructivist theory, the present article traces this distinction at both the identity-discursive and functional-strategic levels. The main hypothesis of the article is that Iran pursues regionalism as an endogenous, participatory process based on shared culture and identity with its neighbors in the South Caucasus and West Asia, whereas Turkey, through a trans-regionalist approach and via alliances with extra-regional powers such as the U.S., UK, and NATO member states, acts to create a Turkish-Sunni hegemonic bloc and advance a policy of containing Iran.<\/p>\n

2. Theoretical framework: regionalism in the mirror of constructivism; from the social construction of identity to patterns of competition<\/strong><\/h4>\n

To fundamentally understand the difference between Iran and Turkey\u2019s foreign policy approaches in the South Caucasus and West Asia, we need an analytical framework that goes beyond mere material and geopolitical reductionism and penetrates the deeper layers of identity and meaning in state action. Mainstream classical theories of international relations, when analyzing the phenomenon of region and regionalism, have largely been based on material foundations and instrumental rationality. In the realist tradition, a region is merely a given, predetermined geographical space where states compete for power and relative security, and the polarity structure governing the international system shapes their behavior. In this view, a region is nothing but a reflection of the material structure of power distribution. On the other hand, liberal and neoliberal institutionalist theories, although more optimistic about the possibility of cooperation, mainly view a region as a geographical domain formed through economic interactions, trade interdependence, and functionalist institution-building. For liberals, \u2018regionalization<\/em>\u2019 is the product of spillover from techno-economic cooperation and the rational choice of states to maximize absolute gains. Common to both paradigms is the neglect of the identity-based, historical, and meaningful content that constructs a region in the minds and practices of its actors (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 1998, p. 569).<\/p>\n

In contrast, constructivism, as a theoretical approach, opens a new window to understanding the region by creating an ontological and epistemological shift. Emphasizing the \u2018social construction of reality\u2019<\/em>, constructivism shifts the hard core of analysis from merely material structures to semantic and normative structures. From this perspective, social and political realities, including \u201cregion<\/em>\u201d, are not natural or pre-given, but rather \u2018social constructs<\/em>\u2019 built and reproduced through the continuous interaction of actors based on shared intersubjective meanings, identities, and mental images. Therefore, a region is not merely a set of neighboring countries on a map; it is a space where states and nations consider themselves part of a collective \u2018us\u2019<\/em>, see their destinies as intertwined, and internalize regional identity through socialization (Wendt, 2022).<\/p>\n

Adler and Barnett (1998), in their theory of \u2018security communities<\/em>\u2019, demonstrate well how political communities, by creating collective identity, mutual trust, and defining shared interests, build a peaceful and stable region where resorting to force to resolve disputes becomes unthinkable. In such a process, \u2018identity convergence<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018discursive interdependence<\/em>\u2019 are far more important than mere physical proximity or economic exchanges. In other words, regions are \u2018imagined communities<\/em>\u2019 whose members share a common self-awareness of belonging to an integrated whole, even if that whole is politically divided into independent units. For example, the sense of belonging to the \u2018Islamic world<\/em>\u2019, the \u2018Iranian civilizational sphere\u2019<\/em>, or the \u2018Turkic world\u2019<\/em> are all identity constructs that can become the basis for political action and regionalism.<\/p>\n

Based on this theoretical foundation, two distinct ideal patterns of regionalism can be formulated, each identifiable by its identity nature, sources of legitimacy, means of advancing foreign policy, and security consequences:<\/p>\n

2.1. The first pattern: endogenous regionalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n

This pattern emerges when a region is constructed based on deep and authentic cultural, civilizational, historical, and identity ties among its societies. In this case, the driving force of convergence among countries is not the imposition of a hegemonic power\u2019s demands, but rather the existence of natural \u2018enabling factors\u2019<\/em> for agency and the creation of a block of like-minded and aligned countries. Endogenous regionalism springs from shared language, religion, rituals, and common historical experiences, and for this reason, enjoys a high degree of acceptance and legitimacy among regional elites and the general public. This type of regionalism is inherently deterrent, balancing, and stability-oriented:<\/p>\n

– It is deterrent because, by strengthening internal capacities and collective ties, it prevents the infiltration and destructive intervention of extra-regional powers and provides security as an intra-regional public good for the benefit of all countries.<\/p>\n

– It is balancing because, by accepting the diversity and plurality of actors within a shared identity framework, it seeks to naturally create a balance of power among actors, prevent the emergence of unilateral hegemony, and strengthen multilateral mechanisms.<\/p>\n

– It is stability-oriented because it preserves the existing geopolitical status quo<\/em>, official borders, and national sovereignty of countries, and guides changes through peaceful and gradual paths. This pattern views stable order as the product of identity convergence and mutual trust, not the result of a balance of terror or purely economic dependence.<\/p>\n

2.2. The second pattern: imposed or hegemonic trans-regionalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In contrast to the previous pattern, imposed or hegemonic trans-regionalism emerges when a regional power or a set of extra-regional powers, lacking authentic identity-based commonalities with the host societies but relying on material superiority (military and economic) and soft instruments (media, education, religion), seeks to construct a region based on their own identity and interests. This pattern advances \u2018regionalization<\/em>\u2019 not as a spontaneous and natural process, but as a top-down ‘political project’, often through alliances with powers outside the region (Jamshidi, 2007, p. 791). The result is the construction of an artificial, fake, or distorted identity (such as the concept of \u2018Turan\u2019<\/em> as opposed to \u2018Iran\u2019<\/em>) that lacks deep roots in the historical self-awareness of the region\u2019s societies. This pattern has an aggressive, counter-balancing, and destabilizing approach:<\/p>\n

– It is aggressive because, to consolidate its imposed identity and interests, it resorts to military intervention, border changes, demographic engineering, identity manipulation, and the creation of coercive corridors.<\/p>\n

– It is counter-balancing because it openly seeks to eliminate or contain rivals (especially rivals with natural ties to the region) and create a unipolar hegemonic order in its own favor, rather than establishing balance.<\/p>\n

– It is destabilizing because, by inciting population groups and ethnicities, creating artificial identity cleavages, supporting extremist groups, and violating the national sovereignty of countries, it shatters the previous stable security architecture and plunges the region into a cycle of instability and perpetual conflict. The reason for its instability is that the imposed identity constantly faces resistance from the target societies and requires the continuous use of force and repression for its survival. This order can be described as a \u201cfragile order resting on active identity fault lines\u201d<\/em> that could collapse at any moment.<\/p>\n

The present article argues that the above two patterns well explain the essence of the difference between the foreign policy approaches of Iran and Turkey in the South Caucasus and West Asia. Iran\u2019s foreign policy in this geographical area is close to the pattern of endogenous regionalism. Due to its deep civilizational, linguistic, and religious commonalities with the inhabitants of West Asia and the South Caucasus, Iran considers this region its natural civilizational sphere and possesses enabling, natural, and non-interventionist factors for creating convergence. Its approach is based on maintaining stability, respecting sovereignties and existing borders, and deterring destructive extra-regional influence. In contrast, Turkey\u2019s foreign policy tends toward the pattern of imposed trans-regionalism. Ankara, centered on the discourse of Neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism and in strategic alliance with the U.S., UK, and NATO, seeks to construct a \u2018Turkish world\u2019<\/em> as a region under its own hegemony. This project, designed to counter Iran\u2019s natural influence and cause its geopolitical strangulation, is inherently destabilizing and crisis-creating due to the lack of authentic identity-based commonalities and its reliance on aggressive instruments. This theoretical framework will be the basis for the author\u2019s analysis in the following sections to precisely compare the policies of the two countries in various areas.<\/p>\n

2.3. Iran\u2019s foreign policy: endogenous, deterrent, and stability-oriented regionalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Due to its deep historical, civilizational, linguistic, and religious ties with the inhabitants of West Asia and the Caucasus, Iran defines the region not as an artificial sphere of influence but as its own civilizational sphere. These identity-based commonalities, ranging from Kurds and Lors to Persians and Azerbaijanis, and the Shiites of the region, provide favorable ground for a convergence policy and the creation of a bloc of like-minded powers (Masoumi, 2022). Iran, aware of this capacity, acts with a deterrent and balancing approach: on the one hand, by strengthening the \u2018Axis of Resistance\u2019<\/em> and supporting aligned states and movements, it curbs extra-regional influence and security threats; on the other hand, it consistently emphasizes the stability of borders, respect for national sovereignty, and the peaceful resolution of disputes (Jafari & Darabi, 2022, pp. 54-59). In the Caucasus, Tehran has opposed any geopolitical change of borders or imposed corridors that would lead to its encirclement or weakening and has proposed multilateral initiatives like \u20183+3\u2019<\/em> for regional crisis management. This is endogenous regionalism, aimed at stabilizing and preventing the influence of actors outside the region.<\/p>\n

2.4. Turkey\u2019s foreign policy: aggressive and destabilizing trans-regionalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In contrast, Turkey, under the discourse of Neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism and in alignment with the U.S., UK, and NATO, has pursued a pattern of \u2018trans-regionalism<\/em>\u2019 that redefines the region as a space for restoring historical prestige and establishing Turkish hegemony (Naghibzadeh & Khalil Tahmasebi, 2022, pp. 272-279). This approach has aggressive, counter-balancing, and destabilizing components: it is aggressive because it seeks to create a \u2018Turkish world<\/em>\u2019 through coercive corridors and military intervention in the South Caucasus, Syria, Iraq, and Libya; it is counter-balancing because it openly seeks to contain Iran\u2019s cultural, economic, political, and security influence; and it is destabilizing because, by changing demographic composition, identity manipulation, inciting ethnicities, and supporting extremist groups such as ISIS, it disrupts the region\u2019s security architecture (Ahmadi, 2009, pp. 3-9).<\/p>\n

Turkey\u2019s policy complements the West\u2019s strategy for the \u2018geopolitical strangulation\u2019<\/em> of Iran by blocking transit routes in the north, northwest, and west of the country and creating security threats, aiming to reduce Iran\u2019s resilience and establish Turkey as the region\u2019s hegemon. However, despite its coordination with Washington, Ankara refrains from supporting the disintegration of Iran; because it fears that Kurds and Israel might exploit Iran\u2019s collapse to dismember the country and then threaten Turkey (Roushani & Mossaedegh, 2021, p. 127).<\/p>\n

In the following, the dimensions of this rivalry are analyzed in 9 key areas according to the views of Iranian experts.<\/p>\n

3-1. The Caucasus foreign policy of Iran and Turkey: the \u2018NATO Turani Corridor\u2019 vs. geopolitical sustainability<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The South Caucasus region, especially after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, has become the clearest arena of confrontation between Iran\u2019s pattern of \u2018endogenous regionalism\u2019<\/em> and Turkey\u2019s \u2018’imposed trans-regionalism\u2019<\/em>. This war, which ended with Baku\u2019s victory thanks to Turkey\u2019s full military, advisory, and political support for the Republic of Azerbaijan, was not merely a territorial conflict but a turning point in activating Ankara\u2019s long-held projects to revise the region\u2019s geopolitical architecture in its own favor and to Iran\u2019s detriment. Turkey, maximizing the use of this development, placed the project of territorial linkage with the Republic of Azerbaijan and, beyond that, with the entire Turkic world on its agenda with unprecedented seriousness. Iranian experts analyze this project as the \u2018NATO Turani Corridor<\/em>\u2019 and call it a \u201cstrategic dream for the geopolitical encirclement of Iran<\/em>\u201d. In this plan, creating a communication corridor through Armenia (Syunik province) to physically connect Nakhchivan to mainland Azerbaijan and then to Turkey is the first and most critical step. The ultimate goal of this corridor is not merely a transit route, but the elimination of the physical border between Iran and Armenia, cutting off one of Tehran\u2019s main breathing routes to the north and the Caucasus, and ultimately, the territorial connection of Turkey to the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian republics through a route under Ankara\u2013Baku control and influence (Kazemi, 2022).<\/p>\n

This ambitious idea, promoted under the discourse of the \u2018Turkish world\u2019<\/em> with the aim of creating a Turkish civilizational-political bloc, is not merely a Turkish nationalist project but also enjoys the strategic backing of extra-regional powers. Iranian experts explicitly refer to this emerging structure as \u2018Turki<\/em>c<\/em> NATO\u2019<\/em> and argue that the goal of creating this bloc, which clearly enjoys the support of the United States, UK, and NATO, goes beyond cultural and economic convergence; Turkey seeks to establish a unified military-security front on Iran\u2019s northern borders. This \u2018Turkic NATO<\/em>\u2019, by strengthening the military capability of the Republic of Azerbaijan, holding joint exercises, intelligence and security coordination, and even inviting Armenia to join this bloc, aims to complete the encirclement ring around Iran from the north. The invitation to Tajikistan, a Persian-speaking country with cultural affinities, to join this organization shows Turkey\u2019s effort to penetrate the depths of Iran\u2019s civilizational sphere and change its identity in favor of the \u2018Turkish world<\/em>\u2019. Iranian experts consider this policy as \u201ca continuation of the strategy of Iran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation<\/em>\u201d, designed in full coordination with Washington to block Iran\u2019s transit routes in the north, northwest, and west.<\/p>\n

