{"id":17497,"date":"2025-09-05T01:02:38","date_gmt":"2025-09-04T21:02:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/?p=17497"},"modified":"2025-10-13T22:24:03","modified_gmt":"2025-10-13T18:24:03","slug":"georgia-and-the-indivisibility-of-the-south-caucasus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgia-and-the-indivisibility-of-the-south-caucasus\/","title":{"rendered":"Georgia and the indivisibility of the South Caucasus"},"content":{"rendered":"

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ARVAK Center comment, 05.09.2025[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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Analysis of the situation<\/h4>\n

In late August, discussions in Georgia were once again re-actualized regarding how Western countries sought to compel Tbilisi to initiate a so-called \u201csecond front\u201d against Russia, which, in parallel with the Ukrainian front, was intended to deplete Moscow and disperse its military resources. In particular, on August 26, 2025, the General Secretary of the ruling party \u201cGeorgian Dream\u2013Democratic Georgia\u201d and Mayor of Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, issued a resonant statement. According to him, direct \u201cthreats, blackmail, and insults<\/em>\u201d were articulated in the Georgian Prime Minister\u2019s office at the time. Kaladze pledged to publish evidence of this if necessary[2]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Since the beginning of Russia\u2019s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine (February 24, 2022), Georgian authorities have repeatedly stated that the EU, the Biden Administration, and indeed, official Kyiv have been exerting permanent pressure on Tbilisi on this matter. This was stated at various times by former Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili[3]<\/sup><\/a> (2021\u20132024), his successor Irakli Kobakhidze[4]<\/sup><\/a>, and the founder of the \u201cGeorgian Dream\u201d party himself, Bidzina Ivanishvili[5]<\/sup><\/a>, who is considered the de facto<\/em> leader of the republic and the main opponent of pro-Western factions in Georgia. The current statement by the General Secretary of the ruling party is notable because he for the first time revealed the existence of specific evidence, which suggests that the Georgian side prudently recorded the scandalous negotiations in the \u201cPrime Minister\u2019s office<\/em>\u201d. It should be assumed that the publication of these materials could seriously undermine the image of a \u201cpeace-loving and democratic<\/em>\u201d West and also influence the paradigm of the current U.S.\u2013Russia relations, which, at least on a declarative level, are seeking ways to de-escalate tensions in Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

Geopolitical context & Georgia\u2019s countermeasures<\/h4>\n

In light of the above, Kaladze\u2019s statement can be interpreted as a counter-blackmail in response to EU threats to annul the visa-free regime with Georgia, which was established in 2017. Earlier, on July 15, 2025, the EU\u2019s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, issued an ultimatum to Tbilisi demanding that by August 31, 2025, it must repeal the new \u201cLaw on Foreign Agents<\/em>\u201d and annul the legislative package \u201cOn Family Values and the Protection of Minors<\/em>\u201d, which is seen as infringing on the rights of LGBTQ+ people. Otherwise, Brussels promised to \u201ctake appropriate measures on the basis of Article 8 of the Visa Regulation, in particular, to activate the suspension mechanism of the visa-free regime<\/em>\u201d[6]<\/sup><\/a>. In a broader sense, the EU\u2019s cancellation of the visa-free regime with Georgia would outline the prospect of the EU withdrawing from the \u201cAssociation Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area<\/em>\u201d, which is a key stage on this South Caucasus republic\u2019s path to integration into a unified Europe.<\/p>\n

Kaladze\u2019s warning regarding Tbilisi\u2019s readiness to disseminate the aforementioned materials, coupled with his assurances that such action is presently unnecessary, may suggest Georgia\u2019s confidence that the EU will not revoke the visa-free regime upon the expiration of the ultimatum. Furthermore, merely days before the ultimatum\u2019s deadline, Georgian authorities conspicuously confiscated the bank accounts of several prominent NGOs under the EU\u2019s patronage, accusing them of \u201cactions against the constitutional order<\/em>\u201d. This diplomatic gesture by Tbilisi can be construed as a demonstration of disregard for Brussels and its admonitions. It is probable that the current Georgian authorities possess ample justification to anticipate that the EU and the Donald Trump administration, which has expressed solidarity on this matter, will not escalate beyond their current warnings. Even pro-Western Georgian political figures and experts concede that a consensus within a unified Europe on the Georgian issue is absent, with a number of EU member states unequivocally opposing drastic measures against \u201crecalcitrant<\/em>\u201d Tbilisi. Therefore, it was clear long before Kallas\u2019s ultimatum that Brussels, at least for now, was not ready for radical countermeasures.<\/p>\n

