{"id":17754,"date":"2025-09-19T02:32:35","date_gmt":"2025-09-18T22:32:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/?p=17754"},"modified":"2025-10-13T22:20:27","modified_gmt":"2025-10-13T18:20:27","slug":"foreign-policy-dimension-of-the-upcoming-parliamentary-elections-in-armenia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/foreign-policy-dimension-of-the-upcoming-parliamentary-elections-in-armenia\/","title":{"rendered":"Foreign policy dimension of the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=”” woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”]<\/p>\n

Expert commentary, September 22, 2025[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=”” woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”]<\/p>\n

Norayr A. Dunamalyan[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n

The parliamentary elections in Armenia scheduled for June 7, 2026, promise to be a pivotal event in the context of society\u2019s acceptance of post-war realities and the final shift in geopolitical orientations. In any case, the main theme of the upcoming campaign will be the choice of the country\u2019s \u201cgeopolitical future\u201d, which is a novelty for the entire electoral agenda of the post-Soviet period.<\/p>\n

Internationalization of Armenian domestic policy<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Following the defeat in the 44-day war of 2020, the political discourse in Armenia gradually shifted from discussing models of internal development to revising geopolitical orientations. While the 2021 parliamentary elections were still interpreted as a confrontation between the \u201ccurrent<\/em>\u201d and the \u201cformer<\/em>\u201d elites, symbolizing a supposed division between the \u201cauthoritarian past<\/em>\u201d and the \u201cdemocratic present\u201d<\/em>, their substantive basis remained within the traditional post-Soviet agenda: the fight against corruption, social inequality, democracy, and authoritarianism.<\/p>\n

The introduction of a Russian peacekeeping contingent to Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020, the preservation of the OSCE Minsk Group, and Turkey\u2019s growing influence in the South Caucasus signaled a trend toward the internationalization of political processes around and within Artsakh. However, the military actions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in September 2022, the ethnic cleansing, and the subsequent occupation of the NKR in 2023 transferred this trend directly to the territory of the Republic of Armenia. Domestic politics came under the direct influence of external actors, which became a prerequisite for the transformation of the entire Armenian political system.<\/p>\n

As a result, the political reality that formed after the 2021 elections has largely lost its relevance, as have many of the foreign policy platforms of both the government and the opposition. A characteristic example is the pre-election formula of \u201cRemedial Secession<\/em>\u201d for Nagorno-Karabakh, which was never practically implemented. The 2023 crisis marked the beginning of a radical reconfiguration of the political system: in the public perception, socio-economic problems gave way to issues of territorial integrity and national security, which are directly dependent on the republic’s geopolitical choice (Figure<\/strong> 1<\/strong>).<\/p>\n

\"\"
\nFigure 1. <\/strong>The main problems faced by the population of the Republic of Armenia (the following responses of respondents: \u201cborders<\/em>\u201d, \u201clack of peace<\/em>\u201d and \u201cunresolved territorial disputes<\/em>\u201d are combined in the indicator \u201cPeace and security issues<\/em>\u201d). Source:<\/strong> https:\/\/caucasusbarometer.org\/en\/cb-am\/IMPISS1\/<\/a><\/p>\n

On the other hand, following the September 2022 aggression, Western political presence began to take on a new, institutionalized form. Thus, the EU attempted to portray itself as a mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and used the pretext of de-escalation to send a monitoring mission to Armenia. At the same time, humanitarian support and political statements from European representatives intensified, giving the \u201cEuropean vector<\/em>\u201d real weight in domestic policy. The United States, despite changes in administrations, deepened its presence in the region by concluding the U.S.\u2013Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter and the Washington Memorandums in 2025. The Russian factor, conversely, acquired a negative connotation, turning the \u201cmain strategic ally<\/em>\u201d into a subject of domestic political debate. Consequently, the government continues to distance itself from Russian influence, using narratives such as the \u201chybrid war against Armenia\u201d<\/em>, while the opposition cautiously tries to use pro-Russian rhetoric, although it no longer consolidates the electorate.<\/p>\n