However, this imposed trans-regionalism of Turkey also faces internal challenges and resistance that reveal its artificial and fragile nature. The most important example is Kazakhstan\u2019s cautious approach as the most powerful and important Central Asian member of the Organization of Turkic States. Kazakhstan, contrary to Turkey\u2019s wishes, does not seek the excessive securitization and politicization of this organization and accepts its function at most within the framework of cultural and economic cooperation. From Kazakhstan\u2019s perspective, pursuing Turkey\u2019s interventionist and anti-Iranian approaches could endanger Astana\u2019s balanced and vital relations with Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, and turn the region into a new hotspot of tension. This gap reveals the inherent weakness of Turkey\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism pattern: the lack of natural identity-based commonalities and shared interests makes this imposed order fragile and dependent on the will of an extra-regional power.<\/p>\n

In contrast to this aggressive project, Iran\u2019s Caucasus policy, based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism, rests on 3 principles: geopolitical sustainability, respect for the national sovereignty of countries, and the creation of peaceful transit routes. This Iranian approach can be called \u2018defensive regionalism<\/em>\u2019, in which Iran, perceiving extra-regional threats, focuses on \u2018deterrence and balancing\u2019<\/em> rather than offering alternative hegemonic or trans-regional projects. For Tehran, any imposed corridor that violates Armenia\u2019s national sovereignty and limits Iran\u2019s access to Europe and Asia has been declared a \u2018strategic red line\u2019<\/em>. Therefore, Iran views the so-called \u2018Zangezur Corridor<\/em>\u2019 not as a simple transit route, but as part of a comprehensive plan to sever Iran\u2019s vital geo-economic arteries and complete its northern encirclement. Accordingly, while emphasizing Armenia\u2019s sovereign right over its communication routes, Iran has proposed initiatives such as the \u2018Peace Crossroads\u2019<\/em> within the framework of \u20183+3<\/em>\u2019 meetings for regional crisis management. Some Iranian experts define Turkey\u2019s policy under the West\u2019s \u2018geopolitical strangulation<\/em>\u2019 strategy against Iran and call Iran\u2019s counter-strategy \u2018geopolitical sustainability\u2019<\/em>; a strategy that seeks to preserve the existing status quo <\/em>of borders, prevent the creation of coercive corridors, and strengthen alternative corridors such as the \u2018North-South Corridor<\/em>\u2019 centered on Iran.<\/p>\n

In the deeper layers of this rivalry, the identity dimension also plays a decisive role. Some Iranian experts argue that the \u2018Turani Corridor\u2019<\/em> project is not merely a transport route but the backbone of a \u2018fabricated identity construction\u2019<\/em>. This corridor is supposed to implement the political concept of \u2018Turan\u2019<\/em> \u2013 constructed in opposition to the civilizational concept of \u2018Iran<\/em>\u2019 \u2013 on the map through the physical connection of Turkic-speaking lands. This identity construction, by appropriating Iranian symbols and celebrities (as will be discussed in Section 3-3) and attempting to distort the true history of the region which is linked to Iran, seeks to marginalize Iran\u2019s civilizational presence and influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia and replace it with a Turkish-Turani narrative. In the face of this aggressive wave, Iran advances its endogenous regionalism by emphasizing \u2018authentic civilizational, identity-based, linguistic, and religious commonalities<\/em>\u2019 with neighboring countries and counters this imposed project by stressing shared identity based on celebrations like Nowruz, Persian literary heritage, and historical coexistence. Thus, the confrontation in the Caucasus is not just over pipelines and corridors, but a battle between two identity narratives and two patterns of regionalism: Iran\u2019s regionalist, endogenous, and peaceful \u2018geopolitical sustainability<\/em>\u2019 versus Turkey\u2019s trans-regional, exogenous, and destabilizing \u2018Turani Corridor\u2019<\/em>.<\/p>\n

3-2. Sunnitization and Wahhabization in opposition to Iranian Shiism: manipulating religion as an instrument of trans-regionalism<\/strong><\/h4>\n

One of the most complex and yet destructive dimensions of Turkey\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism in the South Caucasus and West Asia is the instrumental use of religion to undermine Iran\u2019s historical and civilizational influence. This strategy, which can be called \u2018religious manipulation\u2019<\/em>, is operationalized at two complementary but distinct levels: at the first level, the \u2018Sunnitization and Wahhabization<\/em>\u2019 of non-Sunni Muslim communities, especially Shiite communities in the Republic of Azerbaijan; and at the second level, the \u2018creation and promotion of a model of non-Iranian and anti-Iranian Shiism\u2019<\/em> that aligns identity-wise with Ankara\u2013Baku and is defined in opposition to Iranian Shiism and the religious authority centered in the city of Qom. This policy, in its essence, is not an authentic religious act, but a political-security project within the framework of the grand strategy of \u2018geopolitical strangulation of Iran\u2019<\/em> and in continuation of the historical tradition of Neo-Ottomanism (Rafie & Mazloumi, 2012, pp. 88-89).<\/p>\n

To understand the depth of this policy, it must be analyzed in its historical continuum. According to Iranian experts, Turkey\u2019s religious policy in the Caucasus is a direct continuation of the Ottoman Empire\u2019s Re-Sunnification strategy. The Ottomans, who always considered themselves the standard-bearers of the Islamic world and the Caliph of Muslims worldwide, used religion as a tool to create rifts in Shiite communities and draw them into Istanbul\u2019s sphere of influence in their rivalry with Safavid Iran. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) under R. T. Erdogan, by redefining its Turkish-Islamic identity within the framework of Neo-Ottomanism and \u2018Muslim Brotherhood<\/em>\u2019-style politics, has revived this historical strategy and, using modern educational, media, and economic institutions, seeks to promote \u2018Sunni-Brotherhood<\/em>\u2019 Islamic teachings or, at the very least, make the Muslims living in the Caucasus, as well as Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon, indifferent to Iranian Shiism. Some Iranian experts call this approach \u2018covert Wahhabization<\/em>\u2019 and believe that Ankara, in cooperation with some Salafi and Wahhabi institutions also supported by Saudi Arabia, is gradually injecting Salafi-Wahhabi teachings among Shiite communities in the neighborhood. This process, by promoting \u2018Salafi-Brotherhood<\/em>\u2019 values, customs, and rituals, paves the way for the emotional and intellectual detachment of these communities from Iranian Shiism and their rapprochement with Turkish-Salafi Islam.<\/p>\n

The second dimension of this project, perhaps more complex and dangerous, is the attempt to \u2018create a new model of Shiism\u2019<\/em> whose intellectual, political, and even jurisprudential authority is defined not in Qom and Najaf, but in Baku and Ankara. The establishment of modern religious and educational institutions in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iraq, Syria, etc., indicates that Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan are nurturing a generation of Shiite clerics and elites who present a \u2018nationalist and Turkish<\/em>\u2019 narrative of Shiism; a narrative in which Turkish national identity takes precedence over transnational Shiite identity, and Iran is introduced as the \u2018other<\/em>\u2019 or even the \u2018historical enemy\u2019<\/em>. This \u2018Turkish Shiism\u2019<\/em> is explicitly defined in opposition to \u2018Iranian Shiism<\/em>\u2019 and the Axis of Resistance<\/em> in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. The ultimate goal of this policy is to sever the organic and longstanding connection of the Shiites of the Caucasus and West Asia with the religious authority and political jurisprudence teachings of Shiism in Iran, and to draw them into the political and cultural orbit of Ankara\u2013Baku. In other words, they seek to \u2018nationalize religion\u2019<\/em> and appropriate it for the political project of the \u2018Turkish world\u2019<\/em>, so that Iranian Shiite authority loses its ability to influence neighboring countries. Turkey pursues this project in various countries through identity and ethnic groups close to it; for example, in Iraq, by investing in the Turkmen ethnicity, it tries to distance them from Iranian-style Shiism.<\/p>\n

But this religious manipulation project is not limited to Iran\u2019s neighbors; it is also pursued in Iran\u2019s own Azeri provinces to promote divergence and federalism. According to Iranian experts, the ultimate goal of this policy is to export this new identity-religious model to the Azeri-populated regions of Iran, including Tabriz, Ardabil, Urmia, and Zanjan. By investing in some extremist ethnic circles inside Iran, Ankara tries, first, to weaken the sense of belonging of Iran\u2019s Azeris to the Shiite faith and Iranian national identity by creating a \u2018religious and identity-based divergence<\/em>\u2019 among them, and then, by offering an alternative \u2018Turkish-Brotherhood\u2019<\/em> Sunni identity, to create a ground for raising ethnic and political demands inside Iran in its own favor. Turkey\u2019s religious and identity intervention in the Azeri-populated regions of Iran has led to financial, media, and educational networking by Turkey in Azeri and even non-Azeri regions of Iran over the past two decades, and groundwork for promoting the idea of federalism, which will be discussed in detail in Section 3-5.<\/p>\n

In contrast to this aggressive and destabilizing project, Iran\u2019s religious policy is defined entirely based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism (religious coexistence versus identity imposition). Relying on its long-standing tradition of coexistence among different religions and sects within its own geography and the region, Iran has never sought to impose a religion or create artificial, handcrafted sects to advance political goals. Iran\u2019s religious influence in the Caucasus and West Asia, which has historical and natural roots, is exercised primarily through cultural diplomacy, religious seminaries (Howza), training of clergy, and the soft expansion of the discourse of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, Iran\u2019s soft power in the region does not stem from religious manipulation projects but is a natural product of long-standing civilizational and religious commonalities; for this reason, it enjoys greater depth and sustainability compared to Turkey\u2019s artificial and imposed projects. This fundamental difference once again reveals the confrontation between the two patterns of regionalism: Iran\u2019s endogenous regionalism, based on accepting plurality and strengthening authentic identity and religious commonalities, versus Turkey\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism, which, through manipulation and falsification of the authentic identity and religion of the region\u2019s people, seeks to create a uniform and hegemonic bloc to the detriment of its rival and historical other, Iran.<\/p>\n

3.3. The transformation of the concept of Iran into Turan: identity engineering as a tool for undermining Iranian nationhood and cultural influence<\/strong><\/h4>\n

If Turkey\u2019s Caucasus policy (Section 3.1) represents the hard and geopolitical dimension of Ankara\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism, and religious manipulation (Section 3.2) reflects its semi-hard socio-security dimension, then the project of transforming the concept of \u201cIran\u201d<\/em> into \u201cTuran\u201d<\/em> may be regarded as the core of Turkey\u2019s soft-power strategy and psychological operations in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Rooted in the pseudo-scientific theories of Pan-Turkism that emerged in the early 20th century, this project employs a broad array of media, educational, cinematic, and literary instruments to fundamentally rewrite the history, civilization, and regional identity of a geographical sphere that, for more than two millennia, has been closely associated with Iran and the Iranian-Islamic cultural tradition.<\/p>\n

The ultimate objective of this identity manipulation extends far beyond a mere historical claim. Rather, it seeks the comprehensive appropriation of Iran\u2019s civilizational legacy throughout the region, the expropriation of its cultural and intellectual heritage, and ultimately the erasure of \u201cIran<\/em>\u201d from the mental and identity maps of the peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even segments of Iran\u2019s own population. Such efforts aim to create the ideological and cultural foundations necessary for the consolidation of a broader \u201cTurkic world<\/em>\u201d under Turkish leadership. Similar, albeit less intensive, initiatives can also be observed in Iran\u2019s western neighborhood, particularly in Iraq and Syria. This process may be viewed as the soft-power complement to the broader strategy of Iran\u2019s geopolitical containment; before Iran can be physically encircled, it must first be subjected to cultural and civilizational encirclement (Kazemi, 2010).<\/p>\n

The most visible manifestation of this project is the appropriation and reinterpretation of shared regional symbols and traditions. The most prominent example is the attempt to appropriate Nowruz \u2013 the oldest Iranian festival and one of the most significant civilizational symbols of the Iranian cultural sphere \u2013 and redefine it as a \u201cTuranian holiday<\/em>\u201d or a specifically \u201cTurkic spring festival<\/em>. State-affiliated media outlets in Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan frequently seek to downplay the Iranian origins of Nowruz and recast it as an ethnic Turkic celebration. This historical distortion, which disregards extensive archaeological, historical, and literary evidence, serves a broader political purpose: severing the emotional and cultural connection between millions of people who celebrate Nowruz and the Iranian civilizational tradition, while attaching the festival to a newly constructed and politically motivated Turanian identity. Such actions may be interpreted as a form of identity appropriation on a civilizational scale and constitute an important component of a broader cognitive struggle over the historical memory of the peoples of the region.<\/p>\n