Consequently, it can be posited that the impactful declaration by the \u201cGeorgian Dream\u201d Secretary General, which alluded to coercion regarding a \u201csecond front\u201d<\/em>, was directed not solely, and perhaps not primarily, at the collective West, but also at other regional nations of interest to the United States, and particularly to the United Kingdom and the European Union, within the framework of strategies to orchestrate a new proxy conflict against the Russian Federation. While Georgia has unequivocally declined involvement in such an undertaking, Tbilisi possesses a clear comprehension that another locus of anti-Russian sentiment is emerging in the region, seemingly being deliberately fomented by the aforementioned Western centers.<\/p>\n

The approaching \u201csecond front\u201d & the parties\u2019 reactions<\/h4>\n

It is noteworthy that discussions in Tbilisi regarding the \u201csecond front<\/em>\u201d have intensified amidst the peak of the crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Significantly, the Secretary General of Georgia\u2019s ruling party reiterated concerns about the West\u2019s alleged desire to draw the South Caucasus into a destructive conflict merely one day prior to Ilham Aliyev\u2019s forceful anti-Russian declarations. On August 27, 2025, during an interview with the Arabic-language TV channel Al-Arabiya<\/em>, Aliyev accused Soviet Russia of occupying Azerbaijan in 1920, asserting that this historical event is the genesis of the \u201cZangezur Corridor<\/em>\u201d[7]<\/sup><\/a> problem. This was not merely a historical overview but a pointed suggestion that Russia is purportedly a historically \u201coccupying country<\/em>\u201d. As substantiation, Aliyev directly characterized Russia’s current actions in Ukraine as an \u201cinvasion\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Tbilisi appears to believe that a \u201csecond front<\/em>\u201d is rapidly forming through Azerbaijan, a development that Western actors had previously been unable to establish along the Russian-Georgian border. It is noteworthy that, unlike the winter of 2024\u20132025, when the situation stabilized somewhat after a political and diplomatic crisis concerning the downing of the AZAL<\/em> aircraft, the current conflict is escalating. This is further substantiated by the absence of bilateral discussions between Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China, an opportunity they could have utilized if there were a genuine mutual desire to de-escalate the situation. While some Russian media outlets have suggested that Aliyev attempted such discussions[8]<\/sup><\/a>, these claims are questionable, particularly given that the Azerbaijani leader seemingly deliberately scheduled his essentially Russophobic interview with Al-Arabiya<\/em> just days before the summit in Tianjin, China.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the trajectory of the crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations has so far been managed by Moscow and Baku. Both sides retain room for maneuver and the possibility of de-escalation as long as the \u201cDeclaration on Allied Interaction between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan<\/em>\u201d of February 22, 2022, remains in force de jure<\/em>[9]<\/sup><\/a>. However, observers in the expert community fear that the situation could reach a point of bifurcation where control over events is lost. This could be facilitated primarily by Azerbaijan\u2019s partners and allies in the West, as well as by Turkey and Israel, all of whom exert significant influence on Baku\u2019s foreign policy maneuvers.<\/p>\n

The threat of the South Caucasus\u2019s indivisibility<\/strong><\/h4>\n

According to the virtually unanimous opinion of independent experts, Aliyev\u2019s regime, due to objective and subjective reasons, is more dependent on external interference than the \u201cGeorgian Dream\u201d party, which is in power in Georgia. Azerbaijan\u2019s total energy and resource dependency on the Western bloc, its investment dependency on British, European, and American corporations and banks, and Turkish-Israeli patronage over its defense sector have effectively deprived the Caspian republic of the ability to maintain balanced relations with Russia and Iran, against which the Western bloc and its allies in the Middle East are pursuing an extremely aggressive \u201ccontainment policy<\/em>\u201d. In this context, the factor of the Aliyev clan\u2019s personal financial interests, which are tightly linked to Western offshore accounts and an extensive list of elite real estate in Europe, also plays a major role. This inevitably creates a situation where the subjective interests of the ruling regime exert a dominant influence on the country\u2019s foreign policy course and can often contradict the pragmatism of the state interests. In this regard, Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be a stronger figure than Ilham Aliyev, who is more susceptible to manipulation by Western powers. This may explain why Russian politicians have attributed the Russian-Azerbaijani crisis to Western influence, a view often met with skepticism. However, Aliyev’s lack of independence is arguably substantiated by his strong anti-Russian rhetoric, which seems to conflict with Azerbaijan’s long-term interests in a volatile security region.<\/p>\n