Notably, Azerbaijan has been systematically exerting active influence on Armenia\u2019s domestic political situation since 2020, playing on the contradictions and fears of Armenian society and promoting its own narratives. The thesis of removing the reference to the \u201cDeclaration of Independence\u201d from the preamble of the RA Constitution has also become a significant lever of pressure on the Armenian government and society, threatening the country\u2019s internal political stability. Ultimately, the future elections may be reduced to a false dilemma between \u201cpeace<\/em>\u201d and \u201cwar<\/em>\u201d. Meanwhile, the ruling party\u2019s interest in low voter turnout in the parliamentary elections (in which case 17% support can be converted into 54% of seats in the National Assembly) clashes with the need for high participation (25% of all eligible voters must vote \u201cFor<\/em>\u201d) in a referendum on constitutional changes to satisfy the latest demands of the Azerbaijani side. Thus, an externally created domestic political \u201ctrap<\/em>\u201d is being formed, reinforcing authoritarian tendencies in Armenia under the pretext of ensuring \u201cpeace and security<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

The alignment of political forces and their geopolitical preferences<\/strong><\/h4>\n

For almost the entire period of independence, the foreign policy orientation of \u00a0Armenian elites has been conditional. The republic’s three presidents pursued a policy of complementarism at different times, seeking to maneuver between centers of power to obtain resources and security guarantees. This tactic was accompanied by periodic crises in relations with major powers, primarily Russia.<\/p>\n

Until 2022, Russian influence was perceived as a constant, pushing the political forces to seek external legitimacy primarily in Moscow. However, after 2022\u20132023, the post-Soviet logic of interaction ceased to work. The reconfiguration of regional security and the disappearance of the \u201cKarabakh factor<\/em>\u201d radically changed the context. The existence of Armenian Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) during the 2021 vote and its absence today changes the entire picture of the future elections, replacing the agenda of \u201csaving the Armenian population of Artsakh<\/em>\u201d with the issue of \u201csaving Armenia<\/em>\u201d. The artificial separation of these two aspects is politicized, aimed at justifying the idea of an \u201cera of peace<\/em>\u201d and narrowing the Karabakh issue to the level of a \u201chistorical misunderstanding<\/em>\u201d between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. As a result, the \u201cKarabakh consensus<\/em>\u201d that dominated Armenian politics until 2021 is considered irrelevant, and economic, social, and other issues will be overshadowed by the dilemma between \u201cWestern\/European<\/em>\u201d path and \u201cpeace<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s also worth noting that the apathy that arose after the defeat in the 44-Day War of 2020 could also undergo some unexpected transformations. The low level of support for the ruling party (17%) was characteristic of the post-war reality, but several events occurred in the second half of 2025 that could serve as a catalyst for the authorities\u2019 election campaign (Figure 2<\/strong>).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\"\"Fig. 2. <\/strong>Distribution of electoral preferences in the Republic of Armenia (July 2025).
\nSource:<\/strong> https:\/\/www.iri.org\/resources\/public-opinion-survey-residents-of-armenia-june-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n

The fact is that the political situation in Armenia after 2018 was \u201cabnormal\u201d. High expectations were formed under the influence of post-revolutionary euphoria, and the defeat in the war created a new anomalous reality with high levels of indifference to political processes and distrust. At the same time, trust in the government and the National Assembly is now at the level of 2010\u20132012 (Figure 3<\/strong>), which in the past allowed the ruling party to retain power. The \u201cnormalization<\/em>\u201d of the political situation is expressed in the fact that even with a low level of trust, the authorities are able to reproduce their power through administrative resources, electoral passivity, and weak competition. Unlike the period of post-revolutionary mobilization (2018\u20132020), when the legitimacy of the government was based on mass enthusiasm, today the factor of its stability is institutional control over the election process and society’s habituation to minimal standards of stability.<\/p>\n

\"\"
\nFig. 3. <\/strong>Level of trust in the Government and the National Assembly in Armenia, %.
\nSource:<\/strong> https:\/\/caucasusbarometer.org\/en\/cb-am\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, the Prime Minister\u2019s election campaign is built on presenting the \u200b\u200b”peace agenda<\/em>” as a fait accompli. However, a clash between inflated expectations and the ongoing conflict could undermine this strategy, as Armenia has virtually no leverage over regional processes. As a result, the isolation of the domestic agenda from international processes reduces the election to the task of preserving power without guarantees of real peace. This leads to a kind of \u201cvirtualization\u201d of politics, where categories like \u201cthe European path\u201d<\/em> \u201cenhancing sovereignty<\/em>\u201d, and \u201cunblocking communications<\/em>\u201d become declarative. However, a society tired of uncertainty may accept this situation as a means of stabilization, which, in turn, may push the opposition towards more “constructive” steps.<\/p>\n