Following the appropriation of cultural traditions, attention shifts toward the appropriation of historical personalities and intellectual heritage. In this regard, few examples are as illustrative as efforts to redefine the identity of the poet Nizami Ganjavi, one of the greatest narrative poets in the history of Persian literature. Historical, linguistic, cultural, and geographical evidence overwhelmingly confirms Nizami\u2019s Iranian cultural identity. He composed exclusively in Persian, lived within the cultural environment of the Iranian world, and his works are deeply infused with themes derived from pre-Islamic Iranian traditions as well as Iranian-Islamic intellectual thought. There is no evidence that he ever composed poetry in Turkic.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, Pan-Turkist intellectual and political circles have systematically sought to reinterpret Nizami as a Turkic figure through conferences, monuments, publications, and media productions. According to critics of this process, these efforts have even involved alterations to the presentation of Nizami\u2019s mausoleum in the Republic of Azerbaijan, including the removal of Persian inscriptions and the attribution of fabricated Turkish verses to the poet. Such practices, which stand in contradiction to established scholarly and academic standards, are interpreted by these critics as part of a broader political effort to diminish the Iranian cultural identity of the Caucasus.<\/p>\n

A similar process is often identified in relation to Jalal al-Din Rumi (Mawlana). Through extensive investment in the cultural and tourism industries centered in Konya, Turkey has sought to present Rumi primarily as a \u201cTurkish Sufi\u201d<\/em>, thereby incorporating another major component of the Iranian-Islamic intellectual tradition into a Turkish national narrative. These efforts may be understood as attempts to appropriate the soft-power assets of Iranian civilization and relocate them within an alternative identity framework.<\/p>\n

These individual cases of cultural appropriation should be understood within the context of a broader project aimed at transforming the geographical and civilizational concept of \u201cIran<\/em>\u201d into that of \u201cTuran\u201d<\/em>. This project involves the construction of an imagined geography and a manufactured collective identity. In classical Iranian historical and mythological narratives, \u201cTuran<\/em>\u201d referred to lands beyond the Amu Darya (the Ceyhon River) inhabited by people of Iranian origin but were not under the rule of the Iranian government and had no identity or civilizational connection with the Turks of Central Asia. Pan-Turkist ideology, however, has reinterpreted the concept as the ancient homeland of all Turkic peoples and positioned it in direct opposition to Iran.<\/p>\n

Beginning in the early 20th century, Pan-Turkist intellectuals constructed an expansive historical narrative portraying \u201cTuran<\/em>\u201d as a transcontinental homeland extending from the Balkans to Siberia while simultaneously depicting Iran as the historical adversary of this imagined community. Today, this constructed geography serves as the conceptual foundation for political and cultural representations of the \u201cTurkic World\u201d<\/em> and is increasingly reflected in educational materials, official maps, and political discourse in both Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This phenomenon may be described as \u201cfake geographization\u201d<\/em>, whereby an imagined geographical construct is employed to legitimize political influence and geopolitical claims in territories that have historically formed part of the broader Iranian civilizational sphere. The increasing use of the term \u201cTurkestan<\/em>\u201d in Turkish educational materials to describe Central Asia may also be interpreted within this broader context.<\/p>\n

The domestic dimension of this identity-construction project focuses on Iranian Azerbaijanis. The objective is to weaken their connection to the broader components of Iranian national identity that are shared among all citizens of the country. Through satellite television channels, social media networks, local activists, and expanded cultural and diplomatic initiatives \u2013 including efforts to establish additional consular representations in major Iranian cities \u2013 Pan-Turkist networks seek to redefine the identity of Iranian Azerbaijanis, who have historically constituted an integral component of the Iranian nation.<\/p>\n

The goal is to promote an alternative \u201cTurkic-Turanian<\/em>\u201d identity in which Iranian Azerbaijanis are portrayed not as participants in Iranian history and nationhood but as a distinct nation allegedly subjected to Persian domination. By emphasizing linguistic differences and mobilizing ethnic sentiments, this narrative seeks to create a process of identity divergence whose long-term objective is to facilitate federalist projects and deepen centrifugal tendencies within Iran. From this perspective, identity manipulation is viewed as a prerequisite for any future political challenge to Iran\u2019s territorial integrity, which explains the considerable investment devoted to such efforts.<\/p>\n

In response to these developments, Iran\u2019s approach \u2013 consistent with the model of endogenous regionalism \u2013 is based upon cultural resilience and the reinforcement of authentic historical and civilizational ties among the peoples of the region. This strategy may be described as a return to civilizational self-awareness. Rather than constructing rival identity projects, Iran has emphasized historical documentation, scholarly cooperation, joint academic conferences, support for impartial research, and the promotion of a shared Iranian-Islamic cultural identity rooted in centuries of coexistence.<\/p>\n

Examples include multinational celebrations of Nowruz, commemorations of figures such as Nizami and Rumi as contributors to the shared heritage of humanity rather than the exclusive property of any particular ethnic group, and the promotion of Persian language and literature as a historical lingua franca<\/em> of regional civilization. This approach rests on the assumption that authentic historical realities and deeply rooted cultural affinities possess an inherent deterrent capacity against imposed and artificial identity projects and that there is no need to manufacture antagonistic identities in order to advance the interests of extra-regional powers whose objectives frequently diverge from those of the peoples of the region.<\/p>\n

This policy may therefore be characterized as a form of \u201cidentity deterrence<\/em>, whereby Iran relies upon the depth of its civilizational heritage to counteract the influence of externally driven trans-regional identity projects.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the struggle over the concepts of \u201cIran\u201d<\/em> and \u201cTuran\u201d<\/em> should not be viewed merely as a historical, literary, or cultural dispute. Rather, it constitutes one of the most significant fronts in the confrontation between two competing models of regionalism: an Iranian model grounded in authenticity, pluralism, and the coexistence of historically rooted identities, and a Turkish trans-regional model which, according to its critics, relies upon appropriation, historical revisionism, and the promotion of a constructed supranational identity in pursuit of broader hegemonic objectives and the strategic interests of its Western partners.<\/p>\n

3-4. Turkey\u2019s role in NATO against Iran: the military arm of trans-regionalism for the security encirclement of Iran<\/strong><\/h4>\n

If Turkey\u2019s Caucasus policies (Section 3-1), religious policies (Section 3-2), and identity policies (Section 3-3) constitute the soft and semi-hard dimensions of Ankara\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism, then Turkey\u2019s role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Iran reveals the hard, military dimension of this strategy. Turkey, as NATO\u2019s second-largest army in terms of manpower and possessing a strategically critical geographical position among the alliance\u2019s members, is not considered merely an ordinary member of this military coalition but rather acts as a \u201cforward arm\u201d<\/em> to advance the West\u2019s strategic objectives in a region directly linked to Iran\u2019s national security. This role, analyzed as a continuation of the historical strategy of containing Iran and within the framework of the goal of Iran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation, is operationalized on the one hand using NATO\u2019s own infrastructure against Iran, and on the other hand, by attempting to extend the alliance\u2019s security umbrella to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, tightening the ring of military encirclement around Iran.<\/p>\n

The clearest and most tangible dimension of Turkey\u2019s role in NATO against Iran is making its territory available for the deployment of the alliance\u2019s military and intelligence infrastructure, which directly targets Iran\u2019s security and has been used in the recent U.S. and Israeli wars against Iran. Two strategic facilities in Turkey \u2013 Incirlik Air Base and the K\u00fcrecik Radar Station \u2013 play a vital role in this regard. Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, at a relatively short distance from Iran\u2019s borders, is not only a major logistical hub for U.S. and NATO forces but also a location for the deployment of tactical fighter jets and some U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (within NATO\u2019s nuclear sharing program). Incirlik could serve as one of the primary air launch pads in any military action against Iran. However, a more direct and permanent threat is the K\u00fcrecik Radar Station in Malatya province, southeastern Turkey. This station, which is part of NATO\u2019s Integrated Air and Missile Defense System, utilizes advanced AN\/TPY-2<\/em> radars capable of tracking missiles launched from deep within Iranian territory. This radar, said to be able to detect targets up to a range of 3,000 kilometers, effectively acts as an ever-watchful eye over Iran\u2019s skies, transmitting vital information about Iran\u2019s missile and space capabilities to U.S., Israeli, and NATO command centers. This station is specifically a key element in the U.S. and Israeli \u201cregional deterrence architecture\u201d<\/em> against Iran. These facilities have turned Turkey into an \u201caccomplice\u201d in any Western military adventure against Iran.<\/p>\n

The second and more ambitious dimension of Turkey\u2019s role is Ankara\u2019s systematic effort to extend NATO\u2019s influence and security umbrella to the South Caucasus and Central Asia \u2013 regions directly on Iran\u2019s northern and northeastern borders, historically considered part of Iran\u2019s natural and security sphere of influence. Iranian experts refer to this project as \u201cTurkic NATO<\/em>\u201d and argue that Turkey, with two complementary goals, seeks to bring NATO into these regions: first, to legitimize and create a powerful coalition for its hegemonic project in the Turkic world; and second, to complete the ring of military encirclement of Iran from the north. In this regard, holding joint military exercises with Caucasus and Central Asian countries under various banners is not merely tactical maneuvers, but carries a clear strategic message for Iran. These maneuvers can be seen as shows of force on Iran\u2019s borders and as tests of operational scenarios for intervention in northern and northwestern Iran, especially following the recent U.S. and Israeli wars against Iran. More important than the maneuvers is Turkey\u2019s massive sale of advanced weaponry to the Republic of Azerbaijan, which proved its worth in the Second Karabakh War. These weapons, especially Bayraktar TB2<\/em> drones, guided missiles, and electronic warfare systems, have injected NATO standards into the arsenal of the Azerbaijani army and have significantly increased the interoperability of that country\u2019s armed forces with the Turkish army and, consequently, with NATO. This process can be called the gradual NATO-ization of the Republic of Azerbaijan\u2019s army, considered a major step towards turning its territory into a \u201cNATO operational base on Iran\u2019s northern borders\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

These efforts have also met with implicit or explicit approval from the U.S. and NATO. Washington and Brussels, seeking after the Ukraine war to reduce the dependence of Central Asian and Caucasus countries on Russia and also to counter China\u2019s growing influence, see the \u201cTurkic NATO<\/em>\u201d project as a useful tool to advance their own goals. According to Iranian experts, the ultimate goal is to transform the Organization of Turkic States into a new NATO on Iran\u2019s borders; a NATO that, alongside U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region and Israel\u2019s military presence in Azerbaijan, would complete the 360-degree encirclement of Iran. Corridors such as the so-called \u2018Zangezur Corridor\u2019<\/em> and the \u2018Tramp route<\/em>\u2019 are not merely economic routes but \u201cmilitary corridors<\/em>\u201d for the rapid movement of NATO forces and equipment from Turkey to the South Caucasus and Central Asia and vice versa in the event of a crisis with Iran. This directly and severely threatens Iran\u2019s strategic depth on its northern and northwestern borders. According to Iranian experts, to complete this scenario, the U.S. and Turkey are vigorously pursuing a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia so that the accession of these two countries to NATO, followed by the security threat to Iran as well as China and Russia, can be operationalized by the West in the near future, and NATO can be deployed in a region with rapid access to these three countries.<\/p>\n

The Turkish government\u2019s role against Iran\u2019s security is not limited to the framework of NATO but is also pursued through bilateral security and intelligence cooperation. Turkey\u2019s National Intelligence Organization (M\u0130T) closely cooperates with Western intelligence agencies and some regional countries to monitor Iran\u2019s movements and its aligned forces and networks. Alongside supporting NATO infrastructure on its soil, Ankara has used its intelligence channels to gather intelligence from deep within Iran and its territory for sabotage activities and covert operations against Iranian interests. All these actions have turned Turkey into a neighbor with destructive behavior towards Iran, which, within the framework of the trans-regionalism strategy, prioritizes advancing Western security interests over respecting good neighborly relations and regional stability.<\/p>\n

In the face of this extra-regional security encirclement, Iran\u2019s policy, based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism, relies on defensive balancing and strengthening non-NATO coalitions. The goal of this action is not to create a rival aggressive military bloc, but to neutralize threats and create endogenous deterrence. Accordingly, Iran has pursued two parallel paths: first, the development of fully indigenous defense capabilities, especially in the missile and drone fields, which are not dependent on any external coalition or extra-regional power, and which guarantee Iran\u2019s independent deterrent power against NATO threats. In fact, Iran\u2019s defense doctrine, learning from the experience of countries dependent on NATO, is based on \u201cstrategic self-reliance\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The second path is strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation with powers independent of NATO, such as Russia and China, as well as pursuing intra-regional security initiatives. Iran\u2019s firm opposition to the presence of extra-regional forces in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and West Asia, and its pursuit of regional security formats such as \u201c3+3\u201d<\/em>, is precisely aimed at preventing the realization of the \u201cTurkic NATO\u201d<\/em> scenario and maintaining the security of its northern and western borders. By emphasizing that regional security must be provided by the region\u2019s countries themselves, Iran is presenting an \u201calternative model\u201d<\/em> for the region\u2019s security architecture: a model that, unlike Turkey and NATO\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism, is based on national sovereignty, mutual respect, and the collective cooperation of the region\u2019s countries. This confrontation goes far beyond a simple military rivalry and represents a battle between two different security orders: the imposed trans-regional order (NATO-centered with a \u201cTurkish arm<\/em>\u201d) versus the endogenous regional order (centered on Iran).<\/p>\n

3-5. Interventionist policy towards Iran\u2019s Azerbaijani-speaking population: identity engineering and groundwork for internal divergence<\/strong><\/h4>\n