Currently, the topic of an impending Russian-Azerbaijani military clash is no longer taboo in the official media of Moscow and Baku. Azerbaijani politicians and pro-government propagandists increasingly mention Russia\u2019s \u201coccupation policy<\/em>\u201d, \u201cAzerbaijani Derbent<\/em>\u201d that was supposedly taken away, the need to establish NATO bases in the republic, and the intensification of work to create a so-called \u201cTuran army<\/em>\u201d. In turn, the Russian side, represented by independent politicians, Duma deputies, and experts, is also sharpening its rhetoric about a \u201csecond front<\/em>\u201d, which they claim is an inevitability caused by \u201cBaku\u2019s ill-considered policy, instigated by the West<\/em>\u201d[10]<\/sup><\/a>. Some Russian analysts are now openly analyzing data on the potential and strength of the Azerbaijani armed forces, considering the likelihood of assistance from Ankara and other allies of Baku, and predicting the outcome of a Russian-Azerbaijani military conflict[11]<\/sup><\/a>. Thus, the verbal representations of a \u201csecond front<\/em>\u201d or a \u201csouthern front<\/em>\u201d in the international media space are already acquiring concrete contours and geography.<\/p>\n

Returning to the conflict between Georgia and the collective West, one might assume that Tbilisi believes it was able to avoid the threat of becoming an arena for military action against Russia at the cost of worsening relations with the EU. In reality, however, the situation is much more complex, both theoretically and practically.<\/p>\n

The indivisible geography of the South Caucasus dictates that a hypothetical military confrontation between major interested powers would extend beyond initial engagements. A clash between Moscow and Baku, for instance, would not be confined to the Russian-Azerbaijani border; it would invariably engulf the entire Black Sea-Caspian region, encompassing not only the Greater Caucasus but also the southern flank along the Armenian-Turkish and Georgian-Turkish borders. This is due to the fundamental stakes involved: not merely the future of Russian-Azerbaijani relations or the fate of Azerbaijan, but the broader question of undivided dominance and military presence in the entire region by either Russia or the Western bloc, acting through Turkey. Consequently, Georgia’s resolute stance, while shifting the geopolitical front eastward from its immediate territory, would not ultimately insulate Tbilisi from the pervasive threat of a large-scale regional conflict.<\/p>\n

Back in August 2014, when Russia began intensive work on the construction of the high-altitude \u201cAvaro-Kakhetian road<\/em>\u201d through Dagestan to the Georgian border, Tbilisi was deeply concerned about this project. Despite Russian assurances that the highway with dozens of bridges and tunnels through gorges and mountain ridges would be intended for mutually beneficial communication and trade, Tbilisi increasingly, and not without objective reasons, began to talk about its military purpose[12]<\/sup><\/a>. The project was also met with alarm in Baku, where it was noted that the road was the shortest and most convenient route for Russia through Georgia\u2019s Kakheti region to Azerbaijan\u2019s Zakataly region and the western borders of Azerbaijan stretching along the Kura Valley, which are most vulnerable due to the absence of natural barriers for effective defense.<\/p>\n

At the time, Azerbaijan\u2019s regime tried not to publicize its concerns, likely not wanting to jeopardize the positive momentum in its relationship with Moscow. Tbilisi was more resolute on this issue amid the political and diplomatic crisis that followed the \u201cAugust War\u201d of 2008. However, no signals had any effect on Moscow, and the \u201cAvaro-Kakhetian road<\/em>\u201d, dubbed a \u201cmilitary project<\/em>\u201d aimed at a rapid invasion into the heart of the South Caucasus, was built in record time. Now, Tbilisi senses a symmetrical threat from Turkey, which, in the event of a Russian-Azerbaijani conflict, and in accordance with the provisions of the \u201cShushi Declaration<\/em>\u201d of June 16, 2021[13]<\/sup><\/a>, would be obliged to come to the defense of its ally. In this case, Georgia, against its will, would become the main logistical artery for providing forces and means to the warring powers, and thus an immediate arena for intense military action and an integral part of the \u201csecond front<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