\u201cNormalization<\/em>\u201d is accompanied by the consolidation of parties loyal to the government. Thus, in 2024\u20132025, as part of the EU accession campaign, the \u201cEuro-bloc<\/em>\u201d, which served more of a PR function. Furthermore, the presence of pro-Western (anti-Russian) forces in Armenia\u2019s political landscape significantly expands the ruling party’s room for maneuver. The emergence of a new (conditionally pro-Russian) force led by Samvel Karapetyan \u2013 \u201cMer dzevov<\/em>\u201d (\u201cIn our way<\/em>\u201d) \u2013 also indicates a renewal of the political landscape, but the ruling elite remains the primary moderator of these processes.<\/p>\n

Other opposition parties face the problem of reconfiguration. The conflict between the \u201cArmenia\u201d bloc and the Republican Party hinders their consolidation, although both structures are traditionally considered pro-Russian. The most clearly pro-Russian position today is expressed by the supporters of R. Kocharyan. The \u201cDashnaktsutyun\u201d party combines harsh opposition to the current government with a course of maintaining a strategic alliance with Russia and concluding an alliance treaty with Iran, turning radical rhetoric into an instrument of institutional struggle.<\/p>\n

Thus, foreign policy is seen as a resource in domestic political struggle, which, in turn, allows other countries to influence the electoral process in Armenia and its politics as a whole.<\/p>\n

Sources of external legitimacy<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The August summit in Washington can be seen as an important source of external legitimacy for the current government, logically fitting into the peace agenda and the discussion of the republic\u2019s economic future (unblocking communications). The fact is that the parties to the conflict had different interests in initialing the peace treaty and agreeing to the \u201cTrump Path<\/em>\u201d. In short, the Armenian side sought to use the summit\u2019s results in its election campaign, while Baku aimed to use it to increase pressure on Armenia if necessary and to mobilize its population around another foreign policy \u201cvictory<\/em>\u201d. However, both agendas are intertwined in the context of the upcoming elections in Armenia, as Baku links the final signing of the peace treaty to changes in the RA Constitution.<\/p>\n

Notably, the establishment of contacts with Turkey is being used by the Armenian authorities as an additional political resource in the election campaign. \u00a0However, this strategy increases Yerevan\u2019s dependence on the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. If in the past Ankara directly linked the opening of the border to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, today this linkage has become more complex: the Armenian leadership\u2019s attempt to convert improved relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan into domestic political capital is embedded in the general context of trilateral relations, where Armenia remains the weakest link.<\/p>\n

Paradoxically, relations with France and India, which were emphasized as part of Armenia’s foreign policy diversification, have now receded into the background, and political interaction with Iran is not being promoted in the context of the domestic political struggle.<\/p>\n

Thus, external legitimacy in the upcoming campaign is formed through symbolic and institutional rapprochement with the West, as well as attempts by the authorities to use the normalization of relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan as confirmation of their \u201cpeace agenda<\/em>\u201d. However, it is the Russian factor that requires separate consideration. Unlike the EU and the U.S., which are strengthening their institutional presence, or Turkey and Azerbaijan, which are active moderators of the regional processes, Russia has transformed from a strategic ally into a variable, that causes sharp domestic political disputes and has become a factor in the revision of the traditional model of complementarism.<\/p>\n

The symbolic meaning of the Russian factor<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The Russian factor in Armenian politics today has largely lost its practical basis but retains an important symbolic dimension. For part of society and the opposition forces, Russia continues to be associated with a \u201ctraditional ally<\/em>\u201d and a guarantor of security, even if this status is gradually changing. For the government, distancing from Moscow becomes a symbol of a new course, a demonstration of “sovereignty” and an orientation towards the West.<\/p>\n

In the election campaign, Russia is more of a marker of political identity than a real source of resources:<\/p>\n