If the Caucasus projects (Section 3-1) seek the external encirclement of Iran, and the religious (Section 3-2) and identity (Section 3-3) projects aim to change the cultural and religious fabric of the region to Iran\u2019s detriment, then Turkey\u2019s interventionist policy towards Iran\u2019s Azerbaijani-speaking population must be considered the \u201cfinal stage and most dangerous layer<\/em>\u201d of Ankara\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism \u2013 a layer that directly targets Iran\u2019s territorial integrity and national cohesion. This policy, pursued with particular subtlety and complexity by Turkey\u2019s intelligence, cultural, and media institutions, is not a sporadic reaction but a long-term, systematic strategy to create ethnic rifts, weaken Iranian national identity among Azerbaijani-speakers, and ultimately, pave the way for changing Iran\u2019s political structure from a centralized state to a federal system based on ethno-linguistic cleavages. This policy of Turkey can be called the \u201cinternal front of the strategy for Iran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation\u201d<\/em>; a front intended to cause social and political divergence within Iran simultaneously with external pressure.<\/p>\n

Ankara\u2019s extensive networking and financial and media support for extremist ethnic circles inside Iran is for this very reason. Turkey\u2019s National Intelligence Organization (M\u0130T) and Turkish government-affiliated cultural institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (T\u0130KA) and the Yunus Emre Foundation, by creating and strengthening non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Telegram and Instagram groups, satellite channels, and news websites, and by implementing apparently neutral cultural, recreational, and educational programs, are engaged in promoting extreme and divergent ethnic literature among a portion of Iran\u201ds Azerbaijani-speaking population. Some Turkish media outlets, such as the television channels \u201cG\u00fcnaz TV\u201d and \u201cAraz TV\u201d, which broadcast from outside Iran, with large budgets and under the direct or indirect guidance of Baku and Ankara, systematically incite ethnic sentiments, exaggerate economic and social problems in Azerbaijani-populated regions, and promote the false narrative of \u201csuppression of Turks in Iran\u201d<\/em>. By creating a poisonous \u201cinformation bubble<\/em>\u201d, these media seek to detach their audience from Iran\u2019s public sphere and expose them to a one-sided, anti-Iranian narrative.<\/p>\n

The goal of this networking is to create an \u201cethnic civil society\u201d<\/em> and strengthen the authority of \u201calternative elites<\/em>\u201d using individuals from across the borders who can act as the vanguards of divergent political, economic, and security demands in the future. This process can be called \u201ccultivating a fifth column<\/em>\u201d. By granting scholarships, inviting Azerbaijani students and civil activists to training courses in Turkey, and financially supporting ostensibly cultural organizations, Ankara is building a generation of Azerbaijani-speaking elites who prefer a Turkish-Turani identity over Iranian national identity and act as a pressure lever against the central Iranian government. The goal of this policy is not to defend the cultural rights of Azerbaijanis (which are recognized in Iran\u2019s Constitution) but to \u201cpoliticize ethnic identity<\/em>\u201dand turn it into a tool of political and security pressure. Historical records show that Turkey, on behalf of Western countries, has always tried to incite Iran\u2019s Azerbaijanis against the central government by highlighting their demands, and then, ignoring those demands, use the resulting weakening of the central government to impose its own political, security, and economic demands on Iran. Thus, it considers Azerbaijanis only as a pressure lever to intensify divergence in Iran.<\/p>\n

The beating heart of this interventionist policy is the promotion of the idea of \u201cethnic federalism\u201d<\/em> as an alleged solution to the \u201cAzerbaijani issue<\/em>\u201d in Iran. This idea, which has been increasingly raised in recent years by Pan-Turkist circles with the implicit or explicit support of Ankara, is not merely a political proposal but a \u201cstep-by-step strategy for divergence and weakening Iran from within\u201d<\/em>. This idea, which encompasses identity engineering to changing Iran\u2019s political structure, can be summarized in several main axes, all of which stand in direct opposition to Iran\u2019s unified and historical structure:<\/p>\n

– Territorial division based on language: Under this idea, in any region of Iran where \u201cTurkic-speaking\u201d individuals (according to the Pan-Turkists\u2019 definition) live, \u201cindependent Turkish provinces<\/em>\u201d should be established. This would effectively mean the fragmentation of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, and significant parts of North Khorasan, Hamadan, Qazvin, Fars, Isfahan, Gilan provinces, etc., and turning them into autonomous political units with their own flags, local governments, and specific laws.<\/p>\n

– Imposition of Turkish as an official language: This plan would make education in the Turkish language mandatory in schools and universities and introduce Persian \u2013 which as a common language connects all Iranians \u2013 as an \u201cimposed language<\/em>\u201d and a \u201csymbol of oppression\u201d<\/em>. The goal is to sever the new generation of Iran\u2019s Azerbaijanis from the vast literary and scientific heritage of the Persian language (which Azerbaijanis themselves have played an irreplaceable role in creating throughout history) and replace it with a language that serves as the link between Azerbaijanis and Ankara and Baku, thereby weakening the connection of this segment of the Iranian people with other Iranians.<\/p>\n

– False emphasis on the suppression of Azerbaijanis and ethnic hatred: The narrative of \u201csuppression of Turks in Iran\u201d<\/em>, constantly repeated by these circles, is designed to create anger, mistrust, and a sense of victimhood among Azerbaijanis. Alongside this, a deep \u201ccultural dichotomization<\/em>\u201d is carried out to completely separate Azerbaijani identity from Iranian identity. Iranian experts point to specific examples of this fabricated dichotomization: emphasizing the authority of the \u201cBook of Dede Korkut\u201d (the epic tales of the Oghuz Turkic tribes) against Ferdowsi\u2019s \u201cShahnameh\u201d as a symbol of Iranian identity; introducing poets like “Fuzuli of Baghdad” (who wrote poetry in both Persian and Turkish) as a literary symbol of Azerbaijanis against Ferdowsi or \u201cNizami Ganjavi\u201d, whose Iranian identity is denied or distorted. These dichotomizations place Azerbaijanis in an \u201ceither\/or\u201d identity trap: either they are Turks and Turanians and must break ties with Iran, or they are Iranian and thus considered \u201ctraitors to their people\u201d<\/em>. This action constitutes \u201cengineering historical memory\u201d<\/em> and \u201cconstructing an artificial identity schism within the body of a single nation\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

– Stoking ethnic identity in public arenas: This policy has even extended to ostensibly non-political arenas such as sports. Efforts are underway to stoke ethnic identity in sports teams from Turkic-speaking regions, such as \u201cTractor Sazi\u201d of Tabriz, and even attempts are made to steer other Iranian ethnic groups down the same path, turning famous and popular football or volleyball teams in these regions into tools for advancing the policy of fabricated identity construction. The transformation of these clubs and their fans from a national-sports phenomenon into an \u201cethnic symbol\u201d<\/em> and a \u201ccenter of political protests\u201d<\/em> against the central government is also being seriously pursued by Baku and Ankara, and articles on this subject have been published in Israeli and British think tanks and publications in recent years, indicating the identity of the behind-the-scenes supporters of these policies. The goal is to exploit pure sports sentiments to create a popular base for promoting divergent and anti-national unity ideas in Iran.<\/p>\n

The central core of this intervention is a widespread psychological operation to deny the existence of deep identity, civilizational, religious, and historical ties between Azerbaijanis and other Iranian ethnic groups. Pan-Turkist discourse, ignoring a wealth of historical evidence, presents Azerbaijanis as \u201cpeople of Turkic origin<\/em>\u201d whose land has \u201cbeen occupied by Persians\u201d<\/em> and to whom Iranian and Shiite identity has been \u201cimposed<\/em>\u201d. This observation holds true even though Azerbaijanis represent one of the most ancient Iranian ethnic groups. Their original tongue, Old Azari, constituted a northwestern branch of the Iranian language family, and the shift toward Turkic linguistic influence was a gradual process spanning several centuries. This historical distortion can be called \u201cethnic manipulation through fabricated narrative-building<\/em>\u201d; an attempt to erase Iran\u2019s footprint among the country\u2019s Azerbaijanis. This historical fabrication not only distorts the past but also targets the future: if Azerbaijanis believe they \u201care not Iranian\u201d<\/em>, then the path is paved to incite them to take any political action against Iran\u2019s unity and territorial integrity.<\/p>\n

A noteworthy point in this policy is its inherent paradox. Turkey, on the one hand, tries with all its might to weaken Iran\u2019s unified structure and promote ethnic federalism, but on the other hand, it greatly fears the complete collapse and disintegration of Iran. Ankara wants a weak Iran that cannot compete with it in the region, but especially after the recent U.S. and Israeli wars against Iran and Israel\u2019s concrete threats against Turkey, it treats the disintegration of Iran as a \u201cred line\u201d. Because the disintegration of Iran would mean the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northwestern Iran, which could directly encourage Turkey\u2019s own Kurds to engage in armed struggle and separatism. Furthermore, Israel, which has historically supported the disintegration of Iran and the creation of a \u201csecond Israel<\/em>\u201d in northwestern Iran, would exploit this collapse to advance its own goals and could, in the next step, become a threat to Turkey itself. Thus, Ankara\u2019s support for federalism is a \u201cdangerous game on the edge of a cliff\u201d<\/em>: creating enough instability to weaken Iran, but not so much that Iran collapses and the consequences affect Turkey (this will be discussed further in Section 3-7).<\/p>\n

In contrast to this extensive interventionist project, Iran\u2019s policy, based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism, rests on two pillars: \u201cnational cohesion<\/em>\u201d and \u201chistorical coexistence\u201d<\/em> as a defensive shield. Iran\u2019s greatest strength against these threats is the historical loyalty and deep sense of belonging of Iran\u2019s Azerbaijanis to the Iranian nation and homeland. Throughout history, from the Safavid era to the Sacred Defense (Iran-Iraq war) and especially during the recent U.S. and Israeli military attacks on Iran, Azerbaijanis have always been at the forefront of defending Iran. Prominent figures such as Sattar Khan, Baqer Khan, Martyr Bakri, and the late Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are symbols of this unwavering loyalty of Azerbaijanis to Iran. Relying on this reality, Iran has pursued policies of \u201cbalanced development\u201d<\/em>, \u201cequal political participation\u201d<\/em>, and \u201crecognition of cultural and linguistic diversity<\/em>\u201d (including teaching the Azerbaijani language at universities, publishing books, and allowing local newspapers and publications in that language). These policies, contrary to the claims of Pan-Turkists, have made Azerbaijanis an inseparable and influential part of Iran\u2019s national sovereignty. This model can be called \u201cconvergence within plurality\u201d<\/em>; a pattern in which ethnic and linguistic identity is seen not as a threat, but as part of the colorful mosaic of Iran\u2019s national identity. This endogenous and historical cohesion is the most important obstacle to the success of Turkey\u2019s imposed projects and fake federalism.<\/p>\n

3-6. Turkey\u2019s anti-Iranian policy in Syria and Lebanon: from the illusion of eliminating the Axis of Resistance to being trapped in Israel\u2019s snare<\/strong><\/h4>\n

If the South Caucasus and Central Asia are considered the arena for Turkey\u2019s economic, security, and cultural operations against Iran (Sections 3-1 to 3-5), then Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine must be regarded as the \u201cmain battlefield of direct confrontation\u201d<\/em> between Ankara and Tehran\u2019s regional influence and the Axis of Resistance. The Syrian crisis, which began in 2011, was not merely a civil war but quickly turned into a \u201cregional cold war battleground\u201d<\/em> in which Turkey emerged with full force as the \u201cshock absorber of Iran\u2019s influence<\/em>\u201d and the \u201cdriver of the Greater Middle East plan\u201d<\/em>. Some experts analyze this policy under the heading \u201cTurkey\u2019s implicit support for the U.S. Greater Middle East plan<\/em>\u201d and believe that Ankara, from the very beginning, pursued the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government not only to eliminate a regional rival but also as a vital step to sever the vital arteries of the Axis of Resistance and contain Iran in the Eastern Mediterranean, so that it could dominate the region and pursue its own plans for creating corridors for the transfer of goods and energy and becoming the sole security savior of West Asia with whom everyone must deal. However, what happened on this ground was not the realization of Turkey\u2019s goals, but its entrapment in a strategic trap as vast as the entire Middle East; a trap that not only did not weaken Iran but also left Ankara disarmed against Israel and stuck in an endless quagmire, and now Syria must bear the heavy security and economic costs of Israel\u2019s increased role-playing in Turkey.<\/p>\n

From the very first months of the Syrian crisis, Turkey, through full logistical, financial, weapons, and intelligence support for armed opposition groups against the Assad government, effectively became one of the main players on the battlefield. The unstated but entirely obvious goal of this intervention was to \u201creduce Iran\u2019s Shiite influence<\/em>” and sever the geographical and operational link of the Axis of Resistance from Tehran to Beirut. Initially, by carrying out several cross-border military operations and occupying large parts of northern Syria, from Afrin to Jarabulus and Idlib, and then participating in the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government, Ankara effectively created a \u201csafe zone\u201d<\/em> under its control that pursued two strategic goals: first, to cut or disrupt the Iran\u2013Iraq\u2013Syria\u2013Lebanon land corridor, which is the logistical backbone of the Axis of Resistance; and second, to create a \u201cSunni belt\u201d<\/em> under Turkish influence that could be used to pressure the Assad government and contain Iran\u2019s and Hezbollah\u2019s influence. In fact, Turkey\u2019s occupation of northern Syria and then the establishment of the Jolani puppet government in that country is part of the broader U.S. and NATO strategy to \u201cencircle Iran from the west\u201d<\/em> and complete the encirclement ring that starts from the Caucasus (Section 3-1), continues to the Persian Gulf, and ultimately leads to Iran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation.<\/p>\n