The indivisibility of the political geography of the South Caucasus is beyond doubt, as is the axiomatic assertion that a war in this region would encompass all its borders and have a total character. The permanent signals from Tbilisi mentioning Western blackmail over a \u201csecond front<\/em>\u201d evidently indicate that Tbilisi is trying to warn its immediate neighbors in the region about a catastrophe that threatens everyone equally.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> The original (in Rus.) was posted on our website on 05.09.2025.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cTbilisi Mayor Announces West’s Demand to Open \u2018Second Front\u2019 Against Russia\u201d. Kommersant (in Rus.), 26.08.2025, https:\/\/www.kommersant.ru\/doc\/7990399<\/a> (download date: 02.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThe Second Front Against Russia\u201d. What They Say About It in Georgia. Gazeta.ru (in Rus.), 18.11.2022, https:\/\/www.gazeta.ru\/politics\/2022\/11\/18\/15804997.shtml<\/a> (download date: 02.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cKobakhidze made a statement about a second front against Russia\u201d. RIA NOVOSTI (in Rus.), 23.02.2025, https:\/\/ria.ru\/20250223\/front-2001110435.html<\/a> (download date: 02.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIvanishvili announced a proposal to fight with Russia for three to four days\u201d. RBC (in Rus.), 21.10.2024, https:\/\/www.rbc.ru\/politics\/21\/10\/2024\/6716a71c9a794727b423696b<\/a> (download date: 02.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> Barateli I., \u201cVisa-free travel in question\u201d. Novaya Gazeta Evropa (in Rus.), 31.08.2025, https:\/\/novayagazeta.eu\/articles\/2025\/08\/31\/bezviz-pod-voprosom<\/a> (download date: 02.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIlham Aliyev accused Russia of occupying Azerbaijan in 1920\u201d. NEWSRU.CO.IL (in Rus.), 28.08.2025, https:\/\/www.newsru.co.il\/world\/28aug2025\/az_202.html<\/a> (download date: 02.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cAliyev, who failed at the SCO summit, hopes to meet Putin in Beijing: will the Russian president agree to save his tomatoes?\u201d. Bloknot Russia (in Rus.), 02.09.2025, https:\/\/bloknot.ru\/obshhestvo\/provalivshijsya-na<\/a>-sammite-shos-aliev-nadeetsya-na-vstrechu-s-putinym-v-pekine-soglasitsya-li-prezident-rossii-spasat-ego-pomi dory-1451287.html<\/a> (download date: 03.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cDeclaration on Allied Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan\u201d. Kremlin.ru<\/a> (in Rus.), 22.02.2022, http:\/\/kremlin.ru\/supplement\/5777<\/a> (download date: 03.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> Stolyarov M., \u201cThe Second Front\u201d \u2013 Transcaucasian? Why Azerbaijan Chooses the Path of Militarization\u201d. Stoletie.ru (in Rus.), 25.08.2025, https:\/\/www.stoletie.ru\/tekuschiiy_moment\/vtoroj_front__za<\/a>kavkazskij _666.htm<\/a> (download date: 03.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThe army has been mobilized; the plan has been drawn up. Aliyev has already worked out the attack. What should Russia expect?\u201d Tsargrad (in Rus.), 27.08.2025, https:\/\/tsargrad.tv\/dzen\/armija-mobilizovana-plan-svjorstan-aliev-uzhe-otrabotal-napadenie-chego-zhdat-rossii_1350928<\/a> (date accessed: 03.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cAvar-Kakheti road: threats and opportunities\u201d. Regional Dialogue (in Rus.), 11.12.2014, https:\/\/regional-dialogue.com\/ru\/avaro-kakhetskaia-doroga\/<\/a> (download date: 03.09.2025).<\/p>\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cShusha Declaration on allied relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey\u201d. Prezident.az, 16.06.2021, https:\/\/president.az\/ru\/articles\/view\/52122<\/a> (download date: 03.09.2025).<\/p>\n

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[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=”” woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] ARVAK Center comment, 05.09.2025[1] [\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=”” woodmart_inline=”no” text_larger=”no”] Analysis of the situation In late August, discussions<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":17469,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[143],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-17497","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-comments"],"yoast_head":"\nGeorgia and the indivisibility of the South Caucasus - \u0531\u2024\u054c\u2024\u054e\u2024\u0531\u2024\u053f\u2024<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/arvak.am\/en\/georgia-and-the-indivisibility-of-the-south-caucasus\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Georgia and the indivisibility of the South Caucasus - 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