But the most important and at the same time tragic aspect of Turkey\u2019s policy in Syria was Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan and Hakan Fidan\u2019s misguided and simplistic understanding of Israel\u2019s strategic intentions. In analyzing the consequences of Turkey\u2019s Syria policy for the Axis of Resistance, one must note that Erdo\u011fan and his foreign policy team, with the \u201cillusion<\/em>\u201d of being able to simultaneously confront Iran and contain Israel, effectively did the greatest strategic service to Tel Aviv. Turkey first, by weakening the Syrian central government and creating areas under the control of armed groups, \u201ceffectively put Syria on the path to partition<\/em>\u201d, and finally, by bringing to power a puppet government composed of mercenary terrorists loyal to itself, created a space in which Israel could easily advance. With its \u201clow strategic understanding\u201d<\/em>, Ankara imagined it could use Israel as a lever against Iran, unaware that Israel sees Turkey as well as Iran as a civilizational and strategic rival in the Islamic world and seeks to weaken both regional powers simultaneously.<\/p>\n

The result of this miscalculation was a strategic disaster for Turkey and its allies, which had two consequences:<\/p>\n

– Handing Syria over to Israel: By weakening Syria\u2019s national sovereignty, Turkey effectively turned that country into an \u201cIsrael\u2019s playground<\/em>. The Israeli army, which was previously concerned about the influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria, intensified its airstrikes and ground operations deep inside Syrian territory, taking advantage of the security vacuum created by Turkey, and has now also occupied parts of southern Syria. This situation can be described as the \u201crealization of Israel\u2019s long-held desire to occupy from the Nile to the Euphrates<\/em>\u201d through the exploitation of Turkey\u2019s misguided policies.<\/p>\n

– Leaving Lebanon defenseless: Hezbollah in Lebanon, as the most powerful arm of the Axis of Resistance, always considered Syria its \u201cstrategic depth\u201d<\/em> and \u201clogistical bridge\u201d<\/em>. Turkey\u2019s anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian policies made this bridge highly vulnerable. According to the firm belief of Iranian experts, \u201cErdo\u011fan and Fidan left Lebanon defenseless against Israeli attacks<\/em>\u201d. During the successive Israeli wars against Lebanon, the weakness of the Syrian corridor due to Turkey\u2019s presence and obstruction made Hezbollah\u2019s reconstruction and logistical capacity difficult and shifted the balance of terror on Israel\u2019s northern borders in Tel Aviv\u2019s favor. This facilitated Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon and the assassination of Resistance commanders.<\/p>\n

But Turkey\u2019s anti-Iranian policy in Syria did not only harm Iran and Lebanon; it also trapped Ankara itself in \u201cIsrael<\/em>\u2019s strategic snare\u201d<\/em>. Iranian experts point out that Turkey is now in direct tension with Israel in northern Syria. Israel, which sees Turkey as an ambitious rival in the Islamic world, by advancing in Syria and supporting Kurdish groups, has effectively limited Ankara\u2019s sphere of influence and even threatens its military interests. Turkey, which once entered the Syrian crisis hoping to use the Israel card against Iran, now finds itself facing Israeli expansionism in Syria. According to international experts, this situation is the result of \u201cErdo\u011fan and Fidan\u2019s low understanding of the international system and Israel\u2019s intentions\u201d<\/em>, which “ended up harming Turkey itself, but it is now too late to compensate\u201d<\/em>. Turkey is now facing accumulated crises in Syria: increasing Arab public hostility to Turkey\u2019s occupation, the strengthening of Syrian Kurds under the protection of the U.S. and Israel, the Syrian refugee crisis inside Turkey, and growing international isolation. In other words, Ankara, with its own hands, has turned the alleged \u201cstrategic depth<\/em>” of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto\u011flu into a \u201cstrategic quagmire\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

One of the less-examined but highly critical dimensions of Turkey\u2019s policy in Syria is the role this country has played in facilitating Israeli and U.S. airstrikes on Iran. Turkey\u2019s control of Syrian airspace and the presence of its forces, given the destruction of Syria\u2019s military infrastructure by Israel, have effectively created a \u201csafe corridor<\/em>” for Israeli and American warplanes. Israel, which previously had to take complicated and risky routes through Jordan or Iraq to attack targets deep inside Syria or near Iran\u2019s borders, can now more confidently use the \u201csecurity vacuum<\/em>” created in northern Syria due to Turkey\u2019s occupation and the weakness of the central government to approach Iran\u2019s borders. In effect, by weakening Syria\u2019s air defense and sovereignty, Turkey has punctured \u201cIran\u2019s defensive shield on its western borders<\/em>\u201d and left Israel\u2019s hand freer for aerial adventures against Iran. This has made Turkey an \u201cindirect partner\u201d<\/em> in Israeli and US airstrikes on Iran and the infrastructure of the Axis of Resistance; strikes aimed at weakening Iran, which Turkey exploits as a tool to advance its strategy of Iran\u2019s \u201cgeopolitical strangulation\u201d<\/em>, but has effectively lost control over how this strategy is realized due to its own misguided policies, ceding it to the U.S. and Israel.<\/p>\n

In contrast to this aggressive and destabilizing Turkish policy, Iran\u2019s approach in Syria and Lebanon has been entirely based on the pattern of endogenous, stability-oriented regionalism. Iranian experts describe this policy as \u201cdefending the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the region<\/em>\u2019s countries against terrorism and foreign and extra-regional intervention\u201d<\/em>. From the very beginning, Iran, through advisory presence and support for the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad and the Lebanese Resistance, has sought to preserve the existing political structure, prevent the collapse of border integrity and the authority of the central government in Syria and Lebanon, and counter secessionist and terrorist projects in the region. Therefore, Iran\u2019s goal is not to create a Shiite empire, but to \u201cestablish a resistance bloc against extra-regional intervention\u201d<\/em> and consolidate a regional order based on respect for the sovereignty of states. Iranian experts call this approach \u201cdefensive regionalism against aggressive trans-regionalism\u201d<\/em> and argue that Iran, unlike Turkey which has resorted to occupation and artificial geopolitical changes, has always emphasized a political solution and maintaining the unity of Syria and Lebanon. This fundamental difference once again displays two opposing patterns: Iran\u2019s endogenous regionalism, which seeks stabilization and preserving the existence of regional states, versus Turkey\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism, which, through military intervention and occupation, has driven the region towards partition and absolute instability. In this arena, although Turkey sought to weaken Iran, it fell into the trap it had dug for others.<\/p>\n

3-7. Turkey\u2019s stance in the U.S. and Israeli war with Iran: the paradox of weakening and disintegration<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Among all the dimensions of Turkey\u2019s aggressive trans-regionalism against Iran, the country\u2019s stance regarding the two full-scale wars of the U.S.–Israel axis against Iran is the most complex, contradictory, and at the same time revealing aspect of this strategy. In this scenario, Turkey has not been a marginal player but one of the main pillars of the U.S.-led \u201canti-Iranian coalition\u201d<\/em>. However, unlike a simple ally, Ankara is grappling with a deadly \u201cstrategic paradox<\/em>” on this field: on the one hand, it is eager to severely weaken Iran to eliminate its civilizational and regional rival and consolidate its hegemony in the Caucasus and West Asia; but on the other hand, it is deeply worried about the collapse and disintegration of Iran. This paradox, rooted in Turkey\u2019s own ethnic and security vulnerabilities, defines Ankara\u2019s \u201cred line\u201d not based on \u201cconfronting Iran\u201d<\/em> but on the “extent and result of this confrontation\u201d<\/em>. Therefore, \u201cErdo\u011fan wants a weak and crippled Iran, but still unified, not disintegrated\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In the event of a large-scale military conflict between Iran and the U.S.–Israel axis, Turkey\u2019s role as the \u201clogistical and intelligence arm<\/em>\u201d of this coalition has been far beyond that of a neutral neighbor. Examining Turkey\u2019s stance and performance in the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran has increased speculation by Iranian experts about 3 main areas of Turkey\u2019s cooperation with the aggressors as follows:<\/p>\n

– Use of Turkish airspace and some military bases<\/strong>: Turkey, possessing numerous airbases, especially Incirlik Air Base (hosting U.S. fighter jets and tactical nuclear weapons) and more eastern bases like Batman and Diyarbak\u0131r, could serve as the main “launching pad” for airstrikes deep into Iranian territory. This would drastically reduce the flight time of attacking warplanes to sensitive targets in northwestern, western, and even central Iran, enabling \u201csurprise and successive attacks\u201d<\/em>. The K\u00fcrecik radar station is also considered \u201cNATO\u2019s eyes\u201d<\/em> for tracking Iranian missile launches and providing early warning to Israel and U.S. forces.<\/p>\n

– Intelligence support and sabotage:<\/strong> Turkey\u2019s National Intelligence Organization (M\u0130T), given its years of infiltration and networking in Iran\u2019s Azerbaijani- and Kurdish-populated regions (Sections 3-5 and 3-8), is capable of acting as a vital source of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) for identifying targets, assessing damage, and even directing sabotage operations inside Iran. The close cooperation of M\u0130T with the Mossad and the CIA in recent years for \u201cmapping Iran\u2019s critical infrastructure<\/em>\u201d and \u201ccultivating infiltration agents\u201d<\/em> has been seriously criticized by Iranian experts. Turkey could also infiltrate special operations teams through its long borders with Iran to carry out sabotage against Iran\u2019s vital facilities.<\/p>\n

– Benefiting from the destruction of Iran\u2019s energy and military infrastructure:<\/strong> Turkey\u2019s main strategy is not participation in destruction, but the \u201ctargeted and calculated weakening<\/em>\u201d of Iran\u2019s regional competition capability. Therefore, Ankara does not seek the complete destruction of Iran, but benefits from the destruction of its rival\u2019s \u201ceconomic and military arteries\u201d<\/em> \u2013 such as refineries, export terminals, power plants, drone and missile manufacturing factories, and command centers of the IRGC and regular army \u2013 by the U.S. and Israel, so that Iran\u2019s position is downgraded to a second-tier regional power, no longer able to compete with Turkey in the Caucasus, Syria, and Iraq. This development is considered the final stage of the \u201cstrategy of Iran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation\u201d<\/em>, in which, after the transit and economic encirclement (Section 3-9), the final military blow is struck to paralyze Iran.<\/p>\n

It is here that the inherent contradiction in Turkey\u2019s strategy becomes apparent. Ankara, while eager to weaken Iran, is deeply worried about the \u201cstructural collapse<\/em>\u201d and \u201cdisintegration of Iran\u201d<\/em>. This is the \u201cmost important strategic constraint on Ankara\u201d<\/em> vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> Iran, and two main reasons for this concern can be cited:<\/p>\n

– The nightmare of a \u201csecond Israel\u201d<\/em> in northwestern Iran:<\/strong> Turkey\u2019s most important concern is Israel\u2019s exploitation of Iran\u2019s collapse to create a \u201cpuppet state\u201d<\/em> in the Azerbaijani-populated regions of Iran (using the fake term \u201cSouth Azerbaijan<\/em>\u201d). Experts believe that Israel, which has deep strategic relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan and has long sought to dismember Iran and create a \u201csecond Israel<\/em>\u201d on Iran\u2019s northwestern borders, will exploit the instability caused by war \u2013 which may arise due to economic problems and subsequent internal protests \u2013 to advance this project. They warn that the emergence of a \u201cTurani-Zionist<\/em>\u201d state in northwestern Iran, backed by Tel Aviv, would not only challenge Turkey\u2019s influence in the Turkic world but would also establish a new \u201cstrategic enemy<\/em>\u201d precisely on Turkey\u2019s eastern borders. This state, due to its ideological affinity with extreme Pan-Turkism but under Israeli tutelage, could also raise territorial and identity claims against Turkey itself, placing Ankara in a weaker position than today.<\/p>\n

– The Kurdish uprising and the risk of Turkey\u2019s disintegration:<\/strong> The second and perhaps most critical concern is the \u201cKurdish issue\u201d<\/em>. In their analyses, Iranian experts point out that the disintegration of Iran would mean the creation of a \u201cKurdish autonomous or independent region<\/em>\u2019 in western and northwestern Iran. This would directly ignite a Kurdish uprising in southeastern Turkey. Iran\u2019s Kurds, with an independent base and receiving weapons aid, would become a hub for armed struggle against Turkey and revive the dream of a \u201cGreater Kurdistan\u201d<\/em>. This scenario is \u201cAnkara\u2019s absolute nightmare\u201d<\/em>, and Turkey knows well that Israel and the U.S. will use the Kurdish card against both Iran and Turkey. Israel, which has always supported Kurdish secession as a tool to weaken regional states, would, in the event of Iran\u2019s collapse, not only use this opportunity to create an independent Kurdistan but would also use it as a permanent pressure lever against Turkey\u2019s territorial integrity. Therefore, Turkey fears that a \u201cdecisive US and Israeli victory over Iran<\/em>\u201d could ultimately lead to \u201cTurkey\u2019s own defeat\u201d<\/em> through ethnic disintegration.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, Turkey\u2019s strategic \u201cred line\u201d in the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran is not the principle of confronting Iran, but \u201cmanaging the extent of Iran\u2019s collapse\u201d<\/em>. This policy can be described as \u201cweakening up to the brink of collapse, but not beyond\u201d<\/em>. Ankara wants an Iran weak enough that it can no longer compete in the Caucasus, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, downgraded to a second-rate power, but at the same time preserves its political structure and territorial integrity so that it does not turn into a \u201cmosaic of secessionist states\u201d<\/em>. This is a \u201cdangerous game on the edge of a cliff<\/em>\u201d that requires very precise coordination and control over the course of the war and its outcomes. Therefore, \u201cTurkey does not overstep in coordination with the U.S. to advance this aggressive anti-Iranian policy, because it knows well that crossing the \u201cred line\u201d of disintegration would have consequences far more devastating for Ankara than for Tehran\u201d<\/em>. This paradox can be considered the \u201cinherent contradiction of aggressive trans-regionalism\u201d<\/em>; a contradiction arising from the fact that a hegemonic power, using destructive tools, seeks to create a stable order in its own favor, unaware that those destructive tools naturally fuel uncontrollable instabilities that sooner or later will affect the country itself.<\/p>\n

In contrast to this complex and paradoxical strategy, Iran, relying on the pattern of endogenous regionalism and the doctrine of \u201ccomprehensive deterrence\u201d<\/em>, manages the threats. Iran\u2019s defense strategy is not merely military but \u201cmulti-layered and hybrid\u201d<\/em>, based on \u201ccreating regional coalitions, increasing the strategic depth of the Resistance, and fostering national cohesion\u201d<\/em>. By strengthening its indigenous missile and drone capabilities, Iran has conveyed the message that any aggression will be met with a devastating response across the region, including attacks on U.S. bases in regional countries and Israel. This deterrence is \u201cbased on Iran\u2019s ability to impose unacceptable costs\u201d<\/em> on its enemies. On the domestic front, contrary to Ankara\u2019s assumption, national cohesion and the historical loyalty of Iran\u2019s ethnic groups (especially Azerbaijanis and Kurds) to the homeland will be the most important defensive shield against secessionist projects. This endogenous cohesion and cross-border deterrent power complicate the equation for Turkey: any military adventure against Iran could be not an \u201ceasy victory<\/em>\u201d but the beginning of a \u201cstrategic quagmire<\/em>\u201d for Ankara itself. This once again reveals the contradiction of the imposed trans-regionalism pattern: a pattern designed to destroy the rival but ultimately endangers the very existence of its executor and supporter.<\/p>\n

3-8. Cooperations and rivalries in the Kurdish issue: instrumental policy and the destabilizing paradox<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The Kurdish issue in West Asia is one of the most complex and multi-layered arenas of interaction between Iran and Turkey; an arena where \u201climited and tactical cooperation\u201d<\/em> and \u201cdeep and strategic rivalry<\/em>\u201d occur simultaneously and paradoxically. This duality is not accidental but a direct reflection of the confrontation between the two patterns of endogenous regionalism and imposed trans-regionalism. On the one hand, both countries share common interests in opposing increased autonomy or independence for Kurds in the region and defending the existing geopolitical status quo and the territorial integrity of regional states. But on the other hand, Turkey, within the framework of the \u201cgeopolitical strangulation of Iran\u201d<\/em> strategy and with a completely instrumental and opportunistic approach, does not hesitate to use Kurds against Iran and even actively seeks to destabilize Iran\u2019s Kurdish regions by supporting Kurdish groups opposed to Tehran. This dual policy, which simultaneously pursues \u201cfighting the PKK<\/em>\u201d and \u201csupporting anti-Iranian Kurds\u201d<\/em>, not only reveals the inherent contradiction of Turkey\u2019s trans-regionalism but also exposes the region to the risk of \u201cescalating Kurdish tensions<\/em>\u201d and growing instability.<\/p>\n

Iran and Turkey, as two regional powers with significant Kurdish populations, agree on one strategic principle: firm opposition to any Kurdish secessionist project and preventing the formation of an independent Kurdish state in the region. This common position, rooted in the security concerns and territorial integrity of both countries, has in some cases led to tactical cooperation and implicit coordination. The most prominent example was the coordinated opposition of Iran and Turkey to the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq\u2019s Kurdistan Region. At that time, both countries played an important role in neutralizing this project by applying political and economic pressure, threatening military action, and coordinating with the central Iraqi government. This cooperation indicated a \u201ctemporary overlap of security interests\u201d<\/em> between the two countries and was based on \u201cdefending the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of regional states\u201d<\/em>, which is a fundamental principle of Iran\u2019s endogenous regionalism. According to Iranian experts, this agreement was a \u201cnatural result of a shared understanding of the secessionist threat\u201d<\/em>, but this consensus should not obscure the deep rivalry between the two countries in other dimensions of the Kurdish issue.<\/p>\n

While Iran\u2019s policy towards the Kurds is based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism, grounded in \u201cstabilization and respect for citizenship rights within the framework of national sovereignty\u201d<\/em>, Turkey\u2019s approach is highly \u201cinstrumental, selective, and opportunistic<\/em>\u201d. Turkey, which considers the Kurdish movements affiliated with the PKK inside its own territory and in northern Iraq and Syria as the \u201cnumber one enemy of its national security\u201d<\/em>, at the same time uses other Kurdish groups as a \u201cpressure lever and destabilization tool<\/em>\u201d against Iran. Some Iranian experts call this dual policy \u201cAnkara\u2019s strategic hypocrisy<\/em>\u201d and believe that Turkey, while brutally suppressing the People\u2019s Protection Units (YPG) and the PKK in Syria, provides financial, logistical, and intelligence support to some anti-Iranian Kurdish groups based in areas under Turkish occupation or in adjacent regions of Iraqi Kurdistan. These groups, mainly composed of Kurdish opposition parties from Iran, operate under Ankara\u2019s protective umbrella, engaging in intelligence, propaganda, and sometimes sabotage activities against Iran, and they can operate more easily given the conditions in Iraqi Kurdistan. Through this policy, Ankara is effectively pursuing the destabilization of Iran\u2019s Kurdish regions, which is precisely in line with weakening Iran geopolitically and in clear contradiction with its claims of cooperating with Iran against separatist forces.<\/p>\n

This behavior can be analyzed within the grand strategy of \u201cencirclement and geopolitical strangulation\u201d<\/em>. By supporting anti-Iranian Kurds in neighboring countries, Turkey seeks to \u201copen a new internal front against Tehran\u201d <\/em>and \u201cpreoccupy Iran\u2019s security on its western borders\u201d<\/em>. Turkey\u2019s goal is to create a \u201cchronic security crisis\u201d<\/em> in Iran\u2019s Kurdish provinces so that Tehran\u2019s military, intelligence, and economic capabilities are weakened, and Iran\u2019s focus on other fronts of rivalry, especially in the Caucasus and Syria, is reduced. In fact, Turkey\u2019s support for anti-Iranian Kurds is \u201can important part of the puzzle of Iran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation\u201d<\/em> and complements the pressures coming from the north (Caucasus), west (Syria and Lebanon), and south (Persian Gulf) in the current situation.<\/p>\n

This instrumental policy of Turkey contains a fundamental and very dangerous contradiction. According to Iranian experts, \u201cTurkey, on the one hand, fights the Kurdish movement in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria with all its might and considers it an existential threat, but on the other hand, by strengthening and arming anti-Iranian Kurdish groups in all three countries, it lights the same fire that will sooner or later burn itself\u201d<\/em>. By supporting anti-Iranian Kurds and transferring some elements of the PKK to its Iranian branch, PJAK, Turkey increases the military and intelligence experience and capability of the Kurds; a capability that can easily cross borders and later be used again by the PKK or other Kurdish groups opposed to Turkey. Referring to ethnic dynamics in the region, Iranian experts warn that \u201cthe Kurdish movement is not a monolithic phenomenon, but its ethnic and ideological solidarity networks are such that destabilizing one part of the Kurdish regions inevitably spreads to other parts, and Turkey cannot confine this fire within Iran\u2019s borders\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In other words, Ankara is \u201cplaying with matches in a gunpowder depot<\/em>\u201d with this policy. Although one of the reasons for Turkey\u2019s opposition to the disintegration of Iran is precisely the \u201cfear of the formation of an independent Kurdistan in western Iran\u201d<\/em> that could inspire and support Turkey\u2019s Kurds, Ankara\u2019s current policy of supporting anti-Iranian Kurds is effectively planting the seeds of the very tree whose poisonous fruit Turkey dreads. This contradiction reveals the \u201ccounter-balancing and destabilizing<\/em>\u201d nature of Turkey\u2019s imposed trans-regionalism: a pattern that, to weaken its rival, resorts to destabilizing tools whose consequences it cannot control even for itself.<\/p>\n

In contrast to this instrumental and contradictory Turkish approach, Iran\u2019s policy towards the Kurds, both domestically and regionally, is based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism and the principles of \u201cstabilization, respect for citizenship rights, and opposition to foreign intervention<\/em>\u201d. This approach can be called \u201ccrisis management through convergence and participation<\/em>\u201d. Historically, Iran has not considered Kurds as a mere \u201csecurity threat<\/em>\u201d but as an authentic and inseparable part of the Iranian nation. By adopting policies of balanced development, political participation (wide presence of Kurds in the parliament, government, judicial, military, and security institutions), and recognition of cultural and linguistic rights, Iran has sought maximum inclusion and reduction of ethnic cleavages. Therefore, unlike Turkey\u2019s ethnic manipulation projects, the Iranian model is based on historical coexistence and a multi-layered national identity, in which ethnic identity and national identity are not defined in opposition to each other, but rather ethnic identity is a subset of national identity.<\/p>\n

On the regional level as well, Iran has consistently supported the national sovereignty of Iraq and Syria and the rights of Kurds within the framework of those countries\u2019 constitutions and has opposed any foreign intervention and secessionism. This policy can be called \u201cresponsible regionalism\u201d<\/em>, which seeks to \u201ccreate a stable order based on mutual respect and intra-regional cooperation\u201d<\/em>, not \u201cinstrumental exploitation of ethnic cleavages to weaken rivals\u201d<\/em>. This approach is, in the long term, more \u201cstabilizing and less costly<\/em>\u201d than Turkey\u2019s adventurous and tension-creating strategies. While Ankara plays with the Kurdish fire, Tehran, relying on historical ties and mutual trust, seeks to neutralize this potential threat and turn it into an opportunity for regional convergence.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the Kurdish issue serves as a \u201cfinal test<\/em>” for measuring the different approaches of Iran and Turkey, revealing the substantial difference between the two patterns of regionalism. Turkey\u2019s imposed trans-regional pattern views Kurds merely as a \u201ctool for pressure\u201d<\/em> and a \u201clever to destabilize the rival\u201d<\/em>, to be either suppressed (PKK) or strengthened (anti-Iranian Kurds) according to tactical needs. This instrumental and unprincipled view is inherently \u201cdestabilizing<\/em>\u201d and, by creating endless cycles of violence and insecurity, drives the region towards chaos. In contrast, Iran\u2019s endogenous pattern, by accepting the reality of ethnic plurality and striving for integration and participation, seeks \u201csustainable stabilization\u201d<\/em> through \u201cestablishing justice and strengthening coexistence\u201d<\/em>. This pattern views Kurds not as a threat but as part of the solution to the region\u2019s security dilemma. Turkey\u2019s contradictions in this arena are the best evidence of the instability and inherent dangers of imposed trans-regionalism; a strategy that sacrifices the stability of the entire region in the name of weakening Iran.<\/p>\n

3-9. Energy hub and transit projects: the economic encirclement of Iran within the framework of the geopolitical strangulation strategy<\/strong><\/h4>\n

If Turkey\u2019s security-military policies (Sections 3-4 and 3-7) seek the hardware encirclement and weakening of Iran, and its identity-religious policies (Sections 3-2, 3-3, and 3-5) aim for its software collapse, then Turkey\u2019s projects to become an energy hub and transit corridors should be considered the \u201cgeo-economic dimension\u201d<\/em> of the grand strategy of \u201cIran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation\u201d<\/em>. This dimension, ostensibly wrapped in a cloak of economic cooperation and regional development, is in fact orchestrating an \u201call-out economic war\u201d<\/em> against Iran. The ultimate goal of this war is not merely to reduce Iran\u2019s transit and energy revenues, but to \u201csever the vital geo-economic arteries\u201d<\/em> of the country and turn it into a \u201clandlocked island<\/em>\u201d; a country excluded from all major regional trade and energy corridors, whose economy is inevitably weakened and downgraded to a dependent country lacking regional competition capability. This strategy is a \u201ccreeping economic encirclement<\/em>\u201d being implemented in full coordination with Washington and using the West\u2019s financial, logistical, and diplomatic levers. By defining itself as the \u201cenergy and transport hub<\/em>\u201d between China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe, Turkey has effectively designed a new \u201ccorridor architecture\u201d<\/em> for the region, at the center of which is Ankara, not Iran, and these actions complete the final ring of Iran\u2019s encirclement. In the following, the 4 main tools of this strategy are examined:<\/p>\n

3-9-1. The so-called \u201cZangezur Corridor\u201d and the \u201cTrump Route\u201d: the northern lock on Iran\u2019s encirclement<\/strong><\/p>\n

The so-called \u201cZangezur Corridor<\/em>\u201d, also referred to as the \u201cNATO Turani Corridor<\/em>\u201d and \u201cTurkic NATO<\/em>\u201d (Section 3-1), is not merely a geopolitical-military project, but the backbone of Turkey\u2019s \u201canti-Iranian geo-economic architecture<\/em>\u201d north of Iran. The goal of this corridor is to directly connect Baku\u2013Nakhchivan\u2013Turkey and then extend it eastward towards the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The geo-economic significance of this corridor is that it completely bypasses \u201cIran\u2019s historical route\u201d<\/em> in east-west trade, which passed through the ancient Silk Road (Ostovar & Nazar, 2024, pp. 295-304). Therefore, the so-called \u201cZangezur Corridor<\/em>\u201d is considered a \u201ccomplement to the U.S.-backed corridors for containing Iran<\/em>\u201d. In this context, the \u201cTrump Route\u201d<\/em> or the \u201cMiddle Corridor\u201d<\/em>, which starts from China and Central Asia, crosses the Caspian Sea, and reaches Europe through the Caucasus and Turkey, has been designed precisely along these lines. This route, which will take shape with active U.S. support, explicitly excludes Iran from one of the world\u2019s most profitable transit routes. This coordination has been interpreted as a \u201cTurkey<\/em>\u2013West synergy to lock Iran\u2019s geo-economic capacity on its northern borders\u201d<\/em>. In contrast, Iran-centered corridors such as the China\u2013Iran\u2013Europe railway (which could deliver goods to Europe in less time and at lower cost) have faced political and logistical obstacles due to this trans-regional rivalry and Turkey\u2019s lack of cooperation.<\/p>\n

3-9-2. The Iraq<\/strong>\u2013Turkey Corridor (\u201cDevelopment Road\u201d) and the revival of the Turkey\u2013Saudi Arabia railway: the western and southern locks<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Simultaneously with locking Iran\u2019s north, Turkey is pursuing complementary projects to encircle Iran from the west and southwest. The most important of these is the \u201cIraq\u2013Turkey Corridor\u201d, known as the \u201cDevelopment Road<\/em>\u201d, which, with massive investment from Turkey and some Arab countries, connects Basra port in southern Iraq to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean via railway and highway. Dr. Ahmad Kazemi considers this project \u201cpart of a larger plan for the geo-economic isolation of Iran<\/em>\u201d and argues that it aims to directly compete with Iran\u2019s Chabahar port and its transit routes to Iraq and Syria. With the completion of this corridor, goods from India, China, and the Persian Gulf will be transported via sea to Basra and then through Turkey to Europe, instead of passing through Iranian territory. Hence, this project is also seen as an \u201ceconomic bypass of Iran from the south\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Alongside this project, the plan to revive the historic Turkey-Saudi Arabia railway (which during Ottoman times was part of the Hejaz railway) is also on Ankara\u2019s agenda. This railway, which connects Turkey to Saudi Arabia via Syria and Jordan, if completed, will complete the \u201csouthern ring\u201d<\/em> of Iran\u2019s transit encirclement and create a rival corridor to the Iran\u2013Iraq\u2013Syria routes. This corridor network can be called an \u201canti-Iranian economic belt\u201d<\/em> that subjects Iran to geo-economic encirclement from 4 directions (north, west, southwest, and south). Turkey\u2019s emphasis on reviving this railway route has intensified especially at the same time as the U.S. conflict with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, and in Turkish media and statements by Turkish officials, the creation of the so-called \u201cZangezur Corridor\u201d<\/em> and the Turkey\u2013Saudi Arabia railway is explicitly described as a tool to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n

3-9-3. Qatari gas exports to Europe via Syria: excluding Iran from Europe\u2019s energy equation<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Energy is one of the most critical battlegrounds in the geo-economic struggle between Iran and Turkey. Turkey, seeking to become \u201cEurope\u2019s energy hub<\/em>\u201d and a replacement for Russia and Iran, is seriously pursuing the project of \u201cQatari gas exports to Europe via Syria<\/em>\u201d after the overthrow of the Assad government. This project is the \u201cmost dangerous threat to Iran\u2019s energy position\u201d<\/em>. Under this plan, Qatari gas \u2013 which has the world\u2019s largest gas reserves after Russia and Iran \u2013 will be transported via a pipeline through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkey, and from there to European markets. This plan is seen as \u201cTurkey\u2019s attempt to seize Iran\u2019s geopolitical heritage in Syria and turn it into an energy corridor for its own benefit\u201d<\/em>. If realized, this pipeline could completely replace Iranian gas in the European market, not only depriving Iran of a vital source of revenue but also severely reducing Tehran\u2019s geopolitical leverage. This project has been one of the main reasons for Turkey\u2019s intervention in Syria and its efforts to overthrow Bashar al-Assad; because only a Syria under Turkish influence could issue a permit for the pipeline\u2019s passage.<\/p>\n

3-9-4. The non-connection of Iran\u2019s Railway to Turkey\u2019s network: silent obstruction to weaken Iran<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Among all these major projects, perhaps none reveals Ankara\u2019s anti-Iranian policy in transit as much as the \u201cnon-connection of Iran\u2019s railway to Turkey\u2019s national network\u201d<\/em>. This action is a \u201csilent but highly effective obstruction<\/em>\u201d against Iran. Turkey, which has connected its rail network to all its western (Bulgaria, Greece), southern (Syria, Iraq), and eastern neighbors (Georgia, Republic of Azerbaijan), and is even connecting it to Nakhchivan and Central Asia, still refrains from connecting this network to Iran\u2019s national railway. This non-connection occurs even though Iran could offer a much shorter, safer, and cheaper route for transporting goods from China and Central Asia to Europe. This action is \u201cfully aligned with U.S. trans-regional policies to economically weaken Iran\u201d<\/em>, and its aim is to prevent Iran from being established as a \u201cmajor and indispensable transit route\u201d<\/em> in international trade. Because in a world where corridors are the arteries of power, being connected to major networks means increased geopolitical weight, economic security, and political bargaining power, and Turkey, with its hegemonic outlook, does not want Iran to enjoy such an advantage. Therefore, this policy is \u201cpart of Turkey\u2019s effort to monopolize control over regional corridors<\/em>\u201d, which, with Western support, marginalizes Iran.<\/p>\n

3-9-5. Iran\u2019s endogenous regionalism: The North-South Corridor and Economic Resistance<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In the face of this extensive geo-economic encirclement, Iran\u2019s strategy, based on the pattern of endogenous regionalism, focuses on \u201cdiversifying transit routes<\/em>\u201d and \u201cdeepening cooperation with the East\u201d<\/em>. This strategy has been called by some experts the strategy of \u201ccreating a Resistance Axis corridor network\u201d<\/em>. The main axis of this strategy is the \u201cInternational North-South Transport Corridor<\/em>\u201d (INSTC), which connects Iran via Russia to northern Europe and via Chabahar and Bandar Abbas to international waters and South Asian and African markets. This corridor, whose main actors are Iran, Russia, and India, is precisely a rival to Western-backed corridors (such as the \u201cMiddle Corridor\u201d and the \u201cTrump Route\u201d) and is independent of routes under Turkish or Western control. The development of Chabahar port as Iran\u2019s \u201cgolden gateway\u201d to the East, and investment in east-west rail connections (such as the Khaf\u2013Herat railway and connection to China via the Eastern Corridor), are other components of this strategy. Relying on its \u201cunique geographical position\u201d<\/em> and \u201cneighborhood with 15 countries\u201d<\/em>, Iran has the capacity to become the region\u2019s transit hub, provided that with active diplomacy and infrastructure investment, it can neutralize Turkey\u2019s encirclement projects carried out on behalf of the United States. This corridor confrontation goes far beyond economic rivalry and represents a battle between two geo-economic orders: Turkey\u2013West\u2019s imposed order seeking \u201cmonopoly and encirclement\u201d<\/em>, versus Iran\u2019s endogenous order emphasizing \u201cbalanced interaction and connection<\/em>\u201d with all neighbors and independent Eastern powers. In this battle, Iran\u2019s economic resilience and its ability to create alternative routes will be a vital test for its geopolitical survival.<\/p>\n

4. Conclusion and recommendations: beyond rivalry; towards an endogenous and balanced regional order<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The comparative analysis of the foreign policies of Iran and Turkey in the South Caucasus and West Asia from the perspective of constructivist regionalism presents a clear picture of two opposing and conflicting patterns of regional order-building. These two patterns differ not merely in the choice of tools or tactical priorities, but in their ontological foundations, sources of legitimacy, and ultimate horizons. Iran sees the region as an \u201cendogenous civilizational and identity sphere\u201d<\/em>; a space where deep cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical ties provide natural grounds for convergence and the creation of a bloc of like-minded and aligned countries. This regionalism, rooted in the \u201chistorical self\u201d<\/em> and \u201ccollective memory<\/em>\u201d of the peoples of this expanse, adopts a \u201cdeterrent, balancing, and stability-oriented\u201d<\/em> approach. This approach does not seek to impose hegemony, but rather aims for \u201ccollective threat management\u201d<\/em>, \u201cpreserving the national sovereignty of states\u201d<\/em>, and \u201cdeveloping intra-regional cooperation\u201d<\/em> based on mutual respect and shared interests. In this paradigm, security is a “regional public good<\/em>” that must be provided by the region\u2019s own actors through trust-building and identity convergence, not through alliances with interventionist extra-regional powers.<\/p>\n

In contrast, Turkey has chosen a pattern of \u201cimposed and hegemonic trans-regionalism\u201d<\/em>. In this pattern, the region is defined not as a shared civilizational sphere, but as a \u201cspace for restoring historical prestige\u201d<\/em> and \u201cconsolidating Turkish-Sunni hegemony\u201d<\/em>. This constructed regionalism, rooted in Neo-Ottomanist and Pan-Turkist discourses and lacking authentic identity-based commonalities with the region\u2019s societies, is forced, in order to sustain itself, to rely on \u201cstrategic alliances with extra-regional powers\u201d<\/em> (the U.S., UK, and NATO), the \u201cuse of aggressive hard and soft tools\u201d<\/em>, and the \u201cpursuit of destabilizing projects\u201d<\/em>. This pattern, with its \u201caggressive, counter-balancing, and destabilizing\u201d<\/em> approach, seeks the \u201celimination or containment of civilizational rivals\u201d<\/em> (especially Iran), \u201cidentity and religious engineering<\/em>\u201d in its own favor, and the \u201cgeopolitical and geo-economic encirclement<\/em>\u201d of Iran through coercive and monopolistic corridors.<\/p>\n

The detailed comparison of the two countries in 9 key areas (Caucasus policy, religious engineering, Turani identity construction, role in NATO, intervention in Iran\u2019s Azerbaijani regions, policy in Syria and Lebanon, stance on potential war, Kurdish issue, and transit and energy projects) clearly confirms this paradigmatic confrontation. In all these areas, Turkey, in full or partial coordination with the West, pursues the project of \u201cIran\u2019s geopolitical strangulation<\/em>\u201d in order to reduce Tehran\u2019s regional competition capability and establish itself as the region\u2019s undisputed hegemon. However, this aggressive strategy faces a \u201cfundamental paradox<\/em>\u201d: Turkey wants a weakened and marginalized Iran, but it greatly fears the disintegration and collapse of Iran, because it knows that this would lead to the emergence of a \u201csecond Israel\u201d<\/em> in northwestern Iran, a Kurdish uprising, and a threat to Turkey\u2019s own territorial integrity. This contradiction reveals the \u201cinherent limitation and fragility\u201d<\/em> of the imposed trans-regionalism pattern: a pattern that, with destabilizing tools, seeks a stable order, but plants the seeds of uncontrollable chaos and instability that will sooner or later engulf itself. The crises Turkey is grappling with in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean are evidence of this claim.<\/p>\n

In the face of this trans-regional project, Iran, relying on the pattern of endogenous regionalism, despite enormous pressures, has been able to defend its existence and interests through \u201chybrid deterrence\u201d<\/em>, \u201cnational cohesion\u201d<\/em>, and \u201calternative Eastern coalitions\u201d<\/em>. The analysis of this rivalry shows that the security dilemma of the Caucasus and West Asia can only be resolved not by exogenous hegemonic projects, but by accepting and strengthening \u201cendogenous, identity-based, and participatory regionalism<\/em>\u201d \u2013 the path that Iran emphasizes. Now, to transform this successful defense into a \u201csustainable strategic initiative\u201d<\/em>, Iran needs to adopt more active, multi-layered, and long-term policies.<\/p>\n

In this regard, Iran should take greater advantage of its historical advantage in the South Caucasus region, which is a long-standing civilizational and identity bond with the countries of this region. Defining Caucasian politics as a multidimensional competition solely to secure the interests of Iran, Turkey, Russia, Israel, and the United States is a strategic mistake. Iran also has a distinct advantage due to its deep historical ties with the nations of Armenia and Georgia. Both of these nations have played pivotal roles in regional civilization and Christian civilization. For example, dynasties with Iranian roots ruled Armenia, Georgia, and Caucasian Albania long before the emergence of the Turkish element in the region, and the historical peaceful coexistence of Iranians with these dynasties lays the groundwork for Iran to play an effective role in the Caucasus against the influence of Turkey and Israel in this region.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, Discussions of \u201cIranian Culture<\/em>\u201d should extend beyond the concept of \u201cIranian Shia Culture<\/em>\u201d. While the latter is a vital component, it is part of a broader cultural legacy tied to an Iranian statehood that dates back to the earliest periods of recorded history. Ancient history provides a shared foundation for many Iranian peoples \u2013 such as Tajiks, Afghans, and Kurds \u2013 whereas other frameworks may emphasize their separation. By comparison, Turkey\u2019s \u201cTurkic policy<\/em>\u201d relies on \u201clinguistic proximity<\/em>\u201d to unite diverse groups across racial and religious lines; an Iranian framework could potentially offer even more profound historical and cultural links.<\/p>\n

In this regard, drawing on the lessons of this research and considering the opinions of experts, the following strategic recommendations are offered to increase Iran\u2019s influence against Turkey\u2019s destructive trans-regional approach in its interaction with the Republic of Armenia:<\/p>\n

4.1. Armenia: Iran\u2019s natural and strategic ally to halt Turkey\u2019s aggressive process<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Armenia, at the heart of the South Caucasus, has a completely unique and decisive role as a \u201cnatural and strategic ally of Iran\u201d<\/em> against the expansionist projects of Turkey, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and NATO. From a constructivist perspective, Iran and Armenia are not just two neighbors, but two ancient civilizations with a shared historical experience of coexistence and a shared threat from Pan-Turkism and Ottoman-Turkish hegemony-seeking. The collapse of Armenia or its excessive weakening would be not only a humanitarian catastrophe but also a \u201cgeopolitical catastrophe<\/em>\u201d for Iran, as it would mean the completion of the NATO \u201cTurani Corridor\u201d, the complete encirclement of Iran from the north, and the severance of one of Tehran\u2019s most vital breathing routes to the Caucasus and Europe. Accordingly, Iran\u2019s strategy towards Armenia should be upgraded from \u201cimplicit support<\/em>\u201d to a \u201ccomprehensive and operational strategic alliance\u201d<\/em>, paying attention to the following points:<\/p>\n

– Guaranteeing Armenia\u2019s geopolitical security: Iran must declare the independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Armenia (including the preservation of Syunik province) as a \u201cred line\u201d as an \u201cofficial doctrine\u201d<\/em>. Any attempt to change international borders by force or to create imposed corridors on Armenian soil through the intervention of extra-regional powers must be met with a \u201cdecisive and costly response<\/em>\u201d from Iran. This security guarantee is the cornerstone of any strategic cooperation.<\/p>\n

– Deep economic and transit cooperation: Iran and Armenia must develop alternative and complementary corridors to those under Turkey\u2019s control with speed and seriousness. The rapid completion of the Persian Gulf\u2013Black Sea corridor via Iran\u2013Armenia\u2013Georgia will not only save Armenia from geographical isolation but also turn it into a \u201cvital transit bridge<\/em>\u201d between Iran and Europe, reducing its dependence on Turkish and Georgian routes. Establishing a joint free trade zone on the Meghri border and making large-scale Iranian investments in Armenia\u2019s energy, road, and rail infrastructure will tie Armenia\u2019s economy to Iran\u2019s and make it resilient to economic pressure from Turkey and Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n

– Defense-security cooperation: Given the increasing military threats from the Republic of Azerbaijan (backed by Turkey and Israel) and the equipping of its army with advanced NATO weapons, Iran and Armenia need \u201cjoint defense cooperation\u201d<\/em> to create deterrence. This cooperation could include joint border exercises, intelligence sharing on enemy military movements, and advisory-technical assistance to strengthen Armenia\u2019s defense capabilities. Signing a \u201cbilateral defense pact<\/em>\u201d or designing a \u201cregional security mechanism<\/em>\u201d involving Iran, Armenia, and other countries aligned with their views, such as India, could shift the security dilemma of the Caucasus in favor of stability.<\/p>\n

– Increasing cultural and civilizational convergence: Iran and Armenia are two ancient civilizations with shared historical enemies (Pan-Turkism). Strengthening cultural diplomacy, jointly registering and preserving cultural heritage (especially in areas threatened by fake Turkish-Turani identity construction), and mutual support in international forums to counter the distortion of the two countries\u2019 authentic history, identity, and civilization can institutionalize this strategic alliance at deeper levels.<\/p>\n

Iran must understand that in order to increase its cooperation and partnership with Armenia and other countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, it cannot only focus on its religious heritage. Rather, it must use its other civilizational and identity capacities in the fields of literature, philosophy, and other humanities to attract Armenia’s cooperation and participation in its Caucasus strategy. One can suggest the term \u201chistorically evolved Iranocentrism<\/em>\u201d to better capture this complexity.<\/p>\n

Besides, the religious aspect is equally significant. Beyond the foundational Iranian influence on Armenian religious life in antiquity (such as Gregory the Illuminator), the contemporary treatment of religious heritage and the traditional freedoms afforded to Christian and Jewish minorities in Iran serve as a compelling example of the differences between Iranian and Turkish regional policy approaches.<\/p>\n

4.2. Implementing active corridor diplomacy and neutralizing geoeconomic encirclement<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Iran must respond to the Turkey\u2013West geo-economic encirclement with an \u201caggressive corridor diplomacy<\/em>\u201d:<\/p>\n

– Iran\u2019s dependence on other countries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan for connection to Armenia via railway is a strategic mistake. Because it allows these two countries to block Iran\u2019s access to Armenia if they wish and to put pressure on Iran and gain concessions. Therefore, Iran should pursue a policy of direct connection to Armenia via railway. Previously, during the presidency of Mr. Kocharyan and Mr. Ahmadinejad, agreements in this regard were made with financial support from China, but they were not followed up in subsequent governments.<\/p>\n

– Immediate completion of the North\u2013South Corridor (INSTC): This corridor must be turned from a project on paper into an operational reality. Removing logistical, customs, and banking obstacles with Russia, Azerbaijan (if possible), and India, and massive investment in the Rasht\u2013Astara and Chabahar\u2013Zahedan rail lines should be Iran\u2019s absolute priority.<\/p>\n

– Activation of the East\u2013West Corridor through Iranian territory: Connecting Iran\u2019s railway to Afghanistan (Khaf\u2013Herat) and from there to China and Central Asia could create an alternative route to the Western-backed Middle Corridor through the South Caucasus. However, to complete this route, Iran\u2019s rail lines need to be connected to Iraq\u2019s railway network and, if possible, to Turkey\u2019s network.<\/p>\n

– Turning Chabahar into a regional hub: Competing with the Iraq\u2013Turkey Corridor (\u201cDevelopment Road\u201d) through the comprehensive development of Chabahar port and its connection to the country\u2019s rail and road network and offering competitive tariffs and special facilities to economic partners (India, Afghanistan, Central Asia) to make the port attractive.<\/p>\n

4.3. Smart resistance against manipulation of identity, civilizational, and religious components<\/strong><\/h4>\n

In the face of the projects of \u201cBrotherhoodization\u201d,<\/em> \u201cWahhabization\u201d, and so-called \u201cTurani identity construction\u201d<\/em> (Sections 3-2 and 3-3), the following measures should be taken:<\/p>\n

– Establishing of an \u201cinternational scientific-cultural institution<\/em>\u201d with the participation of scholars from Iran, Armenia, Tajikistan, and other like-minded countries within Iran\u2019s civilizational sphere, to provide reasoned and academic opposition to the distortion of history and the appropriation of the celebrities of these countries by Baku and Ankara.<\/p>\n

– Strengthening media diplomacy in Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Kurdish languages to present alternative narratives and reflect the historical realities and peaceful coexistence in Iran.<\/p>\n

– Creating a \u201cregional religious dialogue mechanism<\/em>\u201d with the participation of independent Shiite and Sunni scholars to neutralize the divisive Salafi-Wahhabi projects supported by Turkey and foster religious empathy in the South Caucasus region.<\/p>\n

4.4. Intra-regional political and security front-building<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Iran must seize the initiative to create an \u201cendogenous political-security bloc<\/em>\u201d in the Caucasus and West Asia through the following methods:<\/p>\n

– Strengthening the \u201c3+3<\/em>\u201d format: Iran, with greater initiative, can upgrade this platform from a consultative forum to a \u201cregional organization for cooperation and security<\/em>\u201d with a permanent secretariat, aimed at resolving disputes in the South Caucasus without the intervention of extra-regional powers.<\/p>\n

– Creating a \u201cdefense-economic pact\u201d<\/em> with independent countries of the region: Proposing the formation of a \u201ccooperation and security bloc<\/em>\u201d involving Iran, Armenia, Syria, Iraq, and other aligned countries based on the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and countering foreign intervention. This bloc could act as a counterweight to \u201cTurkic NATO\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

– Deepening cooperation with Russia and China: RF and PRC, as great powers dissatisfied with the U.S. unipolar order and NATO expansionism, are natural partners for Iran in countering Turkey\u2019s transregionalism. Strategic coordination with Moscow and Beijing is essential to contain the projects of \u201cTurkic NATO<\/em>\u201d and \u201canti-Iranian corridors\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

5. Strategic management of the Kurdish issue: breaking Turkey\u2019s paradox<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Iran can turn Turkey\u2019s paradox of instrumentally using Kurds against Iran (Section 3-8) into an opportunity through \u201csmart Kurdish diplomacy\u201d<\/em>. By strengthening security and intelligence cooperation with the governments of Iraq and Syria, as well as deepening dialogue with moderate Kurdish currents that respect the national sovereignty of states, Iran could \u2013 not use Kurds as a \u201cpressure lever against Turkey<\/em>\u201d (which would contradict Iran\u2019s foreign policy principles) \u2013 but rather alert them to the \u201ccommon threat of Pan-Turkism and Israeli expansionism<\/em>\u201d and form a \u201cunited front\u201d<\/em> of actors harmed by Turkey\u2013Israel projects. The goal is to neutralize Turkey\u2019s project of strengthening \u201canti-Iranian Kurds\u201d<\/em> and turn the Kurdish regions from an arena of threat into a bulwark against secessionism and foreign intervention.<\/p>\n

The security dilemma of the South Caucasus and West Asia is the product of the confrontation between two readings of regional order. Turkey\u2019s imposed and hegemonic order, which advances through \u201cfalsification of history<\/em>\u201d, \u201cidentity manipulation\u201d<\/em>, \u201ceconomic encirclement\u201d<\/em>, and \u201crecourse to hard power<\/em>\u201d in alliance with extra-regional powers, is inherently fragile, crisis-prone, and ultimately self-destructive, as Turkey today is trapped in the Syrian quagmire and its own ethnic contradictions. In contrast, Iran\u2019s endogenous regionalism, based on \u201ccivilizational authenticity\u201d<\/em>, \u201chistorical coexistence\u201d<\/em>, \u201crespect for state sovereignty\u201d<\/em>, and \u201cdeterrence against foreign intervention\u201d<\/em>, is not only a moral choice but the sole \u201csustainable and realistic solution<\/em>\u201d for ensuring long-term peace and stability in this turbulent region. Strengthening the \u201cArmenia\u2013Iran axis\u201d as the backbone of resistance against Pan-Turkism and the influence of destructive extra-regional powers and NATO, and pursuing an \u201cactive, multilateral, and identity-based regional diplomacy\u201d<\/em>, can shift the balance of power in favor of the endogenous order and open a new horizon of cooperation and convergence in the Caucasus and West Asia. This is the path prescribed by the history, geography, and shared identity of the peoples of this region.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Dr. Ehsan Movahedian is a well-known Iranian international relations scholar and lecturer at Allameh Tabataba\u2019i University (ATU) in Tehran, where he specializes in international affairs and South Caucasus geopolitics. A PhD graduate in international relations from Allameh Tabataba\u2019i University, he has been extensively cited and interviewed by various international media outlets for his in-depth analyses of regional dynamics, particularly concerning Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. He advocates peace, sovereignty, and balanced cooperation in the region. He criticizes Azerbaijan\u2019s use of ultimatums in peace talks, warning that external interference risks turning the South Caucasus into a \u201cgeopolitical playground\u201d. Movahedian also opposes projects like the \u201cZangezur Corridor<\/em>\u201d, viewing them as threats to Iranian security and regional sovereignty.<\/p>\n

References<\/strong><\/h4>\n
    \n
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